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Commanding General, 
United States Army, 

Senior Leader Staff Ride 



The American Soldier 
SSG Joseph Arnaldo, New Bedford, Mass., 
Infantry squad leader, comes off the line 
after 10 days in the Ardennes, 30 December 1944 

(from "A Time for Trumpets", Charles B. MacDonald) 

World War II & Battle of the Bulge Chronologies TAB A 

World War II Allied Conferences TAB B 

Allied Command Architecture & Order of Battle TAB C 

The U.S. Army in December 1944 TAB D 

Biographical Sketches - Senior Allied Commanders TAB E 

German Command Architecture & Order of Battle TAB F 

The German Army in December 1944 TAB G 

Biographical Sketches - Senior German Commanders TAB H 

Comparative Military Officers' Ranks TAB I 

Equipment TAB J 

The Defense of Bastogne TAB K 

Casualties, Medical Statistics & Battle Losses TAB L 

Suggestions for Further Reading TAB M 

Glossary TAB N 

Code Names TAB O 

Tab A 

World War II & Battle of the Bulge Chronologies 

"But war is a ruth/ess taskmaster, demanding success 

regard/ess of confusion, shortness of time, and 
paucity of tools. Exact justice for the individual and 
a careful consideration of his rights is impossible. 
One man sacrifices his life on the battlefield and 
another sacrifices his reputation elsewhere, both 
in the same cause. The hurly burly of the conflict 
does not permit commanders to draw fine 
d is tin ctions. To succeed, th ey m ust dem an d 
results, close their ears to excuses, and drive 
subordinates beyond what would ordinarily be 
considered th e Urn it of human capacity. Wars 
are won by the side that accomplishes the 
impossible. Battles are decided in favor of troops 

whose bravery, fortitude, and especially, 
whose endurance surpasses that of the enemy's: 
the army with the higher breaking point wins. " 

General George Marshall 


World War II Chronology 


Global Events 

Western Front 


Eastern Front 

Southwest Pacific 

Central Pacific 






UK & FR declare 
war on GE 

invade, divide 

War (19; 


British Army 
deploys to France 

Russo-Finish War 



Churchill becomes 
Prime Minister 

GE occupies 
Denmark, invades 


GE invades NL, 

USSR occupies 

Romanian territory 


FR falls; British 
Army evacuated 
from Dunkerque 

Italy declares war 
on UK, FR 


GE begins air 
attacks against UK 

British Fleet 
attacks IT Fleet 


Battle o 

: Britain 

Italy invades Egypt 
from Libya 


JA invades Indo- 


GE, IT, JA form 
Axis Pact 


IT invades Greece 

GE troops enter 
Romania to protect 
oil fields 


HU, RO join Axis 

UK attacks IT fleet 
at Trianto 


GE reinforces IT in 

British open drive 
in North Africa 


vv t?o lci ii niuiii 

ftfl & rl i t o r r a n o a n 

IVICU 1 ICI 1 dl ICdl 1 

Qm ithuisoct Pacific 


Oontral Paoifir* 

Vsdllldl rdOIIIU 

f"*h i na / Ri i rma / 

V/l III Id/ DU 1 1 lid/ 



US passes Lend- 


Russo-JA non- 
aggression pact 

GE invades 

BEF withdrawn 
from GR 

cit reinT 1 1 in Norm 
Africa; Rommel's 
1 st Offensive 


GE attacks Crete 


GE invades USSR 


US declares oil 
embargo vs JA 


GE torpedo atk on 
USS Green opens 
undeclared war in 
North Atlantic 




GE, IT declare 
war on US 

German offensive 
stopped before 


JA Atks Philippines 

JA Atks Pearl 

JA alliance with 

Anglo-Amer Conf 

British drive for 




UN declaration 
signed by 26 

Rommel's 2d 
Offensive begins 

Soviet Winter 
Offensive makes 
limited gains 

US & Filipino 
withdraw to Bataan 

Combined Chiefs 
of Staff activated 

JA captures Br N. 
Borneo, Invades 



JA occupies 

Gen MacArthur 
reaches Australia 





Doolittle Raid (on 


US surrender in 

Battle of Coral Sea 



Global Events 

Western Front 


Eastern Front 

Southwest Pacific 

Central Pacific 



Rommel opens 
drive into Egypt 

GE Summer 
Offensive in 
southwest USSR 

Battle of Midway 

Tobruk falls to Axis 


BR-US decision to 
invade N. Africa 

GE captures 

JA invades New 


Allies raid Dieppe, 

US landings on 


Battle of 

Stalingrad begins 


BR attack at El 

US Naval victory in 
ooiomon isianos 


Allied landings at 
Casablanca, Oran, 

A In i Q ro 
MIL) lUlb 


GE moves into 
unoccupied FR 

French resistance 
in N. Africa ends 



Allied Conference 
at Casablanca 

US Air Force joins 
bombardment of 

Russian Leningrad 


Rommel breaks 
through Kasserine 
Pass, Tunisia 

Battle of Stalingrad 

Russian Campaign 
in Ukraine 

JA resistance ends 
on Guadalcanal 

Siege of Leningrad 







Conference in 

Axis forces in N 
Africa surrender 

Allies attack New 

ii ii 


— aTt ■ Ii — -1 

Allies invade Sicily 


Conference in 

GE abandon 

Fall of Mussolini 

Allied victory in 


GE reinforces IT 


IT declares war on 

Allied landings in 

Australian victory 
at Finschhafen, 
New Guinea 

Stillwell's Burma 
Campaign begins 



Global Events 

Western Front 


Eastern Front 

Southwest Pacific 

Central Pacific 





UN Relief and 




Winter Line 

Allies invade 
Bougainville & 


Soviets begin 
Winter Offensive 



Landings at Anzio 

Soviet offensive 
enters Estonia 

Allied attack at 
Rapido River (IT) 


Allied bombing 
focuses on GE 
aircraft production 

Invasion of 
Marshall Islands 


Attack on Cassino 

Soviets drive into 

Rabaul falls 

Attacks on Truk in 
Caroline Islands 

Merrill's Marauders 
advance into 
Hukwang Valley 

Invasion of 
Admiralty Islands 

Japanese Imphal- 
Kohima Offensive 


UN Organization 
for Educational 
and Cultural 

Strategic bombing 
priorities shift to 
support Normandy 

Allies attack 
Gustav line in IT 

Odessa retaken by 

Allied landings in 
New Guinea 

Myitkina airfield 
captured by Allies 


Normandy Invaded 

Rome liberated 

Major Soviet 
offensive in Central 
Region and in 

JA fleet loses 
heavily in Battle of 
Philippine Sea 

Strategic bombing 
campaign against 
Japan begins 

GE launches first V 
weapons against 


UN Monetary and 
(Bretton Woods); 
creates IMF and 
World Bank 

Breakout from 

Florence liberated 

Warsaw uprising 

Marianas invaded 

Slim's Burma 
Offensive begins 



Global Events 

Western Front 


Eastern Front 

Southwest Pacific 

Central Pacific 



Allies rush for 
Seine River 

Allies land in 
Southern France 


Guam liberated 

JA invaders driven 
back from Indian 

Soviets reach East 


UNRRA allocated 
$50m to IT - first 
commitment to 
former enemy 

Brussels liberated 
Market Garden 

Soviets declare 
war on Bulgaria 

Landinas in 

LUI 1 1 1 V_J O II 1 

Caroline Islands 


German defense of 
German soil 


Dumbarton Oaks 
lays permanent 
UN groundwork 

Forces from 
Southern France 
link up with Forces 
from Normandy 

Soviets reach 
and Poland 

Leyte Invasion; JA 
Fleet suffers major 

Begin final major 

Allied Offensives 
bog down 


Saipan airfields 
open for Allied 
bombing campaign 



Battle of the Bulge 



Global Events 

Western Front 


Eastern Front 

Southwest Pacific 

Central Pacific 




Soviet Winter 
Offensive liberates 

US landings on 


Yalta Conference 

Allies defeat 
Colmar pocket; 
end Battle of the 

5th Army offensive 
in northern IT 

Budapest liberated 

Battle for Manila 

Landings on Iwo 


US 9th Army drives 
to Rhine; 9 th Arm 
Div crosses at 

Soviets capture 

Manila liberated 

Koln falls 

Soviets advance in 
Czech, Hungary, 

Landings on 


Roosevelt dies; 
Truman US 

US, UK forces 
cross Rhine in 

5th Army crosses 
Po River 

GE resistance in 
East Prussia ends 

San Francisco 
conference drafts 
UN Charter 

US units reach 
Elbe River 

Vienna falls 


V-E Day 

War ends 

War ends 

Soviets capture 
Berlin; war ends 

Resistance ends 
on Mindanao 

Resistance ends 
on Okinawa 

British capture 



Carrier based 
planes join attack 
against Japan 

Clement Atlee 
replaces Churchill 


Atomic bombing 
of Japan 



war ends 

war ends 

war ends 


Battle of the Bulge Chronology 


• June 6 - OPERATION OVERLORD, Allied forces invade French coast in Normandy. 

• July 3 - Field Marshall Gunther von Kluge replaces Gerd von Rundstedt as CINC-West. 

• July 25 - Operation Cobra, US First Army breaks out of coastal enclave. 

• August 1 - HQ, 12th Army Group activated, LTG Bradley commander; LTG Hodges assumes command US First 
Army, (V, VII & XIX Corps); US Third Army activated, LTG Patton commander, (VIII, XII, XX, & XV Corps). 

• August 15 - US Seventh Army, LTG Patch (US VI, French I and II Corps; later US XV Corps) lands in southern France 
in Operation Anvil-Dragoon. 

• 1 7 August - Field Marshall Model replaces von Kluge as Commander OB West. 

• 31 August - HQ 6th Army Group LTG Devers, comes ashore and takes command in southern France. First French 
Arm, GEN de Lattre de Tassigny, assumes command of I & II Fr Corps. 

• 1 September - GEN Eisenhower (SHAEF) assumes direct command of 12th Army Group from GEN Montgomery. 

• 1 September - Field Marshall von Runstedt reappointed CINC West. 

• 9 September - HQ, US Ninth Army, LTG Simpson, activated. VIII Corps assigned with mission to secure Brittany 
Peninsula and port of Brest. 

• 1 September - US Seventh Army makes contact with US Third Army. GEN Bradley orders attack on 1 4 Sept thru 
West Wall: First Army seize crossing over the Rhine Cologne-Bonn-Coblenz; Third Army at Mannheim. Plans are 
aborted because of supply difficulties. V Corps arrives line Regne-Bastogne-Longvilly-Wiltz-Selagne-Arlon-Luxemburg 

• 1 1 September - Recon patrol of 5th AD makes first entry into Germany. 

• 1 2 September - V Corps' 4th ID takes St. Vith. 28th ID crosses Our River and takes Sevenig and positions west of 


16 September - Hitler makes initial decision to conduct counteroffensive, directs planning to begin with 1 November as 
attack date. 

17 September - Operations Market and Garden begin; goal is to secure axis across the Rhine River. 4th ID V Corps 
attempts to take Schnee Eifel and Brandscheid. 

19 September - 4th ID repels German counterattack, gets onto Schnee Eifel. 

22 September - Supply difficulties force GEN Eisenhower to make Antwerp principle objective for Allied Forces. All 
other attacks are limited. 

26 September - US Ninth Army assigned sector on south of First Army, VIII Corps begins movement from Brest. 
4 October - VIII Corps takes relives V Corps in Ardennes. V Corps shifts left towards Monshau-Losheim. 

6 October - MG Gerow returns from testifying in Washington, resumes command V Corps. 

1 5 October - Newly arrived 9th AD is assigned to VIII for training. 

1 8 October - GEN Eisenhower issues plan for offensive. 21 st Army group priority is open Antwerp. 1 2th Army group 
is to cross Rhine vie Cologne between 1-5 November. 

21 October - GEN Bradley orders US First and Ninth Armies attack 5 November; US Third Army attack 10 November. 
Aachen surrenders to First Army. 

22 October - US Ninth Army reassigned sector north of US First Army with XIX Corps. 

2 November - US First Army begins new offensive in Hurtgen. 
9 November - Third Army begins major attack towards Sarre. 

13 November - 82d A/BD is relieved in Holland and moves to reserve and reconstitute. 

14 November - 8th ID begins replace 28th ID in Hurtgen; starts move to VIII Sector to reconstitute. 

16 November - First and Ninth Armies open Operation Queen to close to Rhine River. 

19 November - 8th ID completes relief of 28th ID. 

27 November - 101 A/BD is relieved in Holland and reverts to reserve for reconstitution. 

28 November - Antwerp begins operations as major source of supplies for Allied Armies. 

3 December - 83d ID from VIII sector begins relief of 4th ID in Hurtgen, moves to VIII to reconstitute. 
11 December - 106th ID, with 14th CavGp attached, relieve 2d ID in Ardennes. 


• 1 3 December - V Corps' 2d ID, 78th ID, and 99th ID attack to take Roer and Urft Dams. US Third Army begins 
assault over Sarre Rive at Sarrelautern. 

• 1 6 December - Battle of the Bulge begins with attacks by Sixth & Fifth Panzer and Seventh Armies. 2d ID continues 
attack towards Wahlerscheid. 78th ID repels German attack vie. Rollesbrioch, unable take Kesternach. 99th ID holds in 
north but is forced back in south. 106th ID & 28th ID, attacked and forced back. 4th ID, and 9th AD attacked but 
generally hold. CCB 9th AD attached 106th ID to assist at St. Vith. 1st ID released by VII Corps; 10th AD released by 
XX Corps. 

• 17 December - 82 A/BD and 101 A/BD released from SHAEF Reserve and ordered to Ardennes. Ninth Army 
releases 7th AD to VIII Corps and 30th ID to V Corps. 9th ID (VII) releases 47th IR to V Corps, moves to Eupen. 26th 
IR (1 st ID) attached to 99th ID. 14th Cav Gp falls back on VIII north flank. 422d and 423th IR's (106th ID) isolated on 
Schnee Eifel. 277th VGD and 12th SS Pz (1SS Pz Korps) fail to penetrate to Elsenborn. 3d Para and 1st SS Pz breaks 
thru along Rollbahn D to Honsfeld & Bullingen, turn SW. 18th VGD attacks N and S around Schnee Eifel. Elements of 
7th AD and 9th AD committed defense of St. Vith. 28th ID falls back slowly as LVIII SS and XLVII Pz Korps push 
towards Skyline Drive. CCR, 9th AD released by VII Corps to block Bastogne-Trois Vierges road. 4th ID stops LXXX 
and LIN Korps' attacks vie. Osweiler and Dickweiler. 10th AD elements arrive Luxembourg City. 

• 1 8 December - VII extends south taking over part of V Corps sector, takes control of 8th ID and 78th ID; releases CCA 
3d AD and 9th ID to V Corps. V Corps works to stabilize line Monshau-Buetgenbach-Malmedy-Stavelot; holds at 
Butgenback and Elsenborn, but 1 st SS Pz penetrates south of Buetgenbach and Waimes. 26th IR reverts to 1st ID with 
mission to hold Buetgenbach to Waimes. 99th ID attached to Cdr, 2d ID. 30th ID recovers most of Stavelot, organizes 
defense of Malmedy-Stavelot. 422d IR and 423d IR (106th ID) attempt breakout from Schnee Eifel. 7th AD unable 
assist as engaged defending St. Vith. 28th ID disorganization nearly complete. 2 Pz Div and Pz Lehr smash almost to 
Bastogne-St Vith road thru CCR 9th AD. 4th ID and 10th AD south of breakthrough put under US Third Army. CCB 
10th AD remains with VIII to defend Bastogne. 

• 1 9 December - Allied commanders conferring at Verdun decide to halt offensives toward the Rhine and concentrate 
on reducing enemy salient in the Ardennes. Because of Ardennes counter-offensive, Field Marshal Montgomery orders 
XXX Corps, to assemble in Louvain-St Trond-Hasselt region to hold Meuse R line. US Ninth Army is ordered to go on 
the defensive. In US First Army area, VII Corps remains generally in place. In V Corps area, 2d and 99th IDs repel 
further attacks and start towards new defensive positions from which they will defend Elsenborn ridge. 9th ID (-47th IR, 
which is already in corps zone, and 60th IR) takes up defensive positions in 2d ID zone, relieving elements of 2d and 
99th IDs. 1st ID holds line E of Malmedy. CCA, 3d AD, relieves 18th IR, 1st ID, of defense of Eupen. 30th ID holds at 
Stavelot and engineers blow bridge across the Ambleve R there; keeps enemy from Stoumont in costly battle. CCB, 3d 
AD, is attached to corps to assist 30th ID. XVIII Corps (A/B) takes responsibility for region generally S of the Ambleve 
R, including Houffalize, key road center between St Vith and Bastogne, with mission of holding N Bank of enemy. 82d 


A/BD closing at Werbomont relieves 30th ID troops in that region. 3d AD, less CCA and CCB, passes to corps control 
and starts toward Hotton-Le Grand Pre area. In VIII Corps area, hope of relieving beleaguered 422d and 423d IRs of 
106th ID in the Schnee Eifel fades. 7th and 9th ADs are aggressively defending region just E of St Vith. 1 12th IR, 28th 
ID, is attached to I06th ID. 28th ID is ordered to abandon Wiltz and return to friendly lines by infiltration; withdraw from 
Diekirch area. 101st A/BD arrives at Bastogne, which enemy has almost encircled. Also employed in defense of 
Bastogne area are CCB of 1 0th AD and remnants of CCR, 9th AD, the latter coming under control of 1 01 st A/BD. US 
Third Army forms provisional corps from former First Army units S of the Ardennes salient, 4th ID and 10th AD (-CCB); 
the corps is to hold enemy on S Bank of the penetration and plug gap existing between it and elements of 9th AD and 
28th ID near Ettelbruck. XX Corps begins withdrawal from hard-won positions E the Sarre. Ill Corps is ordered N for 
attack against S flank of enemy in the "bulge". In XII Corps area, 35th ID halts attack to consolidate in preparation for 
relief. 4th AD and 80th ID are being transferred to III Corps. 

• 20 December - 21 st Army Group takes operational control of US forces N of Ardennes breakthrough, US Ninth and 
First Armies. In US Ninth Army's XIII Corps area, 84th ID is attached to First Army and starts to Marche (Belgium). 
1 02d ID takes responsibility for corps front. In XIX Corps area, 29th ID takes over defense of corps front. 2d AD is 
released as army reserve. In US First Army area, 2d and 99th IDs complete withdrawal to new defensive positions 
before Elsenborne Ridge and organize secondary defense lines. 277th and 12th SS Pz make slight penetration in line of 
99th ID W of Wirtzfeld but are sealed off and destroyed. 1st ID clears assigned region S of Eupen and contains attacks 
in Buetgenbach-Faymonville area. 9th ID takes over new zone on N Bank of corps. 30th ID, in Malmedy-Stavelot sector, 
is attached to XVIII Corps. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, CCB of 3d AD, is attached to 30th ID and assists in attack on La 
Gleize and Stoumont, which enemy defends effectively. Elements of 30th ID continue to defend Stavelot and Malmedy. 
3d AD (-CCA and CCB), upon closing in Hotton area, attacks eastward to secure Manhay-Houffalize road. 82d A/BD is 
attempting to establish contact with friendly forces in Vielsalm-St Vith area, pushing toward Vielsalm and Hebronval. VIII 
Corps units defending St Vith (7th AD, 106th ID, CCB of 9th AD, and 1 12th IR of 28th ID) pass to control of XVIII Corps. 
Enemy pressure on St Vith is undiminished. Elements of 1 0th AD, 1 01 st A/BD, and 705th TD Bn fight their way out of 
local encirclement on perimeter of larger encirclement of Bastogne area. 101st A/BD extends defensive line to W and 
SW of Bastogne, assisted by remnants of CCR, 9th AD, and CCB, 10th Armd Div, both of which are later attached to it, 
along with 705th TD Bn and stragglers from other units. Marvie, SE of Bastogne, is cleared in course of tank battle. 25 
miles SE of Bastogne, 109th IR of 28th ID establishes defensive line Ettelbruck-Oberfeulen-Merzig and also has forces 
near Ermsdorf backing up CCA of 9th AD, to which it is attached. Enemy now holds Waldbillig, 6 miles W of 
Echternach. SW of Bastogne, 28th ID HQ and remnants of 1 10th IR block Neufchateau-Bastogne highway. In effort to 
halt enemy, engineers block roads and demolish bridges as far W of Bastogne as St Hubert. During day, operational 
control of corps passes to Third Army. In US Third Army area, III Corps moves its HQ from Metz to Arlon (Belgium), and 
4th AD and 26th and 80th IDs are assembling in Arlon-Luxembourg area. Elements of CCB, 4th AD, push to Bastogne 
area and make contact with 1 01 st A/BD and 1 0th ADs are temporarily attached to VIII Corps. 80th ID takes up reserve 
battle positions on heights N and NE of Mersch. In Prov Corps area, LTG Patton strengthens corps by attaching 5th ID, 


CCA of 9th AD, and 109th IR of 28th ID. CCA, 9th AD is further attached to 10th AD. CCA, 10th AD, withdraws to 
assembly area as 4th ID moves up to take over its positions near Echternach. Tanks assist 12th IR of 4th ID in futile 
effort to relieve isolated infantry in Echternach. 

• 21 December -US Ninth Army is reinf by Br 51 st ID as its zone expands. XIX Corps releases 2d AD to First Army; 
takes over VII Corps sector at 2400. Under its command, in current positions, are 104th, 83d, 5th Armd (-CCR), 8th, 
and 78th IDs, from N to S. XIII Corps takes over former XIX Corps front and 29th ID. XVI Corps releases 75th ID to 
First Army. In US First Army 60th IR, 9th ID is detached from 104th ID and moves to Outlet in Belgium. VII Corps is to 
operate against N flank of German Salient. In V Corps area, 9th ID, reinf by 102d Cav Gp, rounds up enemy in 
Monschau area. 99th ID breaks up enemy formations with arty fire. CCA, 3d AD, reverts to parent unit and moves from 
Eupen to Werbomont area. 1st ID contains further attacks toward Elsenborn ridge. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, CCB of 
7th AD withdraws from St Vith at night; CCA contains attack near Poteau; CCR clears Vielsalm-Poteau road. CCB, 9th 
AD, is attached to 7th AD. 82d A/BD's 504th PIR clears Cheneux and Monceau, forcing enemy back across the 
Ambleve R; 505th improves positions from the Salm at Trois Ponts to vicinity of Grand Halleux; 508th and 325th Glider 
Inf occupy line Vielsalm-Hebronval-Regne, making no contact with enemy; div makes contact with friendly troops in St 
Vith area. 30th ID is unable to take La Gleize and Stoumont; continues to defend Stavelot and Malmedy. 3d AD, to 
which CCA reverts, contains enemy at Hotton; continues efforts to secure Manhay-Houffalize road. 84th ID is 
organizing perimeter defense of Marche. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, enemy lays siege to Bastogne and 
extends westward; crosses Neufchateau-Bastogne highway in force. Ammunition and food supplies of Bastogne 
garrison are running low. Prov Corps troops are transferred to XII Corps. CCA, 10th AD, tries unsuccessfully to recover 
Waldbillig. CCA of 9th AD and CCR of 10th AD are formed into CCX, 10th AD. 4th ID repels attacks toward Consdorf 
and Osweiler; is out of communication with troops in Echternach. 10 IR, 5th ID, is attached to 4th ID. XII Corps opens 
forward CP in Luxembourg. 

• 22 December - In First Army's V Corps area, Germans breach lines of 1st ID at Buetgenbach and of 9th ID in 
Monschau Forest but are unable to exploit their success. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, withdrawal of delaying forces in St 
Vith area through 82d A/BD line begins. 82d A/BD is under strong pressure along the Salm in Trois Ponts area. 30th ID 
column captures Stoumont. 3d AD maintains roadblocks at strategic points and attempts to clear Hotton area. VII 
Corps, reconstituted to consist of 75th and 84th IDs and 2d AD, is rapidly concentrating in Durbuy-Marche area of 
Belgium and organizing defensive line. 84th ID completes perimeter defense of Marche and establishes 
counterreconnaissance screen to Sand SW. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, Brig Gen McAuliffe, acting CG 101st 
A/BD, refuses German demand for surrender of Bastogne. Garrison is holding under heavy fire and sharp attacks. 28th 
ID troops blocking road SW out of Bastogne at Vaux-les-Rosieres are forced back to Neufchateau. US ammunition 
shortage is becoming acute and weather conditions prevent aerial resupply. Ill Corps begins northward drive to relieve 
Bastogne. On W, 4th AD columns reach Burnon and Martelange. 26th ID, to right, marches about 16 miles before 
making contact with enemy in Rambrouch-Grosbous area. After 5-mile advance, 80th ID runs into stiff resistance at 
Merzig and Ettelbruck but clears most of Merzig. XII Corps, in new zone along E border of Luxembourg, attacks with 4th 


ID SW of Echternach but is held to small gains. 10th AD maintains positions NE of Luxembourg and straightens lines. 
5th ID closes N of Luxembourg. 

• 23 December - In US First Army's V Corps area, 1st ID restores line at Buetgenbach, as does 9th ID in Monschau 
Forest. 60th IR reverts to 9th ID. 5th AD is attached to corps. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 7th AD, remnants of I06th ID, 
1 12th IR of 28th ID, and CCB of 9th AD withdraw from St Vith area as planned, moving through lines of 82d A/BD. 
Assault on La Gleize by 30th ID is unsuccessful. 3d AD passes to control of VII Corps in place. In VII Corps area, 3d 
AD attempts to clear Hotton-Soy road but makes little headway; loses key road junction SE of Manhay. Germans 
penetrate 84th ID positions between Hargimont and Rochefort. 4th Cav Gp, with mission of screening along Lesse R, 
organizes defensive positions between Ciney and Marche. CCA, 2d AD, organizes Ciney for defense and starts toward 
Buissonville. 75th ID, in corps reserve, establishes outposts along the Ourthe R. In US Third Army area, improving 
weather conditions permit extensive air support, particularly in Bastogne area, where supplies are dropped to the 
garrison. In VIII Corps area, enemy continues to press in slowly on Bastogne. In III Corps area, CCA of 4th AD clears 
Martelange and continues 2 miles up Arlon-Bastogne highway while CCB, on secondary road, drives to Chaumont, from 
which it is ousted in counterattack. CCR begins drive toward Bigonville (Luxembourg). 26th ID'S 104th IR clears 
Grosbous and pushes on to Dellen and Buschrodt; 328th occupies Wahl. 80th ID seizes Heiderscheid and holds it 
against counterattacks; finishes clearing Merzig; takes Kehmen; continues to battle enemy at Ettelbruck. Roadblocks on 
diy's S flank are turned over to XII Corps. In XII Corps area, attack SW of Echternach still gains little ground. 1 0th AD 
continues action to shorten and improve its line. 35th ID passes to Third Army control. 

• 24 December - In V Corps' area, 1st ID repels another enemy bid for Buetgenbach. 5th AD closes in Eupen area and 
is held in reserve. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 30th ID overruns La Gleize and releases CCB, 3d AD. 82d A/BD is under 
strong pressure in Manhay area; loses Manhay, although elements of 7th AD are pressed into action in that region. 
17th A/BD is being flown to France from England and subsequently operates under VIII Corps. In VII Corps area, 
Germans reduce 3d AD's roadblock at Belle Haie, on road to Manhay; CCR columns attacking E from Hotton and W 
from Soy clear Hotton-Soy road. Elements of 75th ID enter combat for first time: 290th and 289th IRs are attached 
respectively to CCR and CCA, 3d AD. In 84th ID zone, Germans drive through Verdenne. CCA, 2d AD, reaches 
Buissonville; 4th Cav Gp, attached to 2d AD to cover its assembly and maintain contact with adjacent units, makes 
contact with British at Sorinne. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, heavy fighting continues around Bastogne 
perimeter. The city is badly damaged by air attacks. 1 1th AD, released from SHAEF reserve to corps on 23d, is held in 
mobile reserve W of the Meuse. Combat engineers are guarding Meuse R line and blocking approaches to bridges. In 
III Corps area, CCB of 4th AD is meeting lively opposition S of Chaumont, as is CCA at Warnock; CCR seizes 
Bigonville. 318th IR (-), 80th ID, is attached to 4th AD. 6th Cav Gp (TF Fickett) arrives from XX Corps front to guard W 
flank of corps in Neufchateau area; 6th Cav Ren Sq is assigned sector between 4th Armd and 26th IDs. 26th ID 
secures Rambrouch and Koetschette but is held up at Arsdorf and Hierheck. 80th ID contains determined 
counterattacks. In XII Corps area, 5th ID, to which 10th IR has reverted, relieves left flank elements of 4th ID and 


attacks toward Haller and Waldbillig, making slow progress. 2d Cav Gp, designated TF Reed, relieves right flank units 
of 4th ID along the Moselle. CCA, 10th AD, captures Gilsdorf and Mostroff on Sauer R. 

• 25 December - In US First Army area, V Corps maintains defensive positions and has only light patrol contact with 
enemy. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82d A/BD, to shorten line, withdraws from Vielsalm salient upon order, pulling back to 
general line Trois Ponts-Basse-Bodeux-Bra-Manhay. 7th AD is reinf by 424th IR, 106th ID; tries vainly to recover 
Manhay. 30th ID clears region N of the Ambleve R between Stavelot and Trois Ponts. VII Corps, directed to go on the 
defensive, conducts limited attack to stabilize right flank of First Army. 3d AD attacks toward Grandmenil and 
crossroads just E, which enemy has recently seized, and reaches edge of town; is establishing defensive line in Werpin- 
Amonines area. TF cut off in Marcouray radios that it is starting toward Soy through enemy territory. 84th ID recovers 
Verdenne, but an enemy pocket remains between there and Bourdon. CCB, 2d AD, seizes Celles, blocking enemy's 
westward advance on Dinant; reconnoiters to Sorinne and Foy Notre Dame; CCA occupies Havrenne. In US Third 
Army area, VIII Corps maintains Bastogne perimeter against pressure from all sides. In III Corps area, CCR, moving to 
W flank of 4th AD from Bigonville launches surprise attack and gains road from Vaux les-Rosieres to Chaumont; CCB 
and CCA seize Chaumont, Hollange, and Tintage. 26th ID TF begins struggle for Eschdorf, gaining weak hold there; 
other elements of the div clear Arsdorf. 31 9th IR 80th ID, clears its sector to the Sauer and makes contact with 26th ID; 
assisted by 317 th IR, contains counterattacks and drives almost to Kehmen. Ettelbruck is found clear. 

• 26 December - In US First Army area, army halts enemy's westward drive short of the Meuse. German supply lines 
are now overextended, and stalled armor becomes a lucrative target for aerial attacks. XVIII Corps (A/B) maintains 
defensive positions and defeats enemy efforts to break through to the Meuse. In VII Corps area, 3d AD stabilizes its 
front except on left, where contact has not yet been established with 7th AD; seizes Grandmenil and heights S of Soy- 
Hotton road. 84th ID reduces enemy pocket between Verdenne and Bourdon; hurls back enemy thrust toward Menil. 
2d AD repels counterattacks in Celles area and against Havrenne and Frandeux, inflicting heavy losses on enemy. In 
US Third Army area, armored units break through to Bastogne. In III Corps area, forward tanks of CCR, 4th AD, push 
through Assenois to Bastogne, but vehicles are unable to follow. 1 01 st A/BD is temporarily attached to corps. CCA, 9th 
AD, is detached from 10th AD, XII Corps, and attached to 4th AD for employment on W flank. 26ID closes along the 
Sauer, winning Eschdorf in lively battle, and begins crossing. 80th ID, after clearing Scheidel, is halted in Kehmen area 
and transferred in place to XII Corps. Intercorps boundary is adjusted accordingly. 35th ID is attached to III Corps to 
assist in action against S flank of Ardennes salient. In XII Corps area, 5th ID improves positions in Echternach area and 
takes Berdorf. 6th AD, transferred to corps from XX Corps, moves into Luxembourg and relieves 10th AD. Latter 
passes to XX Corps control. 109th IR reverts to 28th ID (VIII Corps) from attachment to 10th AD. 

• 27 December - In US First Army's XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 30th ID maintains defensive positions while regrouping. 
508th PIR, 82d A/BD, continues drive NE of Bra. 7th AD recaptures Manhay early in day. 9th AD is reinf by 1 12th IR of 
28th ID. In VII Corps area, Germans are infiltrating toward Sadzot in zone of CCA, 3d AD, where front line is held by 
289th IR. 84th ID clears pocket in Verdenne area. 2d AD columns envelop Humain and clear stubborn resistance 


there. 83d ID, upon closing in Havelange area, begins relief of 2d AD. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 17th A/BD 
takes over Meuse R sector. In III Corps area, trucks and ambulances roll into Bastogne on road opened by CCR, 4th 
AD, ending siege of the city. 4th AD and reinforcements from 9th AD and 80th ID are broadening corridor to Bastogne 
and attempting to open Arlon-Bastogne highway. From S bank of the Sauer, 35th ID attacks northward between 4th AD 
and 26th ID, 137th IR taking Surre and 320th, Boulaide and Boschleiden. 26th ID pushes northward through 101st 
A/BD, clearing Mecher-Dunkrodt and Kaundorf. In XII Corps area, 80th ID checks attack in Ringel area and blocks 
roads N and NE of Ettelbruck. 6th AD takes responsibility for sector S of the Sauer between Ettelbruck and Mostroff. 
Beaufort, N of Waldbillig, falls to 1 1th IR, 5th ID. 4th ID patrols find Echternach undefended. In XX Corps area, 90th ID 
patrols aggressively and conducts raids to keep enemy pinned down. 5th Ranger Bn is attached to 95th ID. 

• 28 December - GEN Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery meet at Hasselt (Belgium) to plan offensive. In V 
Corps area, final enemy effort to force 1st ID from Elsenborn defenses fails. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, corps zone is 
relatively quiet. CCB, 9th AD, and 1 12th IR move into position to back up 3d AD and 75th ID. In VII Corps area, 75th 
ID, less 289th IR and 290th IR, is attached to XVIII Corps. Germans infiltrating in sector of CCA, 3d AD, take Sadzot 
but are driven out. 83d ID is relieving 2d AD and takes responsibility for sector E of line Buissonville-Rochefort; 
elements push into Rochefort. 2d AD regroups. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 1 1th AD is transferred to corps 
from SHAEF reserve. Ill Corps makes limited progress against delaying opposition between Sauer and Wiltz Rivers. 
35th ID continues drive on S flank of enemy salient despite very heavy fire SW of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. 26th ID makes 
slight progress toward Wiltz. Elements of 80th ID attached to 4th AD revert to parent unit. 6th AD is transferred to 
corps from XII Corps. XII Corps is ordered on the defensive in afternoon. 80th ID repels attack for Ringel. 

• 29 December - In US First Army area, V Corps front is quiet, with both sides on the defensive. XVIII Corps (A/B) zone 
is also virtually static. 75th ID is attached to corps and takes over zone of 7th AD. VII Corps mops up infiltrators and 
patrols. 83d ID releases 33lst IR to 3d AD; attacks toward Rochefort with 329th, making slow progress In US Third 
Army area, VIII Corps prepares for drive on Houffalize. 1 1th AD moves to vicinity of Neufchateau. 87th ID is released 
to corps from SHAEF reserve. In III Corps area, CCA of 4th AD opens Arlon-Bastogne highway. 35th ID is clearing 
Villers-la-Bonne-Eau-Lutrebois region; advance elements make contact with 101st A/BD forces at Marvie, SE of 
Bastogne. 26th ID continues toward Wiltz against increasing resistance. Units in Bastogne (101st A/BD, reinf, and 
elements of 9th AD) revert to VIII Corps. 6th AD is transferred to III Corps from XII Corps and assembles between Arlon 
and Neufchateau. 

• 30 December - In US First Army's XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 7th AD releases 424th IR to 106th ID. 75th ID holds 
positions previously occupied by 424th IR. VII Corps turns over region SW of line Marche-Namur to British. Germans 
abandon Rochefort. In US Third Army area, VIII Corps opens drive on Houffalize. 1 1th AD progresses slowly and at 
heavy cost. 87th ID takes Moircy but loses it in counterattack later in day. 9th AD is ordered to Sedan area as SHAEF 
reserve. In III Corps area, Germans again attempt to cut Arlon-Bastogne highway and isolate Bastogne, reaching 


Lutrebois and surrounding 2 cos of 137th IR, 35th ID, in Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. On left flank of corps, 6th Cav Gp is 
relieved by elements of VIII Corps. 

• 31 December - In US Third Army area, VIII Corps takes command of 4th AD. Elements of 87th ID capture close in on 
Moircy. CCR, 1 1th AD, drives to Pinsamont and Acul while CCB attacks Chenogne. In III Corps area, one 6th AD 
column secures high ground near Wardin; another advances to outskirts of Rechrival. 35th ID is unable to relieve 
isolated forces in Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, and they are presumed lost. Germans still hold Lutrebois. 26th ID repels 
counterattack and reorganizes. Corps arty places TOT's on Wiltz. 


• 1 January - US Third Army continues Ardennes counteroffensive with VIII and III Corps. In VIII Corps area, 87th ID 
takes Moircy and Jenneville. 1 1th AD attacks with CCA toward Hubermont, stopping E of Rechrival, and with CCB 
clears Chenogne and woods to N. CCA, 9th AD, drives toward Senonchamps. 101 A/BD, in Bastogne area, gives fire 
support to 1 1th AD on its left and 6th AD (III Corps) on its right. 17 A/BD relieves 28th ID in Neufchateau area. Ill Corps 
contains enemy salient SE of Bastogne. 4th AD holds corridor into Bastogne and supports 35th ID with fire. 35th ID 
partially clears Lutrebois and reaches crossroads SE of Marvie, but makes no headway in vicinity of Villers-la-Bonne- 
Eau (Belgium) and Harlange (Luxembourg). In region E of Bastogne, 6th AD takes Neffe, Bizery, and Mageret, but then 
loses Mageret. Germans launch offensive, designated Operation NORD WIND, against US Seventh Army. In XV Corps 
area, two-pronged enemy thrust forces I06 Cav Gp, 44th ID, and 100th ID to give ground. 44th ID bears brunt of 
enemy's fight flank drive, which penetrates positions NW of Rimling. 100th ID, caught between the 2 attack forces, 
withdraws its right flank, exposed by withdrawal of TF Hudelson (VI Corps); enemy Infiltrators are cleared from Rimling, 
on left flank. Elements of TF Harris (63d ID) help check enemy. 141st IR, 36th ID, moves up to plug gap between XV 
and VI Corps. In VI Corps area, enemy drives salient into left flank of corps S of Bitche. TF Hudelson's thin line is 
pushed back on left to Lemberg-Mouterhouse area. 45th ID contains enemy along line Philippsbourg-Neuhoffen- 
Obersteinbach and mops up infiltrators in Dambach. Reinforcements from TF Herren (70th ID) and 79th ID are rushed 
to 45th ID, whose boundary is moved W. CCB, 14th AD, moves to guard Vosges exits. 79th ID'S right flank is extended 
to include Rhine sector from Schaffhouse to Gambsheim area. 

• 2 January - In Br Second Army's XXX Corps area, 53d Div assumes responsibility for Marche-Hotton sector (Belgium), 
relieving US 84th ID; boundary between XXX Corps and US VII Corps is adjusted. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 
Gerimont falls to 87th ID; Mande St Etienne to 1 1th AD; and Senonchamps to CCB, 10th AD (attached to 101 A/BD), 
and CCA, 9th AD. 4th AD protects and enlarges corridor leading into Bastogne from the S and helps III Corps clear 
woods near Lutrebois. In III Corps area, 6th AD's CCB enters Oubourcy and Michamps but is driven out of latter; 
unsuccessfully attacks Arloncourt; CCA takes Wardin; div withdraws to high ground W of Michamps-Arloncourt- Wardin 
for night. 35th ID continues fight for Lutrebois. 28 Cav Sq of TF Fickett (6 Cav Gp) is committed between 134th IR and 


137th IR, 35th ID. 26th ID'S 101st IR advances N in area SW of Wiltz. US Seventh Army CP is moved from Saverne to 
Luneville. In XV Corps area, enemy pressure forces 44th ID's right flank back past Gros Rederching and causes 100th 
ID's right flank to fall back farther. In VI Corps area, Germans maintain pressure against reinf 45th ID, particularly on its 
W flank, former zone of TF Hudelson. Fighting occurs at various points along Bitche salient. TF Herren's 276th IR 
takes up switch positions in Wingen-Wimmenau-Rosteig area. CCA, 14th AD, organizes outposts at Vosges exits 
around Bouxwiller. Center and right flank units of corps begin withdrawal to prepared positions on Maginot Line. 79th 
ID takes over S portion of Rhine R line held by TF Linden (42d ID). 

• 3 January - -21 Army Group: US First Army starts counteroffensive to reduce enemy's Ardennes salient from N. VII 
Corps attacks SE toward Houffalize with 2d AD followed by 84th ID on right, and 3d AD followed by 83d ID on left. 2d 
AD gains Trinal, Magoster, positions in Bois de Tave, Freineux, Le Batty, and positions near Belle Haie. 3d AD takes 
Malempre and Floret and from latter continues SE on Lierneux road to Groumont Creek. 75th ID, after attack passes 
through its line, continues mopping up S of Sadzot. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82 A/BD, in conjunction with VII Corps' 
attack, thrusts SE, improving positions. As a diversion, 30th ID pushes small forces S of Malmedy and then withdraws 
them as planned. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, elements of 87th ID are temporarily surrounded in woods E of St 
Hubert. 17th A/BD attacks N late in day in region some 5 miles NW of Bastogne. NE of Bastogne, 101st A/BD and 50lst 
PIR are clearing Bois Jacques. TF Higgins (elements of 101st A/BD and CCA, 10th AD) is organized to block enemy 
attacks toward Bastogne. CCA, 4th AD, continues to defend corridor into Bastogne. 28th ID defends the Meuse from 
Givet to Verdun. In III Corps area, 6th AD repels enemy thrusts W of Michamps and places heavy arty concentrations 
on Arloncourt, Michamps, and Bourcy; to S, attempts to clear high ground near Wardin and takes road junction S of the 
town. 35th ID gains about two thirds of Lutrebois and crossroads W of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau (Belgium) but is unable to 
take Harlange (Luxembourg). East of Harlange, 26th ID continues attack in region N of Mecher-Dunkrodt and Kaundorf. 
6th Army Group: Is assigned defense of Strasbourg. In US Seventh Army area, XV Corps withstands further pressure 
and on left slightly improves positions. Germans deepen penetration at boundary of 44th ID and 100th ID, entering 
Achen, from which they are ousted in counterattack. CCL, Fr 2d AD, pushes into Gros Rederching but is unable to clear 
it. Attempt by 44th ID to relieve French there fails. 36th ID (-RCT 141) assembles near Montbronn. In VI Corps area, 
enemy expands Bitche salient, entering Wingen and Philippsbourg. 45th ID withstands pressure against Reipertsweiler, 
NW of Wingen, and contains attacks in Sarreinsberg-Meisenthal area. Center and right flank elements of corps 
complete withdrawal to Maginot positions. 

• 4 January - In Br Second Army area, XXX Corps opens offensive W of the Ourthe R, protecting US First Army right. 
From Marche-Hotton road, 53d ID drives S abreast US VII Corps. Br. 6 A/BD meets determined opposition S of 
Rochefort. In US First Army's VII Corps area, 2d AD captures Beffe, contains counterattacks near Devantave, seizes 
Lamormenil, and reaches edge of Odeigne. 3d AD takes Baneux, Jevigne, and Lansival and gains bridgehead at 
Groumont Creek. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82 A/BD advances its line to include Heirlot, Odrimont, wooded heights N 
and NE of Abrefontaine, St Jacques, Bergeval, and Mont de Fosse; on extreme left patrols push to the Salm. In US 
Third Army's VIII Corps area, 87th ID attack is halted by resistance near Pironpre. Attack of 17 A/BD evokes strong 


reaction in Pinsamont-Rechrival-Hubermont area. Enemy attacks in 101st A/BD sector are ineffective. In III Corps 
area, 6th AD is repeatedly attacked in Mageret-Wardin area E of Bastogne, and withdraws to shorten line. 35th ID 
clears Lutrebois but is still unable to take Harlange. 26th ID gains a few hundred yards. In US Seventh Army's XV 
Corps area, 44th ID tries vainly to clear Frauenbergand Gros Rederching. In limited attack, 36th ID takes hill between 
Lemberg and Goetzenbruck. In VI Corps area, 45th ID, continuing fight to reduce Bitche salient, drives to outskirts of 
Wingen; attacks NE across Wingen-Wimmenau road to ease pressure on Reipertsweiler; fights to open Reipertsweiler- 
Wildenguth road, taking Saegmuhl and making contact with elements cut off in Wildenguth; clears about half of 
Philippsbourg. TF Linden's line along the Rhine is extended to include zone held by TF Herren 

• 5 January - In US First Army's VII Corps area, 2d AD's main effort against Consy makes little headway; elements 
move toward Dochamps and clear part of Odeigne. 3d AD is slowed by rear-guard action in Bois de Groumont but 
seizes Lavaux and enters Lierneux. 75th ID moves to Aisne R. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82nd A/BD makes progress 
all along line and repels counterattacks near Bergeval. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 87th ID meets resistance 
near Bonnerue and Pironpre, W of Bastogne. Rest of corps maintains defensive positions. In III Corps area, 35th ID 
continues to fight for negligible gains. Fr First Army is to take responsibility for defense of Strasbourg upon relief of US 
elements in that area by French. Relief is scheduled for 2400 but is interrupted by enemy attack. In US Seventh Army 
area, XV Corps clears Germans from Frauenberg and Gros Rederching. VI Corps makes slow progress against Bitche 
salient in 45th ID sector. Most of Wingen and rest of Philippsbourg are cleared. On corps right flank, Germans 
establish bridgehead across the Rhine in Gambsheim area, crossing between Kilstett and Drusenheim and overrunning 
Offendorf, Herrlisheim, and Rohrweiler. TF Linden, hit while executing reliefs, launches two-pronged assault toward 
Gambsheim: TF A moves from Weyersheim to W bank of Landgraben Canal; TF B attacks from Kilstett but is stopped 
just N of there. 

• 6 January - In US First Army's VII Corps area, 2d AD and 84th ID make converging attacks toward Consy, taking 
positions E and W of the town, respectively. 2d AD continues toward Dochamps, completes occupation of Odeigne, 
and makes contact with 3d AD on Manhay-Houffalize road. 3d AD cuts Laroche-Salmchateau road at its intersection 
with Manhay-Houffalize road and captures Fraiture, Lierneux, and La Falise; 83d Armd Ren Bn clears Bois Houby. In 
XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82d A/BD consolidates. To protect its left flank, 30th ID attacks S toward Spineux and Wanne 
with 1 12th IR, 28th ID. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, enemy gets tanks into Bonnerue, lightly held by 87th ID. 
87th ID makes limited attack toward Tillet. In III Corps area, 6th AD holds against repeated counterattacks. 35th ID 
attacks into woods NE of Lutrebois and maintains positions in Villers-la-Bonne-Eau area; 6 Cav Sq of TF Fickett is 
committed near Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. In XII Corps area, 80th ID's 319th IR crosses Sure R near Heiderscheidergrund 
and captures Goesdorf and Dahl. US Fifteenth Army becomes operational. Maj Gen Ray E. Porter is in command. In 
US Seventh Army's XV Corps area, attack to restore MLR on right flank of 44th ID halts on line extending along Sedge 
of Bois de Blies Brucken to area just N of Gros Rederching. In VI Corps area, 45th ID makes slow progress against left 
and center of Bitche salient and on E contains counterattacks on Philippsbourg. Germans continue build up W of the 
Rhine on E flank of corps. 79th ID clears Stattmatten (where encircled elements of TF Linden are relieved), 


Sessenheim, and Rohrweiler; reaches edge of Drusenheim. Further efforts of TF Linden to gain Gambsheim are 

• 7 January - In Br Second Army's XXX Corps area, 53d ID takes Grimbiermont. In US First Army's VII Corps area, 
coordinated attacks of 2d AD and 84th ID toward Laroche-Salmchateau road, intermediate objective before Houffalize, 
make notable progress. Dochamps and Marcouray fall. Only rear guards remain in Consy area. 3d AD seizes Regne, 
Verleumont, Sart, and Grand Sart. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82 A/BD, in rapid advance of 2-3 miles, clears most of 
angle formed by Laroche-Salmchateau road and Salm R. Some elements secure positions on ridge just N of Comte; 
others, during advance to Salm R line, clear Goronne, Farniers, Mont, and Rochelinval. 1 12th IR seizes Spineux, 
Wanne, and Wanneranval. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 87th ID continues attack on Tillet and is engaged 
sporadically in Bonnerue area. 17th A/BD takes Rechrival, Millomont, and Flamierge and reaches outskirts of 
Flamizoulle. In III Corps area, 6th AD remains under strong pressure in Neffe-Wardin region E of Bastogne. 35th ID 
makes limited attack toward Lutrebois-Lutremange road, halting just short of it. In XX Corps area, CG 94th ID takes 
command of sector previously held by 90th ID. Boundary between US Seventh Army and Fr First Army is shifted N, 
giving French responsibility for Strasbourg area. In US Seventh Army's VI Corps area, 45th ID, on left flank of Bitche 
salient, reaches heights overooking Althorn and overcomes final resistance within Wingen. On corps E flank, 79th ID 
organizes TF Wahl (elements of 3l3th IR, 315th IR, and 222d IR; CCA of 14th AD; 827th TD Bn) to operate in N part of 
div front since enemy threat to Maginot Line positions S of Wissembourg is serious. Germans drive back outposts at 
Aschbach and Stundweiler. In Gambsheim bridgehead area, efforts of 314th IR, 79th ID, to clear Drusenheim are 
unsuccessful; Fr 3d Algerian Div takes over attack toward Gambsheim from Kilstett. 

• 8 January - In US First Army's VII Corps area, 4 Cav Gp and 84th ID pursue enemy on right of corps to Marcourt and 
Cielle; other elements of 84th ID start clearing woods S of main road junction SE of Manhay, 2d AD drives on Samree, 
CCA moving S from Dochamps and CCB pushing SE along Salmchateau-Samree Road. 3d AD gains intermediate 
objective line, taking Hebronval, Ottre, Joubieval, and Provedroux. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82d A/BD consolidates 
along line Grand Sart-Salmchateau-Trois Ponts and clears Comte. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, enemy drives 
87th ID units from Bonnerue and maintains pressure in Tillet region. Some 17th A/BD elements gain and then lose high 
ground N of Laval and others are forced out of Flamierge. In III Corps area, 6th AD recovers lost ground in Neffe- 
Wardin sector. TF Fickett occupies zone between 35th ID and 26th IDs, along high ground before Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, 
Betlange, and Harlange. In US Seventh Army's XV Corps area, enemy enters Rimling. 100th ID and 36th IDs improve 
positions in local attacks. In VI Corps area, 45th ID makes slight progress against W flank of salient; TF Herren 
becomes responsible for E flank. 79th ID withstands pressure near Aschbach and moves reinforcements to Soultz- 
Rittershoffen area. Enemy checks efforts to reduce Gambsheim bridgehead. 314th IR is unable to advance in 
Drusenheim or SE of Rohrweiler. CCB, 12th AD, attacks with 714th Tank Bn toward Herrlisheim. 

• 9 January - In US First Army's VII Corps area, 84th ID mops up near Consy, takes commanding ground at Harze, and 
clears woods S of main crossroads SE of Manhay. 2d AD continues toward Samree, which is subjected to heavy arty 


fire. 83 Div attacks through 3d AD, gaining line from Bihain-which is entered but not captured-W to point NE of Petite 
Langlir. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 82d A/BD finishes mopping up within its zone. In 30th ID sector, 424th IR (106th ID) 
takes over Wanne-Wanneranval region, formerly held by 1 12th IR (28th ID). In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 87th 
ID continues to fight near Tillet; elements are clearing Haies-de-Tillet woods. 506th PIR, 101st A/BD, attacks with CCB, 
4th AD, and CCB, 10th AD, toward Noville, gaining 1 ,000 yards. 501st PIR takes Recogne. Ill Corps launches attack to 
trap and destroy enemy in pocket SE of Bastogne. 90th ID attacks through 26th ID toward high ground NE of Bras, 
taking Berle and crossroads on Berle-Winseler road. 26th ID's gains are slight but include heights NW of Bavigne. 
CCA, 6th AD, coordinating closely with 134th IR of 35ID, advances to high ground SE of Marvie and feints toward 
Wardin. I37th IR of 35th ID attacks Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. US Seventh Army's XV Corps area, local attack by 100th ID 
gains Hill 370, S of Rimling, but since this region is becoming untenable, div withdraws left flank to Guising to tie in with 
44th ID. VI Corps makes very slow progress against Bitche salient, but TF Herren's 276th IR occupies Obermuhlthal. 
On NE flank of 79th ID, German tank-infantry attack against 242d IR, TF Linden, overruns Flatten and reaches 
Rittershoffen; counterattack drives Germans back to Flatten and partly regains that town. In Gambsheim bridgehead 
region, CCB of 12th AD seizes part of Herrlisheim, but 79th ID is still thwarted in Drusenheim and SE of Rohrweiler. 
Elements of 232d IR along canal E of Weyersheim are ordered back to organize Weyersheim for defense. 

• 1 January - In Br Second Army's XXX Corps area, 51 st ID, which has taken over attack from 53d ID, reaches 
Laroche. In US Ninth Army's XIX Corps area, 78th ID, in local attack, reaches slopes of hills overlooking Kail R. US 
First Army prepares to broaden attack on 13th, VII Corps thrusting toward line Houffalize Bovigny and XVIII Corps 
toward St Vith. In VII Corps area, most of Laroche-Salmchateau road, intermediate objective of corps, is cleared. 84th 
ID patrols toward Laroche. 2d AD captures Samree and clears Laroche-Salmchateau road within its zone. 83d ID takes 
Bihain, advances slightly in region N of Petite Langlir, and crosses Ronce R east of Petite Langlir. In XVIII Corps (A/B) 
area, elements of 82 A/BD secure bridgehead across Salm R near Grand Halleux. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 
87th ID captures Tillet. Renewing attack toward Noville. 101st A/BD clears portion of Bois Jacques. 4th AD units, 
having passed through 6th AD, attack NE with elements of 101st A/BD toward Bourcy but cease attack upon order. Ill 
Corps continues attack, with greatest progress on right (E) flank. On left flank, 6th AD furnishes fire support for 
neighboring VIII Corps units and outposts N sector of line reached by 4th AD. Elements of 35th ID take Villersla-Bonne- 
Eau and high ground NW. Betlange falls to 6 Cav Sq and Harlange to 28 Cav Sq. One 90th ID regt advances from 
Berle to heights overlooking Doncols; another fights indecisively for Trentelhof strongpoint. Elements of 26th ID reach 
high ground SW of Winseler. In US Seventh Army's VI Corps area, elements of 45th ID enter Althorn, on left flank of 
Bitche salient, but are unable to clear it. Otherwise, the salient is unchanged despite continued fighting about its 
perimeter. On 79th ID's N flank, indecisive fighting occurs at Flatten; bn of 315th IR is committed there and 2d Bn, 242d 
IR, recalled; another bn of 315th IR assembles in Rittershoffen. To S, enemy maintains Gambsheim bridgehead. 
Elements of CCB, 12th AD, are virtually surrounded at Herrlisheim, but tanks sever enemy lines in order to reinforce 
infantry within the town. 


• 1 1 January - In US Ninth Army's XIX Corps area, 78th ID finishes clearing hill positions overlooking Kail R. In US First 
Army's VII Corps area, Laroche, in 84th ID sector, is cleared of enemy; 4 Cav Gp patrol covers portion E of the Ourthe 
R. 83d ID secures road junction on Bihain-Lomre road and attacks Petite Langlir and Langlir. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 
75th ID takes up positions along Salm R that were held by 82d A/BD. I06th ID assumes control of right of 30th ID zone. 
In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 87th ID'S 347th IR finishes clearing Haies-de-Tillet woods and occupies Bonnerue, 
Pironpre, Vesqueville, and St Hubert, from which enemy has withdrawn. Germans are also withdrawing from 17th A/BD 
zone in vicinity of Heropont, Flamierge, Mande St Etienne, and Flamizoulle. In III Corps area, Germans are retiring from 
pocket SE of Bastogne. Elements of all divs of corps are converging on Bras. 6th AD takes over sector E of Bastogne 
formerly held by 4th AD (VIII Corps); elements attack toward Bras, clearing woods near Wardin. 35th ID gains 
additional high ground in Lutrebois-Lutremange area. TF Fickett clears Wantrange and attacks Tarchamps, then moves 
into zone of TF Scott (mainly 26th ID units) as it advances on Sonlez. TF Fickett reaches Sonlez by midnight and 
makes contact with 90th ID. Elements of TF Scott clear forest E of Harlange then, in conjunction with TF Fickett, secure 
heights SW of Sonlez. 90th ID overcomes resistance around Trentelhof, cuts Bastogne-Wiltz road at Doncols, and 
advances on Sonlez. 26th ID improves positions on right flank of corps. In XII Corps area, 80th ID takes Bockholz-sur- 
Sure and high ground S of Burden. 2d Cav Gp clears Machtum, enemy's last position W of the Moselle. In US Seventh 
Army's VI Corps area, 45th ID clears Althorn, at W of Bitche salient, but falls back under enemy pressure in Wildenguth- 
Saegmuhl-Reipertsweiler region. 276th IR makes limited gains on heights between Lichtenberg and Obermuhlthal. 
Enemy renews attacks against 79th ID'S Maginot positions S of Wissembourg, reinforcing troops in Flatten, where 2d Bn 
of 3l5th IR is enveloped, and wresting about two thirds of Rittershoffen from 3d Bn, 3l5th IR. Elements of CCA, 14th 
AD, counterattack from Kuhlendorf but are stopped short of Rittershoffen. CCB, 12d AD, withdraws from Herrlisheim 
and takes up defensive positions W of Zorn R. 

• 1 2 January - In US First Army VII Corps area, 2d AD attacks in vicinity of junction of Manhay-Houffalize and Laroche- 
Salmchateau roads: CCA takes Chabrehez, continues about a mile S in Bois de Belhez, and reduces strongpoint E of 
Bois de St Jean; CCB captures Les Tailles and Petite Tailles. On 3d AD right, 83d Armd Ren Bn drives S through TF 
Hogan (CCR) at Regne, crosses Langlir R, and clears Bois de Cedrogne E of Manhay-Houffalize road and blocks road 
there running W from Mont le Ban. TF Hogan moves to Bihain and clears high ground SW of the town. 83d ID 
completes capture of Petite Langlir and Langlir and gains bridgehead S of Langlir-Ronce R. In XVIII (A/B.) Corps' I06th 
ID sector, bridgehead is established across Ambleve R south of Stavelot. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, enemy 
continues withdrawing. 87th ID takes Tonny, Amberloup, Lavacherie, Orreux, Fosset, Sprimont, and road junction NE of 
Sprimont. 17th AIB Div recaptures Flamierge. Flamizoulle is found to be heavily mined. Renuamont, Hubermont, and 
villages to SW are held by light, delaying forces. In III Corps area, CCA of 6th AD captures Wardin and advances to 
within a few hundred yards of Bras; 357th IR mops up Sonlez and continues to high ground SE of Bras; 359th IR repels 
attacks on crossroads NE of Doncols. In US Seventh Army's VI Corps area, enemy has shifted from aggressive 
offensive to stubborn defensive in Bitche salient. Efforts of 45th ID to regain ground lost on 1 1th are only partly 


successful. 14th AD attacks to relieve 3l5th IR, 79th ID, in Hatten and Rittershoffen; CCA clears part of Rittershoffen. 
Situation in Gambsheim bridgehead is unchanged. 

• 1 3 January - In Br Second Army area, XXX Corps' Ardennes mission is completed as 51 st ID Div reaches Ourthe R 
line southward from Laroche. In US First Army area, VII Corps pushes steadily toward Houffalize. On right flank, 4th 
Cav Gp and 84th ID clear several towns and villages. CCA, 2d AD, reaches positions about 11/2 miles N of Wibrin; 
CCB advances in Bois de Cedrogne to points 5-6 miles due N of Houffalize. 3d AD's CCR cuts Sommerain-Cherain 
road at its junction with road to Mont le Ban and contains Mont le Ban while CCB takes Lomre. After clearing passage 
through woods S of Langlir for 3d AD, 83d ID mops up and regroups. XVIII Corps (A/B) opens offensive, employing 
I06th ID on right and 30th ID on left. I06th ID, with 424 IR on right and 5l7th PIR on left, attacks SE from junction of 
Ambleve and Salm Rivers toward La Neuville-Coulee- Logbierme- Houvegnez line, reaching positions near Henumont. 
30th ID drives S from Malmedy area toward Ambleve R, gaining positions near Hedomont, in Houyire woods, and in 
Thirimont area. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, advance elements of 87th ID reach Ourthe R and make contact 
with British. 17th AIB Div takes Salle, N of Flamierge, without opposition. 1 1th AD, which has relieved elements of 
101st and 17th A/BDs, attacks N with CCR and CCA along Longchamps-Bertogne axis, cutting Houffalize-St Hubert 
highway near Bertogne. Bertogne is enveloped. 506th PIR, 101st A/BD, seizes Foy, on Bastogne-Houffalize highway; 
327th Glid Inf advances through 501st PIR in Bois Jacques toward Bourcy. In III Corps area, 6th AD drives northward, 
CCB partially clearing Mageret. 90th ID drives enemy from Bras and gains Hill 530. 35th ID and TF Fickett are pinched 
out near Bras. 26th ID moves units into positions NE and E of Doncols as boundary between it and 90th ID is moved 
W. In US Seventh Army area, XXI Corps (MG Frank W. Milburn) becomes operational, assuming responsibility for 
defense of left flank of army and taking control of I06th Cav Gp and I03d ID in place. It is to continue organization of 
defensive positions. In VI Corps area, 45th ID makes minor gains against Bitche salient. TF Herren (- 274th IR) moves 
to right flank of corps. 14th AD takes command of Hatten Rittershoffen sector, assisted by 79th ID: CCA and 3d Bn of 
3l5th IR continue to fight in Rittershoffen; CCR secures W third of Hatten and makes contact with 2d Bn of 3l5th IR; 
efforts of CCB to cut roads N and NE of Hatten fail. 

• 14 January - In US First Army's VII Corps area, 84th ID gains its final objectives, taking Nadrin, Filly, Petite Mormont, 
and Grande Mormont. 4th Cav Gp patrol makes visual contact with US Third Army patrol. 2d AD seizes Wibrin, 
Cheveoumont, Wilogne, and Dinez. 3d AD takes Mont le Ban and Baclain. 83d ID clears Honvelez and high ground 
near Bovigny. In XVIII (A/B) Corps' I06th ID sector, 5l7th PIR clears Henumont and continues S; 424th IR secures 
Caulee and Lagbierme. Same elements of 30th ID attack toward Hedamant and Thirimant, night 13-14, and take 
Hedamant befare dawn; other elements clear Villers and Ligneuville and gain bridgeheads across Ambleve R at these 
points. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, 17th A/BD's 507th PIR secures Bertagne, from which enemy has fled, and 
I94th Glid Inf takes Givroulle; both regts continue to Ourthe R. TF of CCA, 1 1th AD, clears Falize woods and drives 
along Langchamps-Compagne highway until stopped by heavy fire. 1 01 st A/BD continues attack toward Noville 
Rachamps-Bourcy area. Elements are forced out of Recogne and Foy, but both are regained in counterattacks. Enemy 
is cleared from Cobru. Tank TF of CCB, 1 1th AD, followed by infantry TF, enters Noville but withdraws under intense 


fire. In III Corps area, CCA of 6th AD clears woods E of Wardin and captures Benonchamps; CCB finishes clearing 
Mageret. Elements of 90th ID drive toward Niederwampach. Having cleared small packets during night, 26th ID moves 
combat patrols against enemy S of Wiltz R. In XX Corps area, 94th ID opens series of small-scale attacks to improve 
defensive positions in Saar-Moselle triangle S of Wasserbillig, a strongly fortified switch position of West Wall; 376th IR 
takes Tettingen and Butzdarf. 95th ID moves two bns to objectives in Saarlautern bridgehead area and then withdraws 
them as planned. In US Seventh Army's XXI Corps area, 142d IR of 36th ID moves to I03d ID zone to cover relief of 
that div by TF Herren. In VI Corps area, enemy continues vigorous defense of Bitche salient. 45th ID makes slight 
gains along its perimeter. 14th AD battles enemy in Rittershaffen and Hatten. 

• 1 5 January - In Br Second Army's 1 2 Corps area, in preparation for Operation BLACKCOCK-to clear triangular enemy 
salient between the Meuse and Roer-Wurm Rivers from Roermond southward-elements of 7th AD seize Bakenhoven 
(Holland) about a mile NW of Susteren as line of departure far main attack by 7th AD on left flank of corps. On US First 
Army's VII Corps right, 84th ID consolidates. 2d AD clears Achouffe, Mont, and Tavernaux and sends patrols to Ourthe 
R and into Hauffalize, which has been vacated by enemy. 3d AD attacks with CCR toward Vaux and Brisy, taking Vaux, 
and with CCB toward Cherain and Sterpigny. Elements of CCA are committed as reinforcements. Bn of 83d ID attacks 
Bavigny but is unable to take it. In XVIII Corps (A/B) area, 75th ID attacks across the Salm before dawn and seizes 
Salmchateau and Bech. 106th ID consolidates and clears Ennal. 30th ID takes Beaumant, Francheville, Hauvegnez, 
and Pont; improves positions S of Ligneuville; clears N part of Thirimant. V Corps opens offensive to clear heights 
between Buellingen and Ambleve and to protect left flank of XVIII Corps. 1st ID, reinf by 23d IR of 2d ID, attacks SE 
with 23d IR on right, 16th IR in center, and 18th IR on left; gains Steinbach, neighboring village of Remanval, and N half 
of Faymanville, but is held up S of Buetgenbach by heavy fire. In US Third Army's VIII Corps area, CCA of 1 1th AD 
takes Campagne and Rastadt and reaches Vellereux; falls back W of Vellereux under counterattack in Rau de Vaux 
defile. CCB bypasses Neville and clears woods to E. 506th PIR, 101st A/BD, occupies Neville. In III Corps area, 6th 
AD, employing 320th IR of 35th ID, overcomes house-to-house resistance in Oubaurcy; CCB takes Arlancourt; CCA 
clears heights SW of Langvilly. 358th IR of 90th ID meets unexpectedly strong resistance as it resumes NE attack; 1st 
Bn makes forced march into 6th AD sector to attack Niederwampach from Benanchamps area and gains town after arty 
barrage by 14 FA bns. 357th IR battles strong points in and around RR tunnels along Wiltz R valley while 359th IR 
starts to Wardin. In XX Corps' 94th ID zone, 1st Bn of 376th holds Tettingen and Butzdorf against counterattack while 
3d Bn takes Nennig, Wies, and Berg. Issues preliminary instructions for attack against Calmar Pocket by Fr First Army, 
which for some time has been engaged in aggressive defense of the Vosges. In US Seventh Army's VI Corps area, 
local actions occur around Bitche salient perimeter. 14th AD continues fight for Rittershaffen and Hatten. 



World War II Allied Conferences 

"Never in history was there a coalition like that 
of our enemies, composed of such heterogeneous 
elements with such divergent aims... Even now 
these states are at loggerheads, and, if we can 
deliver a few more heavy blows, then this artificially 
bolstered common front may suddenly collapse with 
a gigantic clap of thunder. " 

Adolf Hitler 

(upon ordering the attack through the Ardennes) 

The first involvement of the United States in the wartime conferences between the Allied nations 
opposing the Axis powers actually occurred before the nation formally entered World War II. In 
August 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met 
secretly and devised an eight-point statement of war aims known as the Atlantic Charter, which 
included a pledge that the Allies would not accept territorial changes resulting from the war in 

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the wartime conferences focused on establishing 
a second front. At Casablanca in January 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to fight until the 
Axis powers surrendered unconditionally. In a November 1943 meeting in Egypt with Chinese 
leader Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to a pre-eminent role for China in 
postwar Asia. The next major wartime conference included Roosevelt, Churchill, and the leader 
of the Soviet Union, Josef Stalin. Meeting at Tehran following the Cairo Conference, the "Big 
Three" secured confirmation on the launching of the cross-channel invasion and a promise from 
Stalin that the Soviet Union would eventually enter the war against Japan. 

In 1944, conferences at Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks created the framework for 
international cooperation in the postwar world. In February 1945, the "Big Three" met at the 
former Russian czar's summer palace in the Crimea. Yalta was the most important and by far 
the most controversial of the wartime meetings. Recognizing the strong position that the Soviet 
Army possessed on the ground, Churchill and an ailing Roosevelt agreed to a number of 
compromises with Stalin that allowed Soviet hegemony to remain in Poland and other Eastern 
European countries, granted territorial concessions to the Soviet Union, and outlined punitive 
measures against Germany, including an occupation and reparations in principle. Stalin did 
guarantee that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan within six months. 

The last meeting of the "Big Three" occurred at Potsdam in July 1945, where the tension that 
would erupt into the cold war was evident. Despite the end of the war in Europe and the 
revelation of the existence of the atomic bomb to the Allies, neither President Harry Truman, 
Roosevelt's successor, nor Clement Attlee, who mid-way through the conference replaced 
Churchill, could come to agreement with Stalin on any but the most minor issues. The most 
significant agreement was the issuance of the Potsdam Declaration to Japan demanding an 
immediate and unconditional surrender and threatening Japan with destruction if they did not 
comply. With the Axis forces defeated, the wartime alliance soon devolved into suspicion and 
bitterness on both sides. 


World War II Conferences & Treaties 

Conference /Treaty 





August 23, 1939 

Germany, Soviet 

Hitler and Stalin sign non- 
aggression pact which 
meant the Soviets would 
not intervene if Poland were 
invaded. Hitler later 
invaded Russia (June 22, 

Atlantic Conference 

August 1941 

Great Britain, US 

FDR and Churchill approve 
the Atlantic Charter that 
supported self- 
determination, a new 
permanent system of 
general security (a new 
League of Nations), and the 
right of people to regain 
governments abolished by 

Moscow Conference 


Great Britain, US, 
Soviet Union 

Allied aid to Soviet Union 

Washington Conference 

December 1941- 
January 1942 

Great Britain, US 

Agreement to follow 
Churchill's "Europe First" 
strategy; Declaration of the 
United Nations. 

Washington (2d) 

June 1942 

Great Britain, US 

Agreed to give higher 
priority to peripheral 
strategy over cross-channel 
invasion of Europe; agreed 
to share as "equal partners" 
in A-bomb research. 

Casablanca Conference 

January 1943 

Great Britain, US 

FDR and Churchill agree to 
step up Pacific war, invade 
Sicily, increase pressure on 
Italy and insist on an 
unconditional surrender of 


Washington Conference 

May 1943 

Great Britain, US 

Plans for invasion of Italy, 
stepped-up Pacific war, 
increased air attacks on 

Quebec Conference 

August 1943 

Great Britain, US 

D-Day Set for May 1, 1944; 
Southeast Asia command 
reorganized for war on 
Japan; Gilberts and 
Marshalls set as first 
objectives in central Pacific 

Moscow Conference 

October 1943 

Great Britain, US, 
Soviet Union, 

Tentative plans for 
cooperation in postwar 
Europe; Joint 4-power 
declaration includes China; 
Chiang-Kai-shek invited to 
a meeting at Cairo. 

Cairo Conference 

November 1943 

Great Britain, US, 
Soviet Union, 

Agreement on military 
operations in China against 
Japanese; promise of 
postwar return of 
Manchuria to China and of 
freedom for Korea. 

Teheran Conference 

November 1943 

Great Britain, US, 
Soviet Union 

Plans for two-front war 
against Germany, for later 
Russian participation in war 
against Japan, and for 
postwar cooperation. 

Cairo (2d) Conference 

December 1943 

Great Britain, US, 

Anakim postponed, Ike 

Bretton Woods 

July 1944 

Delegates of 44 

Establishment of 
International Monetary 
Fund and Bank. 

Dumbarton Oaks 

August 1944 

Great Britain, US, 
Soviet Union, 

Agreement on 
establishment of U.N., 
disagreement on veto in 
Security Council. 


Quebec (2d) Conference 

September 1944 

Great Britain, US 

Broad plans for global war; 
FDR agreed to Churchill 
plan for Greece and Istrian 
attack, due to fear of Russia 
in Balkans; FDR agreed to 
continue Lend-Lease to 
rebuild Britain's economy; 
tentative agreement on 
Morgenthau Plan for 
postwar Germany; FDR 
still unwilling to recognize 
De Gaulle. 

Yalta Conference 

February 1945 

Great Britain, US, 
Soviet Union 

Plans for dealing with 
defeat of Germany; Stalin 
agreed that Poland would 
have free elections and that 
the Soviets would attack 
Japan within three months 
of the collapse of Germany. 
Soviets receive territory in 
Manchuria and several 

San Francisco 

April 22, 1945 

Delegates of 46 

United Nations Charter 
approved establishing a 
Security Council with veto 
power for the Big Five (US, 
Great Britain, France, 
China, and Soviet Union) 
and a General Assembly. 

Potsdam Conference 

July- August 1945 

US, Great Britain, 
Soviet Union 

Pres. Truman met with 
Stalin and Churchill (Attlee 
after British election) and 
agreed that Japan must 
surrender or risk 
destruction; Atomic bomb 
successfully tested on July 
16 and then dropped on 
Hiroshima on August 6, 
1945; agreement on 
principles governing 
treatment of Germany. 



Allied Command Architecture 
& Order of Battle 

"I have just made a momentous decision. 

I shall go over to the counter-attack, 
that is to say here, out of the Ardennes, 
with the objective - - 
Adolf Hitler, 16 September 1944 

"It is now certain that attrition is steadily sapping 
the strength of German forces on the western front 
and that the crust of defenses is thinner, more brittle, 
and more vulnerable than it appears on G2 maps 

or to troops in the line. " 
12th Army Group I intelligence Summary, 12 December 1944 

Allied Command Architecture 

from 20 December 1944 


Supreme Commander -GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower 

x xxfxx 


21 Army Group 

(North Bulge) 
Cdr- FM Bernard Montgomery 


XXX British Corps 

Cdr - LTG Brian Horrocks 


Ninth US Army* 

Cdr - LTG W. H. Simpson 

51 ID 
6 Tk BDE 
Guards AD 
43 ID 
53 ID 

XIII Corps 


XVI Corps 

L XIX Corps 

8 ID 
29 ID 
78 ID 
102 ID 
104 ID 

* From 1 2th Army Group (Bradley) 
to 21 Army Group (Montgomery) 

** From First Army to Third Army 

"xxlx X 

First US Army* 

Cdr - LTG C. Hodges 

V Corps 


VII Corps 


1 ID 

2 ID 
9 ID 

30 ID 
75 ID 
82 ABN Div 

83 ID 

84 ID 
99 ID 

106 ID 

2 AD 

3 AD 
5 AD 
7 AD 

"xxlx xx 

12th Army Group 

(South Bulge) 
Cdr - LTG Omar Bradley (US) 

x xlx X 

Third US Army 

Cdr -LTG G. S. Patton, Jr. 



- VIII Corps* 

XII Corps 

L- XX Corps 

4 ID 

5 ID 

17 ABN Div 

26 ID 

28 ID 

35 ID 

80 ID 

87 ID 

90 ID 

95 ID 
101 ABN Div 

4 AD 
6 AD 
9 AD 
11 AD 






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12th U.S. Army Group (Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley) 

Assignment of divisions to corps and corps to armies varied throughout the war and frequently 
changed, even in the midst of battles. The alignment of divisions and corps shown here depicts the 
12th Army Group organization as of the end of the battle in January, 1945. 

First U.S. Army (Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges) 

V Corps (Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow) 

1 st Infantry Division (The Big Red One). Brig. Gen. Clift Andrus. The most experienced American 
infantry division. North Africa, Sicily, D-Day, Normandy, Aachen, and the Huertgen Forest. 

2 nd Infantry Division (Indianhead). Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson. Normandy and the attack 
across France and against the Roer River Dams. 

5 th Armored Division. Maj. Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver. 

9 th Infantry Division (Octofoil). Maj. Gen. Louis A. Craig. North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, and 
the Huertgen Forest. 

78 th Infantry Division (Lightning). Maj. Gen. Edwin P. Parker, Jr. Supported 2nd Infantry 
Division's attack on the Roer River dams, its first combat action. 

99 th Infantry Division (Checkerboard). Maj. Gen. Walter E. Lauer. Held a defensive front in the 
Ardennes since November 1944, its only action. 

VII Corps (Maj. Gen. Joseph Lawton Collins) 

2 nd Armored Division (Hell on Wheels). Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon. North Africa, Sicily, 
Normandy, and around Aachen. 

3 rd Armored Division (Spearhead). Maj. Gen. Maurice Rose. Normandy, the pursuit across 
France, and costly fall battles around Aachen. 

83 rd Infantry Division (Thunderbolt). Maj. Gen. Robert C. Macon. Normandy, Brest, and the 
Huertgen Forest. 

84 th Infantry Division (Railsplitters). Maj. Gen. Alexander R. Boiling. First action in November 
1944 around Aachen. 


XVIII Airborne Corps (Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway) 

7 th Armored Division (Lucky Seventh). Brig. Gen. Robert W. Hasbrouck. Pursuit across France, 
heavy fighting near Metz in September and in Holland in October. 

30 th Infantry Division (Old Hickory). Maj. Gen. Leland S. Hobbs. Normandy; repelled German 
counterattack at Mortain; and at Aachen. 

75 th Infantry Division. Maj. Gen. Fay B. Prickett. First action in September. 

82 nd Airborne Division (All American). Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin. Sicily, D-Day, Normandy, 
and Holland. 

Third U.S. Army (Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.) 

Ill Corps (Maj. Gen. John Millikin) 

4 th Armored Division. Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey. Normandy; heavy fighting in Lorraine and the 
drive to the Saar River. 

6 th Armored Division (Super Sixth). Maj. Gen. Robert W. Grow. Normandy, Brittany, and in 

26 th Infantry Division (Yankee). Maj. Gen. Willard S. Paul. Heavy combat near Verdun in 
September. In December, it had only recently been pulled from the line and sent into the Ardennes to 
absorb replacements. 

35 th Infantry Division (Santa Fe). Maj. Gen. Paul W. Baade. Normandy; repelled German 
counterattack at Mortain; Lorraine. 

90 th Infantry Division (Tough Ombres). Maj. Gen. James A. Van Fleet. Heavy losses in first 
engagements in Normandy; Metz; drive to Saar River. Two division commanders relieved. 

VIII Corps (Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton) 

9 th Armored Division. Maj. Gen. John W. Leonard. Untested before the Battle of the Bulge. 

11 th Armored Division (Thunderbolt). Brig. Gen. Charles S. Kilburn. Untested before the Battle of 
the Bulge. 

17 th Airborne Division (Golden Talon). Maj. Gen. William M. Miley. Untested before the Battle 
of the Bulge. 

28 th Infantry Division (Keystone). Maj. Gen. Norman D. Cota. D-Day; Normandy; Siegfried Line; 
heavy combat in Huertgen Forest. Made the disastrous attack on Schmidt. One division commander 
relieved and another killed. 


87 Infantry Division (Golden Acorn). Brig. Gen. Frank L. Culin, Jr. Brief battle experience in the 
Saar, but the division's first real test of battle was near Bastogne. 

101 st Airborne Division (Screaming Eagles). Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. D-Day, Normandy 
and Holland. 

106 th Infantry Division (Golden Lions). Maj. Gen. Alan W. Jones. Completely untested when put 
into the line in the Ardennes. 

XII Corps (Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy) 

4 th Infantry Division (Ivy). Maj. Gen. Raymond O. Barton. D-Day; Normandy, Siegfried Line, and 
Huertgen Forest. 

5 th Infantry Division (Red Diamond). Maj. Gen. S. Leroy Irwin. Normandy; heavy casualties in 
fall fighting for Metz. 

10 th Armored Division (Tiger). Maj. Gen. William H. H. Morris, Jr. Lorraine, Metz, drive to the 
Saar River. 

80 th Infantry Division (Blue Ridge). Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride. Normandy; hard fight for 
Moselle River crossing in September; drive to the Saar River. 

Ninth U.S. Army (Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson) 

XIII Corps (Maj. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem) 
102 nd Infantry Division. Brig. Gen. Frank A. Keating. 

XVI Corps (Maj. Gen. J. B. Anderson) 
Not Operational 

XIX Corps (Maj. Gen. Raymond S. McLain) 

29 th Infantry Division. Maj. Gen. Charles H. Gerhardt. 

8 th Infantry Division. Brig. Gen. W. G. Weaver. 

104 th Infantry Division. Maj. Gen. Terry de la Mesa Allen. 


21 Br Army Group (Fid. Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery) 

XXX Corps (Lt. Gen. Sir Brian G. Horrocks) 
79 th Armored Division (Special). Maj. Gen. Sir Percy C. S. Hobart. 

First Canadian Army (Lt. Gen. h. d. g. Crerar) 

I (British) Corps (Lt. Gen. J. T. Crocker) 

II Corps (Lt. Gen. G. G. Simmonds) 

51 st (British) "Highland" Infantry Division. Maj. Gen. T. G. Rennie. 

Second (British) Army (Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey) 
VIII Corps (Lt. Gen. E. H. Barker) 

XII Corps (Lt. Gen. Neil M. Ritchie) 

Guards Armored Division. Maj. Gen. Alan H. S. Adair. 
43 rd "Wessex" Infantry Division. Maj. Gen. G. I. Thomas. 
53 rd "Welsh" Infantry Division. Maj. Gen. R. K. Ross 



The US Army in December 1944 



The Army of the Battle of the Bulge was the mightiest force the United States had ever 
raised. In his 12th U.S. Army Group, General Omar N. Bradley commanded more soldiers than 
any American general had ever led before. Bradley's three field armies were arrayed across the 
front lines along the German borders: the Ninth Army, under Lt. Gen. William Simpson in the 
extreme north (not directly involved in the Ardennes battle), the First Army, under Lt. Gen. 
Courtney Hodges in the center, and the Third Army, under Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., in the 
south. Arriving from the invasion of Southern France, the 6th U.S. Army Group, under 
command of Lt. Gen. Jacob Devers, had also fallen into line with its Seventh Army, under Lt. 
Gen. Alexander Patch, and a French army. By the fall of 1944, the Army had grown to astrength 
of almost eight million soldiers, a staggering number considering that the service had counted 
only about 180,000 on its rolls in 1939. 

Nonetheless in the fall of 1944, the Army had a serious personnel problem. The81 rifle 
squads of atypical infantry division numbered a total of only 3,240 riflemen. The remainder of 
the 14,000 soldiers of the division performed other tasks Some, including the artillery, armor, 
tank destroyer units and others, were of the combat arms. The remainder handled the essential 
supply and administrative tasks to keep the division in action. The situation in the division 
repeated itself at higher echelons. At the field army level (roughly 350,000 men), about one 
soldier in seven was in the front line. In the European theater as a whole, Omar Bradley 
estimated that only one soldier out of fifteen fought with a rifle. Although riflemen were the 
minority in the Army, they suffered the highest casualty rate~83 percent in Normandy. Bradley 
later reported that three out of every four casualties came from a rifle platoon, and that the rate of 
loss in rifle platoons was 90 percent. Thus there began in Normandy and continued through 
December of 1944 a severe infantry shortage in Europe, compounded by Army decisions to send 
more riflemen to the Pacific. As the Battle of the Bulge started, Bradley was working hard to 
solve the problem, and found that the only way was to assign men from other skills-including 
antiaircraft artillerymen, now that the German Air Force seemed largely defeated--to the infantry. 

The A rmy was f ar more lavishly equi pped than i ts enemy, but in al most every category of 
weaponry, the Germans had superior hardware. Tanks are the best example. Until 1935 in 
American doctrine, the tank was essentially a machine-gun carrier that accompanied the Infantry. 
Experiments with mounting heavy guns in tanks did not get very far, the Chief of Infantry in 
1 938 declaring that a 75-mm. gun was useless in a tank. In 1940, both the rival armies fought the 
Battle of France with tanks armed to a 75-mm standard, and the Germans had already 
experimented with the88-mm gun in a turret. In June 1940, the U.S. adopted the 75-mm gun for 
tanks. In the spring of 1944, as Anglo-American armies prepared for the invasion of Europe, the 
largest gun on an operational American tank was still a short- barrel led, low- muzzle-velocity 
75-mm, the standard armament of the then-standard M4 Sherman tank. At the same time, 
Germany's Panther tanks carried long-barrelled, high- muzzle-velocity 75s and the Tiger carried 
the 88-mm gun. To kill tanks, American doctrine relied on the tank destroyer, a fast, 
heavily-gunned, lightly- armored vehicle standardized as the M10 in 1942. It mounted a3-inch, 
high-muzzle- velocity, flat-trajectory gun on a Sherman chassis. The need for more power to 
cope with German tanks brought the M18, with a76-mm gun, into service in 1944. The M18 


had a shallow open turret and was mounted on a M24 light tank chassis. The M36, an M10 
redesigned to accommodate a 90-mm gun, came into service about the same time. On none of 
these vehi cl es was the armor comparabl e to that of German tanks. Tank destroyers, appropri atel y 
armed to be "killer tanks," lacked the armor to stand up to German tanks for the fight. 

Anti-tank weapons were a similar case. The American 2.36- inch rocket launcher, or 
"bazooka" was too small to penetrate the front armor of German tanks and demanded careful 
aim against soft spots. This was no easy chore for an exposed, nervous infantryman when a 
massi ve German tank I oomed so cl ose that he coul d hear the squeak of the bogi es. The Germans 
adopted an 88-mm Panzerfaust, a rocket- propel led shaped-charge grenade that was about twice 
as powerful as the American bazooka When James M. Gavin was a colonel commanding the 
505th Parachute Infantry, his men tried out the bazooka in Sicily and found it disappointing. 
Gavin later wrote that "As for the 82nd Airborne Division, it did not get adequate antitank 
weapons until it began to capture the first German panzerfausts. By the fall of '44 we had 
truckloads of them. We also captured German instructions for their use, made translations, and 
conducted our own training with them. They were the best hand-carried antitank weapon of the 
war." The U.S. did not even initiate a project for a more powerful, 3.5-inch rocket until August 

In two areas, however, the United States had a distinct advantage. The Garand 
.30-caliber M1 semi-automatic was the best standard infantry shoulder arm of the war. No other 
rifle matched its combination of accuracy, rate of fire, and reliability. In artillery, too the 
American Army had the edge. It was not that the artillery was qualitatively better than German 
equipment, although the U.S. 105-mm howitzer was at least the equal of its German counterpart 
of the same caliber. The effectiveness of American artillery, was multiplied by the best 
equipment and techniques of any army for fire direction, observation, and coordination. "I do not 
have to tell you who won the war," George Patton said in 1945. "You know our artillery did." 
General George C. Marshall agreed when he wrote that "We believe that our use of massed heavy 
artillery fire was far more effective than the German techniques," concluding that "our method of 
employment of these weapons has been one of the decisive factors of our ground campaigns 
throughout the world." 

As the Battle of the Bulge began, the 12th Army Group was maneuvering 31 divisions 
and was wel I on the way to sol vi ng the seri ous suppl y probl ems that had hal ted i ts advance on the 
German borders in September. Both soldiers and their leaders were confident of their own 
abilities and of the prospects for victory. 


American artillery played a crucial part throughout the Battle of the Bulge. Without the battalions 
at Brig. Gen. Anthony McAuliffe's disposal, the defenders of Bastogne would probably never have 
been able to hold against the German attacks. The same was true across the Ardennes front, and 
although the artillery did not react strongly to the initial attacks on 16 December because the 
German bombardment disrupted communications and many units were hampered by having to 
displace rapidly to the rear to keep from being overrun, the guns soon came into their own. Bad 


weather also hampered observation of fire on the first day. Nonetheless, the artillery at Monschau 
literally stopped a German attack by itself, and in the V Corps sector, the 99th Infantry Division 
Artillery helped that green unit to hold its ground for two days, until the V Corps artillery on 
Elsenborn Ridge began to carry the burden. The weight of fire was tremendous: on the night of 17 
December, for example, one V Corps infantry battalion was covered by a defensive barrage of 
11,500 rounds. As the American defense solidified, particularly on the northern and southern 
shoulders of the German penetration, the artillery really began to make itself felt. By 23 December, 
the artillery brought 4,155 guns into action and fired 1,255,000 rounds of ammunition during the 
course of the battle. 

In many cases, artillery did not need to destroy the enemy to have the desired effect. Often, artillery 
fire diverted the German attacks from their axis of advance and derailed the German scheme of 
maneuver, even without causing much physical damage. Most of the firing involved conventional 
artillery, although some 210,000 rounds of ammunition had been fitted with the new and highly 
secret VT (variable time) or POZIT fuze, which detonated the shell by external influence in close 
vicinity of the target, without explosion by contact. The VT fuze allowed artillery to detonate 
above ground, thus spending its effect much more effectively against troops in the open. Claims 
were made that the VT and POZIT fuze played an important part in winning the battle. The truth 
seems to be that, however effective such ammunition was, very little of it was fired before January 

As at Bastogne, artillery took over much of the effective anti-tank combat, with 155-mm guns 
particularly successful in attaining mobility kills. Artillery was successful not just in the indirect 
fire mode, however, but also in direct fire. Post-battle examination of destroyed German tanks 
showed that many of them had been put out of action by howitzer fire. The Antiaircraft Artillery 
Gun Battalions assigned to the various corps played an important role as well. Trained to deliver 
indirect fire in the traditional artillery fashion, the AA gunners also had a 90-mm weapon that 
packed a powerful punch because of its high muzzle velocity. Antiaircraft batteries were therefore 
successful throughout the Ardennes in the anti-tank role. Once artillery spotter aircraft were able to 
fly, the gunners also had considerable success in breaking up concentrations of both tanks and 
troops before they were able to deliver attacks against American positions. 

The many American artillery battalions would have been less effective, however, had they not been 
directed by the most effective fire direction system used by any nation during the war. American 
forward observers could call down an enormous weight of fire on their selected targets, mixing 
divisional and corps fires with the fires of the mortar units organic to the infantry regiments. 
Indeed, German commanders later criticized American artillery fire as "methodical, schematic, and 
wasteful." It was also true that American gunners sometimes allowed gaps to develop at division 
and corps boundaries where they failed to provide overlapping fire between zones. Nonetheless, 
the system functioned when it was needed, and the successful defense of Elsenborn Ridge by V 
Corps units (among many similar cases) depended on the accuracy and weight of the defensive 
concentrations that V Corps Artillery fired, particularly on the night of 17/18 December. Much of 
the artillery's effectiveness came from well-trained forward observers dedicated to their supported 
infantry and armor units, for "men counted as much as weight of metal," as the official historian 
wrote. In the 15th Field Artillery Battalion, to cite only one case, 32 forward observers out of a 
total of 48 became casualties in six days of battle. 


Artillery organization: American corps commanders had a considerable amount of artillery at 
their disposal and were always seeking more. The case of V Corps, which at one point had 37 field 
artillery battalions, is typical: 

V Corps Artillery: 

187th Field Artillery Group 

751st Field Artillery Battalion 
997th Field Artillery Battalion 

190th Field Artillery Group 

62nd Field Artillery Battalion 
190th Field Artillery Battalion 
272nd Field Artillery Battalion 
268th Field Artillery Battalion 

406th Field Artillery Group 

76th Field Artillery Battalion 
941st Field Artillery Battalion 
953rd Field Artillery Battalion 
987th Field Artillery Battalion 

186th Field Artillery Battalion 
196th Field Artillery Battalion 

200th Field Artillery Battalion 
955th Field Artillery Battalion 

Division Artillery, Divisions Assigned to V Corps: 

1 st Infantry Division Artillery 

5th Field Artillery Battalion 
7th Field Artillery Battalion 
32nd Field Artillery Battalion 
33rd Field Artillery Battalion 

2nd Infantry Division Artillery 

12th Field Artillery Battalion 
15th Field Artillery Battalion 
37th Field Artillery Battalion 
38th Field Artillery Battalion 

9th Infantry Division Artillery 

26th Field Artillery Battalion 
34th Field Artillery Battalion 
60th Field Artillery Battalion 
84th Field Artillery Battalion 

30th Infantry Division Artillery 

1 13th Field Artillery Battalion 
1 18th Field Artillery Battalion 
197th Field Artillery Battalion 
230th Field Artillery Battalion 

78th Infantry Division Artillery 

307th Field Artillery Battalion 
308th Field Artillery Battalion 
309th Field Artillery Battalion 
903rd Field Artillery Battalion 

99th Infantry Division Artillery 

370th Field Artillery Battalion 
371st Field Artillery Battalion 
372nd Field Artillery Battalion 

(Dr. Charles Kirkpatrick) 



Biographical Sketches - 
Senior Allied Commanders 

Thirteen Commanders of the Western Front 

Front row, L to R: General Patton, General Bradley, General Eisenhower, 

General Hodges, General Simpson 
Second row: General Kean, General Corlett, General Collins, 

General Gerow, General Quesada 
Third row: General Leven C. Allen, General Charles C. Hart, 

General Truman C. Thorson 

Photographed in Belgium, 10 October 1944 

American Commanders 

General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower 
Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces 

Promoted to five star rank on the eve of the German 
counteroffensive through the Ardennes, Eisenhower 
was the senior officer in the European Theater of 
Operations and commander of the Allied coalition 
against Hitler. Born in the little east Texas town of 
Denison in 1890, he graduated from the U. S. 
Military Academy at West Point in 1915 with a 
commission in the infantry. World War I brought 
the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel and service 
with training the Army's new tank corps, but 
Eisenhower was disappointed that he never had the 
chance to command in France during the fighting. 
He was promoted to major in 1920 and held that 
rank through the next sixteen years of service in the 
small interwar Army, serving in various staff 
positions and, occasionally, with troops. He did not 
command a battalion until 1940. The key to his 
professional development was an early assignment 
in Panama with Brig. Gen. Fox Conner, operations 
officer on General John J. Pershing's staff during 
World War I in France and at that time commanding an infantry brigade. Conner tutored 
Eisenhower in the military art and, most significantly, caused him to think deeply about the 
problems of coalition command. After graduating from the Command and General Staff School at 
Fort Leavenworth, the acknowledged portal to future advancement, and two years later from the 
Army War College, Eisenhower served on the War Department General Staff, where he worked in 
the Office of the Chief of Staff while Douglas MacArthur led the Army. He subsequently worked 
again for MacArthur in the Philippines and returned to the United States as a lieutenant colonel in 
1939 for battalion command in the 15th Infantry, duty as regimental executive officer, and then as 
chief of staff of the 3rd Infantry Division. Thereafter, Eisenhower became chief of staff of the 
newly-activated IX Corps and then of Third Army. It was in that position that he first gained 
national attention, being credited with the battle plan by means of which Lt. Gen. Walter Kruger's 
Third Army decisively defeated Lt. Gen. Ben Lear's Second Army in the famous Louisiana 
Maneuvers of 1941. 


Almost immediately, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall summoned Eisenhower to 
Washington, where he soon made the younger man chief of the War Plans Division of the general 
staff and quickly promoted him to major general. Developing plans that were then in formulation, 
Eisenhower sketched the basic strategy of establishing a base in the United Kingdom and attacking 
Germany by amphibious landings in France. In June 1942, Marshall named him the commanding 
general of the new European Theater. In only a few months, Eisenhower had earned Marshall's full 
trust. Marshall saw in him a man who had the vision to execute the strategy that the Allies had 
agreed upon. After commanding the 1942 Allied landings in North Africa and the subsequent 
campaign in Tunisia, Eisenhower went on to command the Allied assault on Sicily and the Italian 
mainland, in the process gaining valuable experience not only in coalition command, but also in the 
difficult problems of amphibious operations. At the end of 1943, he was named Supreme Allied 
Commander for the invasion of Europe and directed the SHAEF effort to "utilize the resources of 
two great nations . . . with the decisiveness of a single authority." This was never easy, but in 
Eisenhower, President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill found a man 
whose single-minded dedication to the goal of Allied unity was equal to the task. Following the 
success of the Allied landings at Normandy on 6 June 1944, the buildup of the beachhead, the 
breakout at St. Lo, the destruction of a large part of the German Army in the west in the Falaise 
Pocket, and the race across France in September, 1944, Eisenhower's armies stood on the very 
frontiers of the Reich by the early fall — far ahead of the most ambitious predictions of staff 
planners. It was at that point that a shortage of supplies imposed by a paucity of good ports and 
overextended lines of supply from the Norman beaches caused the Allies to pause and allowed the 
Germans to regroup and solidify their defenses along the Westwall fortifications, known to 
Americans as the Siegfried Line 

Eisenhower's perpetual good humor was often strained by the problems involved in keeping the 
Allied coalition firmly wedded to a single strategy, and in coping with the strong personalities of 
many of his subordinates. His perennial problems were Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law 
Montgomery, commander of British 21st Army Group, and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., 
commander of Third U.S. Army — two men who were, as General Omar N. Bradley remarked in 
1978, "two sides of the same coin." Some British commanders, and in particular Montgomery and 
his mentor, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, saw Eisenhower as 
"a nice chap; no general," and thought him unsuited to command the ground battle, although they 
agreed he was superb at the political level. American commanders, including Patton and Bradley, 
often complained that Eisenhower forgot that he was an American and was unable to say no to 
Montgomery. By November of 1944, however, Eisenhower had firm control of SHAEF and 
imposed his will in his subordinates. Although at least one major disagreement lay in the future, he 
had disposed of Montgomery's often-expressed preference for a single thrust toward Berlin and 
insisted on a broad-front strategy with the industrial heartland of Germany as the ultimate goal. (Dr. 
Charles Kirkpatrick) 


Lieutenant General Omar Nelson Bradley 
Commanding General, 12th U.S. Army Group 

Born in Clark, Missouri, in 1893, Bradley was a West Point classmate of Eisenhower and graduated 
from the U.S. Military Academy in 1915 with a commission in the infantry. Like Eisenhower, he 

did not serve in battle during World War I, but instead 
made a reputation as a trainer of troops. After teaching at 
West Point, graduating from Command and General Staff 
School, and serving in various troop assignments, Bradley 
went to Fort Benning, Georgia, where from 1929 through 
1933 he had the most important assignment of his early 
career. Teaching at the infantry school while Brig. Gen. 
George C. Marshall was assistant commandant, Bradley 
earned Marshall's confidence and regard. Thereafter he 
was a "Marshall man," one of the select handful of 
officers to whom Marshall later looked to command the 
mobilization Army. After graduating from the Army War 
College and again serving at West Point, Bradley in 1938 
served on the War Department General Staff. Marshall 
promoted him over the grade of colonel to brigadier 
general in 1941 and made him commandant of the 
Infantry School. Soon, he commanded both the 82nd and 
28th Infantry Division during their training and, as a 
major general, went overseas to serve with Eisenhower in North Africa. There, he took command 
of II Corps during the battles in Tunisia and, promoted to lieutenant general, led that corps in the 
invasion of Sicily in 1943. At that time, he was under command of Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., 
who led Seventh Army. Selected by Eisenhower as the American ground commander for the 
invasion of Europe, Bradley went to England and took over First U.S. Army, commanding it in the 
assault at Normandy and the exploitation from the beachhead. With the activation of 12th Army 
Group in July, 1944, Bradley moved up to a command that included First Army and Third Army, 
under command of Patton (by then Bradley's subordinate), and eventually of the Ninth Army (in 
September 1944) and Fifteenth Army (after the Battle of the Bulge) in the advance across France 
and to the borders of Germany. Bradley's 12th Army Group eventually numbered 1.3 million men, 
the greatest force ever to serve under one American field commander. 

Bradley ran the Veterans Administration at the end of the war and became Chief of Staff of the 
Army in 1948. In 1949 he was promoted to the rank of General of the Army and became the first 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He held that post through the Korean War until he retired in 
1953. He wrote his war memoir, A Soldier's Story, in 1951, and subsequently authored another 
memoir in collaboration with Clay Blair. He died in New York City in 1981. (CK) 


Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee 
Commanding General, Communications Zone 

John Lee was a Regular Army officer, a West Point graduate of 1909, and, like so many of the 
officers who were to hold key positions in the European theater, an engineer. Between 1909 and 

1917 his assignments included tours of duty in the Canal 
Zone, Guam, and the Philippines, as well as the zone of 
interior. During World War I he served first as aide to 
Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, commanding general of the 
89 th Division and later Army Chief of Staff, and then as 
chief of staff of the 89 th Division, actively participating in 
the planning and execution of the St. Mihiel and Meuse- 
Argonne offensives. In the course of his overseas duty he 
was awarded the Silver Star, the Distinguished Service 
Medal, and was twice decorated by the French 
Government. During most of the period between wars 
Lee held the usual peacetime engineer assignments, 
principally on rivers and harbors projects. In 1940 Lee 
was given command of the San Francisco Port of 
Embarkation and promoted to brigadier general; a year 
later he took command of the 2d Division; and in 1942 he 
was again promoted. 

The history of U.S. logistics of the war in Europe is basically the history of the Services of 
Supply (SOS) and its successor on the continent, the Communications Zone; and the logistical 
story is therefore inseparably associated with the officer who in May 1942 was designated by 
General Marshall to command the SOS. General Lee was commanding the 2d Division at Fort 
Sam Houston, Texas, when on 3 May Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, commanding general of the 
War Department SOS, summoned him to Washington for the new assignment. 

The choice of General Marshall and General Somervell thus brought to the job a man of varied 
experience and an officer with a reputation as an able organizer and strict disciplinarian. It also 
brought to the job a controversial personality, for about Lee and his position most of the 
controversies over theater organization and command were to rage for the next three years. 

Lee arrived in Washington on 5 May and in a series of conferences in the next two weeks laid 
the basis for the SOS organization in the United Kingdom. A staff was selected within the next 
week. On 14 May General Lee held the first meeting of his service chiefs, at which he read the 
draft of a directive indicating the lines along which General Marshall and General Somervell 
desired to have the SOS organized. Before leaving Washington, acutely aware of the difficulties 
faced by the SOS in 1917-18, General Lee also called on Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, 
commanding general of the American Expeditionary Forces SOS in World War I, hoping to 
profit from his experience and thus avoid a repetition of the errors of that period. On 23 May 
1942 General Lee left the United States with nine members of his staff and with basic plans for 
the organization of the SOS in England. 

The fledgling theater headquarters in the United Kingdom was to be organized "along the 
general pattern of a command post with a minimum of supply and administrative services." 


These were to be grouped under the SOS and commanded by General Lee. More specifically, 
General Lee was given the following powers: 

[He was] invested with all authority necessary to accomplish his mission including, but not 

limited to, authority to approve or delegate authority to: 

a. Approve all plans and contracts of all kinds necessary to carry out the objectives of 
this directive. 

b. Employ, fix the compensation of, and discharge civilian personnel without regard to 
civil service rules. 

c. Purchase any necessary supplies, equipment, and property, including rights in real 
estate practicable of acquirement. 

d. Adjudicate and settle all claims. 

e. Take all measures regarded as necessary and appropriate to expedite and prosecute 
the procurement, reception, processing, forwarding, and delivery of personnel, equipment, 
and supplies for the conduct of military operations. 

The directive of 14 May thus assigned broad powers to the SOS, and for this reason it developed 
into one of the most controversial documents in the history of the theater. It undoubtedly bore 
the strong influence of General Somervell, who was acutely conscious of the difficulties 
experienced by the SOS in World War I. But the attempt to limit the top U.S. headquarters to a 
minimum of administrative and supply functions and to assign them to the SOS was the cause of 
a long struggle between the SOS and the theater headquarters and the basic reason for the several 
reorganizations which the two headquarters underwent in the next two years. 

Lee was indefatigable in his rounds of inspections of field organizations, and was fully aware of 
the criticism generated by his use of a special train for that purpose. The acquisition of such a 
vehicle had been strongly urged on him by General Harbord. The train was intended as a 
timesaver, and that it undoubtedly was. General Lee refused to bow to the criticism, convinced 
in his own mind that the train was fully justified. As attested by members of his staff, it was a 
work train, and an instrument of torture. General Lee set a grueling pace on his inspection trips, 
and it was rare when a meal was served on the train during daylight hours, for most runs were 
made at night. The day's work, consisting of inspections & conferences, normally began at five 
in the morning and lasted until evening. Most of the staff members who accompanied the SOS 
commander considered the trips agonizing ordeals and would have avoided them if possible. 

One other criticism of the SOS commander was probably more justified. Lee assigned some 
officers to positions of authority and responsibility whose qualifications were at times obscure. 
He was exceedingly loyal to these subordinates, usually placing full confidence in them. This 
otherwise admirable trait sometimes put him in difficult positions, and his own reputation often 
suffered from their actions and unpopularity. In any event, the atmosphere at the ETOUSA-SOS 
headquarters was not consistently conducive to the best teamwork. 

However inaccurately these circumstances may have reflected the real efficiency of the SOS, it is 
an inescapable fact that General Lee at least gave poor first impressions and did not always 
immediately inspire the confidence of the various commanders of the theater. Both General 
Andrews and General Devers were at first disposed to make a change in the command of the 
SOS when they assumed command of the theater. The former commanded the theater only a few 
months. General Devers, after a second look at the operations of the SOS, was satisfied that 
General Lee was doing a very satisfactory job. General Eisenhower's reactions were similar. 
While he initially had doubts of Lee's ability to create an efficient supply organization and was 


fully aware of the complaints of the combat commanders and the tensions between the various 
headquarters, he finally decided to abandon at least temporarily any thought of replacing the 
SOS commander, to put complete faith in him, and to trust in the ability of his organization to 
support the American forces in the coming operation. While the top-level organization and 
functioning of the SOS left something to be desired, and while there were shortcomings in the 
supply procedures within the SOS, observers from the Army Service Forces generally agreed 
that its field organization was functioning well and that the qualms felt by some commanders 
regarding the SOS's ability to support the cross-Channel operations were unjustified. (Extracted 
from Ruppenthal, Roland G., Logistical Support of the Armies: Volume I, May 1941 -September 
1944 , Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1953) 

Major General Courtney H. Hodges 
Commanding General, First U.S. Army 

Courtney Hodges was born in Perry, Georgia, on 5 January 
1887 and entered the U. S. Military Academy in 1904. Not 
well grounded academically, he was "found" deficient in 
mathematics and resigned after one year. Had he graduated, he 
would have been a member of the Class of '08 and, as such, 
some seven years senior to the men under whom he eventually 
served in Europe, Bradley and Eisenhower, both members of 
the Class of '15. On 5 November 1906, Hodges enlisted in the 
Army as a private and — a great rarity of the pre-World War I 
Army — earned a commission from the ranks in 1909, just one 
year behind his USMA classmates. In 1916, he took part in the 
Punitive Expedition into Mexico against Pancho Villa. 

During World War I, he won a Distinguished Service Cross 
and a Silver Star during the Meuse-Argonne offensive and rose 
to the rank of temporary lieutenant colonel, commanding an 
infantry battalion in the 5 th Division. In the last days of the war, 
he personally led a reconnaissance across the Meuse River and into the main German battle 
positions. In forty hours of battle, his position became the spearhead of the attack that finally put 
the Army across the Meuse in force. 

Hodges met Bradley when they taught at West Point together from 1920-1924, where then-Major 
Hodges was a member of the Tactical Department. Bradley commented that he was perhaps the 
first non-graduate to teach tactics to cadets and "ironically, he was a profound inspiration to the very 
corps that had earlier rejected him." Bradley thought him the "quintessential Georgia gentleman," 
and the most modest man he had ever met. Hodges was an exceptional marksman and was at that 
time the Army's leading light in the national rifle matches. 

While George C. Marshall was Assistant Commandant at the Infantry School — the famous 
"Benning Renaissance" of 1927-1930 — Hodges served there as a member of the Infantry Board and 


made a strong favorable impression on Marshall. While there, the already close friendship with 
Omar Bradley, who was also a member of the faculty, flourished. In 1933-1934, Bradley and 
Hodges were classmates at the Army War College. Thereafter, Hodges served in the Philippines 
before returning to the United States in 1941 to become Chief of Infantry, and therefore responsible 
for the organization and training of what the Army still saw as its primary arm. In 1943, Hodges 
assumed command of Third U.S. Army from Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger. He did well in that 
assignment, convincing Marshall that, despite his age — he was fifty seven — he was not too old to 
go to war. Hodges arrived in Europe to understudy Bradley as deputy commanding general of First 
Army and ultimately to take command when Bradley was promoted to command 12 th Army Group. 
Bradley and Hodges were alike in many ways, and thought much the same way about fighting the 
war. That prompted some to remark that, when Hodges took over First Army from Bradley, "the 
new broom swept nothing." Bradley's aide de camp, Maj. Chet Hansen, commented that Hodges 
was not an inspiring presence as a soldier, looking "like a small town banker in uniform." Bradley, 
he thought, exuded confidence and firmness. Hodges, on the other hand, seemed "more worrier 
than warrior." That was the view of many of his subordinates. Maj. Gen. Charles Corlett, XIX 
Corps commander, complained that Hodges didn't understand what was really going on in the 
depleted infantry divisions that were fighting in the Huertgen Forest, despite his frequent telephonic 
demands for information. Hodges, moreover, clearly played favorites, a fact that his subordinates 
couldn't fail to note. He doted on Maj. Gen. Joe Collins, VII Corps commander. Hodges and 
Corlett, on the other hand, barely could exchange a civil word. Others saw Hodges differently. 
Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin delivered a complimentary verdict that still said nothing about his 
virtues as an Army commander: 

I had served under Hodges earlier in the Philippine Islands in the 1930s. He was a fine Soldier 
with a distinguished record in World War I, quiet in manner and thoughtful and considerate in 
his relations with his subordinates. He was highly regarded in the peacetime army. 

Even with their years of friendship and mutual esteem, Bradley remained concerned about Hodges 
and his abilities. "I began to fret privately," he wrote years later, because "Courtney seemed 
indecisive and overly conservative. I hoped that my veteran First Army staff — Bill Kean in 
particular — would keep a fire under him." Eisenhower seems to have shared the same worries, 
fearing that Hodges, separated from First Army staff, "might lack drive." Ultimately, however, 
assessing the comparative merits of his major commanders, Bradley concluded that Hodges "was on 
a par with George Patton, but owing to his modesty and low profile, he has been all but forgotten." 

Lieutenant General George Smith Patton, Jr. 
Commanding General, Third U.S. Army 

Patton was born in California in 1885 to a wealthy family. Throughout his youth, he evidenced 
what appears in retrospect to have been dyslexia, which helps to account for the curious spelling 
that characterizes his memoir, War As I Knew It (1945), and that made academics extremely 
difficult for him. After attending the Virginia Military Institute for a year, he entered the U.S. 
Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1909 as a lieutenant of Cavalry. Early 


assignments in and around Washington, D.C., gave him an acquaintance with Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson, who was coincidentally to occupy the same post during World War II. He 
competed in the modern Pentathlon at the 1912 Oympics in Stockholm. He attended the French 
Cavalry School at Saumur, following which he became an instructor at the Mounted Service 
School at Fort Riley. There, he wrote the Army manual for the saber. In 1916, Patton convinced 
Gen. John J. Pershing to assign him as a supernumerary aide de camp for the Punitive Expedition 
into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa. Patton established a reputation for daring during the 
following months, as well as becoming well-known to the future commanding general of the 
American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. 

Selected to serve on Pershing's staff in 1917, Patton went 
to France and then obtained a transfer to the new tank 
corps, where he was one of the principal staff officers 
responsible for organization and training of the new arm. 
A temporary lieutenant colonel in command of the 304 th 
Tank Brigade, he participated in the St. Mihiel Offensive, 
where most of his tanks suffered mechanical failures, to 
his chagrin, and where he did most of his fighting on foot. 
In the later Meuse-Argonne Offensive, he again led tanks, 
this time as a temporary colonel. He was wounded in 
action in the latter battle and ended World War I with a 
Distinguished Service Cross, several Silver Stars and a 
number of French decorations. 

In 1919, Patton commanded a brigade in the tank training 
establishment at Fort Meade, Maryland. Major Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, who had spent the war training tank 
crewmen, commanded one of his battalions. In that year 
he reverted to his permanent grade of major and returned to the horse cavalry. Over the next 
twenty years, he commanded a squadron of the 3 rd Cavalry at Fort Myer, served two tours in 
Hawaii, was a staff officer in the Office of the Chief of Cavalry, graduated from the Command 
and General Staff School and then the War College. He was promoted to colonel in 1938 and 
assumed command of the 3 Cavalry. Elderly by Gen. George Marshall's standards in 1940, 
Patton still obtained promotion to brigadier general and a brigade command in the 2 nd Armored 
Division, which he subsequently commanded with conspicuous success as major general in the 
famous Louisiana Maneuvers. Later in 1941, he formed the I Armored Corps at the Desert 
Training Center 

In 1942, he commanded troops in the landings in North Africa, Operation TORCH, going ashore 
around Casablanca. After the disaster at Kasserine Pass, he assumed command of II Corps and 
led it throughout the Tunisian Campaign until April, 1943, when he took command of Seventh 
Army for the landings in Sicily in July. There, his earlier touchy relations with British 
commanders flowered and bloomed in a rivalry with Montgomery. His successes in the Sicilian 
campaign were overshadowed by the infamous slapping incident in a U.S. military hospital that 
resulted in his reassignment to a purely nominal command in the deception operation in England, 
Operation fortitude. 

In January of 1944, he was named to command Third Army and began organizing and training 
the force that went ashore in France on 6 July and became operational under 12 th Army Group 


command on 1 August. In that position, he was under command of Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, 
who had been his subordinate in II Corps in Tunisia and in Seventh Army in Sicily. Their 
relationship was not always an easy one. Patton argued, unsuccessfully, for the long 
envelopment of German forces at Falaise. His subsequent operations to cross the Seine and 
exploit across France won him a reputation as America's premier tank general. 

Later appreciations of Patton' s abilities have been mixed — in part because of his enormous ego 
and volatile personality. He always sought the limelight and seemed to have no better 
understanding for operations in an Allied context than did his principal rival, Montgomery. 
Unabashedly American, Patton believed that U.S. forces could have, and should have, been 
given priority in operations in western Europe, and that this would have led to an earlier end to 
the war. One recent critique that spared no Allied general, Montgomery included, reached the 
conclusion that Patton' s reputation was overdrawn. According to that view, he did not so much 
pursue the Germans across France as simply follow them, inasmuch as his forces were not 
actually in contact much of the time. When Patton came up against a determined defense at 
Metz, he did not perform well, a fact that bolstered the argument that, particularly in the pursuit, 
he was "the best traffic cop in the history of the U.S. Army." American opinion, and particularly 
that of the armor community, held an entirely different view and pointed to his tactical 
innovations and intuitive feel for the battlefield. 

There is no doubt, however, that his personality limited his effectiveness, and that his 
impulsiveness — as in the slapping incident — limited his opportunities. Patton' s taste for 
publicity and his rivalry with Montgomery often increased Eisenhower's difficulties. He was no 
easy subordinate, and Bradley actually did not want him as commander of Third Army. Like 
Montgomery, however, he engendered enormous loyalty from the soldiers under his command, 
who performed brilliantly for him. 

Patton was critically injured in an automobile accident near Mannheim in December of 1945 and 
died of his injuries twelve days later in Heidelberg. ( CK) 

Lieutenant General William Hood Simpson 
Commanding General, Ninth U.S. Army 

Born 19 May 1888 and raised in the north-central Texas town of Weatherford, William Hood 
Simpson developed a respect for the frontier values of hard work, determination, and a cheerful 
calmness in the face of adversity. Despite what would soon painfully emerge as extremely poor 
academic preparation, Simpson received an appointment to the US Military Academy at West 
Point in 1905. He entered the Academy that summer, joining the other members of the Class of 
1909, including a "turn-back" from the Class of 1908 - George S. Patton, Jr. Patton and another 
member of the Class of 1908, Courtney H. Hodges, had failed mathematics during Plebe year. 
Patton had been allowed to re-enter West Point with Simpson's class; Hodges, however, was not 
allowed to re-enter and he enlisted in the Regular Army as a private. 

Simpson became a popular, well-liked member of the class and was noted for his good nature if 
not for his scholarship. The 1909 yearbook describes him as "Cheerful Charlie", and the entry 


includes this description of his usual demeanor: "The slow cracking of that aboriginal visage 
terminates in a beaming countenance of good will that no glumness can withstand." This 
outstanding trait would serve him well in later years and would be remarked upon by virtually all 
who worked for him. 

In January 1910, Simpson accompanied his regiment to the 
Philippines where he saw combat in the bloody, nasty, and 
confused fighting against the Moro insurgents. In 1916 
Simpson and his regiment were dispatched to the Mexican 
border to deal with Pancho Villa's irregulars and the 
troubles caused by the turmoil of the Mexican revolution. 
From his base in El Paso, Simpson participated in General 
Pershing's Mexican Punitive Expedition. 

When the US entered World War I, Simpson had been 
assigned as aide-de-camp to Major General George Bell, 
Jr., the El Paso Military District commander. This 
fortunate assignment proved to be Simpson's ticket to 
France - and combat duty. Unlike Eisenhower and 
Bradley, Simpson managed to get overseas and into the 
fighting when his boss, Bell, assumed command of the 33d 
Infantry Division at Camp Logan, Texas, in July 1917. 
Simpson escorted the division to Brest, France, in April 

Promoted June 1918, Major Simpson gained invaluable 
experience during his unit's 7 months of combat, especially after assuming duties as the Division 
Operations Officer in August 1918. He added immeasurably to his knowledge of high-level staff 
procedures by serving as the division's Chief of Staff from the Armistice in November 1918 
until he returned to the States in June 1919. After serving the final months of overseas service as 
a temporary lieutenant colonel, Simpson reverted to his permanent rank of captain on 20 June 
1920. However, the following day Simpson was promoted a permanent major, where he would 
stay for the next 14 years. 

Simpson's experiences between the wars are similar to those of most of his contemporaries and 
include a combination of staff, command, instructor, and student assignments. Simpson's 
assignment to the Chief of Infantry's office was a significant and positive step in his career. He 
was assigned as the battalion commander of the 3d Battalion, 12 th Infantry, in June 1925. Major 
Simpson arrived at the Army War College in Washington, D.C., in August 1927. Along with 
him reported his new War College classmate, Major Dwight D. Eisenhower. 

Simpson was selected to command the 9 th Infantry Regiment at Fort Sam Houston, TX, in June 
1940. Less than 4 months later, he became a brigadier general and was transferred to Camp 
Wolters, Texas, to assume command of the Infantry Replacement Training Center. Simpson 
must have continued to demonstrate outstanding performance of duty in his several assignments 
because in October 1941 he received one of the highest complements a soldier can get - the two 
stars of a major general and command of a division. 

Simpson assumed command of the 35 th Infantry Division, then forming up for its initial training 
at Camp Robinson, AR, in October 1941. Continuing to build his fine reputation as an 


outstanding trainer of troops, Simpson began a rapid succession of training commands. From 
October 1941 until September 1943, he commanded the 35 th Division in Arkansas and 
California, then the 30 th Infantry Division at Fort Jackson, SC, and finally the XII Corps, also at 
Fort Jackson. Each of these units was, for him, a training command - someone else would take 
them into combat. Simpson, however, wanted to capitalize on his combat experience from the 
Philippines, Mexico, and World War I France. In October 1943, he began a command tour that 
would eventually lead him into combat, taking charge of the Fourth Army - later to be 
redesignated the Ninth Army - and received his third star. 

It is primarily Simpson's personal nature that has prevented recognition of his army's 
outstanding performance. Selfless and steady, Simpson placed teamwork and mission 
accomplishment above publicity and personal recognition. Had he sought the limelight, like the 
better known Patton, or had he been more colorful, it seems highly probable that Ninth Army's 
significant accomplishments would have been more widely reported. As it was, by the time 
Simpson and the Ninth Army became operational in Europe and began to achieve significant 
successes, there seemed to be only one army commander and only one army to stir the war 
correspondents' imagination and generate headlines - George Patton and his Third Army. 
Simpson, who seemed actively to avoid publicity, remained in the background, identified in 
reporters' dispatches as "the Ninth Army commander" and rarely by name. This contrasts to the 
reporters' habit of virtually always referring to Patton' s unit as "Patton's Third Army". To 
Simpson, such personal recognition was unnecessary. 

Simpson's operations officer credits his army commander for why the Ninth Army staff worked 
so well: 

General Simpson's genius lay in his characteristic manner, his command presence, his 
ability to listen, his unfailing use of his staff to check things out before making decisions, 
and his way of making all hands feel that they were important to him and to the Army... I 
have never known a commander to make better use of his staff than General Simpson. 

General Simpson retired from active service for reasons of health shortly after the end of the war 
and was promoted to four-star rank on the retired list in 1954. General Simpson died in 1980 at 
age 92. (Extracted from J.D. Morelock, Generals of the Ardennes: American Leadership in the 
Battle of the Bulge, Chapter 4, NDU Press, Washington D.C., 1994) 

Major General Leonard T. Gerow 
Commanding General, V Corps 

Born in Petersburg, Virginia, Leonard T. (Gee) Gerow was a 191 1 graduate of the Virginia Military 
Institute. A good friend of Bradley and Eisenhower, he served in the Mexican Punitive Expedition 
and in France in World War I, winning the Distinguished Service Medal. Bradley and Gerow met 
in 1924 when they were classmates in the Advanced Infantry Course at Fort Benning. He graduated 
first in the class; Bradley, second. Marshall selected Gerow to head War Plans Division of the 
WDGS. "He was an outstanding gentlemen and soldier — cool, hard-working, intelligent, well 
organized, competitive — clearly destined for high rank and responsibility." 


In March of 1939, Gerow became chairman of the special board for the development of tactical 
doctrine at Fort Benning, and then was Chief of Staff of the Provisional 2 nd Division (later 2 nd 
Infantry Division) at Fort Sam Houston. He remained in that position until the end of 1939. 
Gerow was a senior control officer with Third Army during the 1940 Louisiana maneuvers. 
After promotion to Colonel, he was assistant commandant of the Infantry School. 

Gerow was promoted to brigadier general in October 
1940, well before Patton, Clark, Spaatz, or Eisenhower, 
and was assigned to duty with the 8 th Infantry Division at 
Fort Jackson. In December of that year, he became Chief, 
War Plans Division, WDGS. 

Gerow remained at War Plans until February of 1942, 
when he was promoted to major general and took 
command of the 29 th Infantry Division at Fort Meade. He 
took the division to England in October 1942, and was 
subsequently appointed Commander of Field Forces, 
European Theater of Operations. 

At the age of 53, Gerow took command of V Corps in 
July of 1943. At that time, he was one of the youngest 
generals to be given command of a major American 
formation. He commanded V Corps during all of its 
operations from Omaha Beach on D-Day through January of 1945. These operations included 
Normandy; the Breakout; the liberation of Paris, during which event the was the first American 
general to enter that city; the capture of Compeigne, St. Quentin, Charlesville, Sedan, Bastogne, 
and the city of Luxembourg; penetration of the Siegfried Line; the Huertgen Forest, and the 
Battle of the Bulge. Gen. Omar Bradley considered Gerow one of his most trustworthy 

Gerow was promoted to lieutenant general on 1 January 1945 and assumed command of the 
Fifteenth Army on 15 January. Upon his return to the United States that year, he became 
Commandant of the Command and General Staff School, where he remained until January of 
1948, when he assumed command of Second Army at Fort Meade. 

Gerow retired on 31 July 1950. He was temporarily recalled to active duty in April 1951 and 
served as a member of the Army Logistical Support Panel in the Office of the Chief, Army Field 
Forces, Fort Monroe, Virginia. While in retirement, Gerow was promoted on the retired list to 
the rank of general, under the Act of 19 July 1954. He died at Fort Lee, Virginia, on 12 October 
1972 and was buried in Arlington Cemetery. (CK) 


Major General Joseph Lawton Collins 
Commanding General, VII Corps 

Born in New Orleans in 1896, Collins graduated from West 
Point in 1917. He did not serve in the AEF but was ordered 
to duty with the Third Army in occupation of Germany in 
May of 1919. He taught at West Point from 1921 through 
1925 and then attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning. 
From 1927 through 1931, he was an instructor at Benning. 
Promoted to major in 1932, Collins was next a student to the 
Command and General Staff School in 1933, whereupon he 
was ordered to the Philippines. He graduated from the Army 
Industrial College in 1937 and the Army War College in 
1938, serving as an instructor there until 1941. In that year, 
he was appointed as chief of staff of VII corps in Alabama. 

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Collins became chief of 
staff to Maj. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, commander of the 
Hawaiian Department. Promoted to temporary brigadier 
general in 1942, Collins took command of the 25 th Infantry 
Division and led it in battle at Guadalcanal and New Georgia, 
establishing a reputation as an effective and vigorous combat 
commander. In March of 1944, he was ordered to England, 
where he assumed command of VII Corps for the Normandy 
landings. VII Corps landed at Utah Beach and then secured the Cotentin Peninsula and the port 
of Cherbourg in June and July. In July, VII Corps was the spearhead for the breakout at St. L6 
and played a major part in the envelopment of German Seventh Army at Falaise. 

Young, attractive, vigorous, and well -spoken, Collins was a good corps commander who 
consistently delivered results. As a consequence, he was Omar Bradley's favorite commander 
and a particular favorite of Eisenhower's. Hard driving and able, he had a gift for appearing at 
the correct point on the battlefield to influence events, as he demonstrated particularly at La 
Fiere, behind Utah Beach, where he orchestrated the resources of VII Corps to support a river 
crossing at a critical moment. 

He was impatient with those who lacked his mental agility, however, and was quick to relieve 
officers from command, occasionally impulsively. In fact, far more division commanders were 
relieved of command in VII Corps than in any other corps in the European Theater of 

Collins became Chief of Staff of the Army in 1949, succeeding Bradley. He remained in the 
Army at Eisenhower's request after that tour was over as the U.S. Representative on the Military 
Committee and Standing Group of NATO, 1953-1956. He was briefly Eisenhower's personal 
representative to Vietnam with the rank of ambassador. He retired in 1956. Collins died in 
Washington, D.C., on 12 September 1987. (CK) 


Major General Troy H. Middleton 
Commanding General, VIII Corps 

Troy H. Middleton was born in Mississippi in 1889 and 
earned the B.S. from Mississippi A & M College in 1909. 
He enlisted in the Army in 1910 and was commissioned 
into the infantry in 1912. He took part in the Punitive 
Expedition into Mexico in 1917. During World War I, he 
had combat commands in the 47 th and 39 th Infantry 
Regiments in the American Expeditionary Forces, taking 
part in the Aisne-Marne campaign, the St. Mihiel offensive, 
and the Meuse-Argonne offensive. He rose to the rank of 
temporary colonel by 1918 and was decorated with the 
Distinguished Service Medal for his part in the Meuse- 
Argonne offensive. During World War I, Middleton 
commanded in combat and was awarded the Distinguished 
Service Medal for actions in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. 

Middleton then served as an instructor at the Infantry 
School at Fort Benning from 1919 through 1921. He graduated from the Command and General 
Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1924, and from the Army War College in Washington, D.C., 
in 1929. He was Professor of Military Science at Louisiana State University from 1930 to 1936. 
In 1937, he retired from the Army as a colonel to accept the post of Dean of Administration and 
later acting Vice President of that institution. 

Recalled to service in January of 1941, Middleton was assigned to the Infantry Training Center 
from 1941 through 1942, and then in March of 1942 to the 4 th Motorized Division and, in April, 
to the 36 th Infantry Division. He was promoted to brigadier general in June of 1942 and to major 
general in October of that year. He assumed command of the 45 th Infantry Division, which he 
led through 1944. In March of that year, he took command of VIII Corps, which he commanded 
until the end of the war. 

Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodges, and Patton all had a high regard for Middleton's brilliant 
leadership in Operation COBRA and in subsequent battles across western Europe. His reputation 
was that he was a corps commander of extraordinary abilities. He was awarded the 
Distinguished Service Medal, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit, and the Bronze Star during the 

Retiring from the Army again, Middleton returned to LSU and, in 1950, was appointed to the 
university presidency. Middleton continued to serve the Army in numerous consultative 
capacities. He resided in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, until his death in 1976. (CK) 


Major General Manton S. Eddy 
Commanding General, XII Corps 

Manton Eddy was born in 1892 in Chicago. He entered the 
Regular Army in November of 1916 and was commissioned 
in the infantry before World War I. He served with the rifle 
and machine gun units of the 4 th Infantry Division in France 
and was wounded in action in August of 1918. After the war, 
he served on the Infantry Board from 1921 to 1924, and then 
was Professor of Military Science at Riverside Military 
Academy from 1925 through 1929. He graduated from 
Command and General Staff School in 1934 and remained 
there as an instructor in tactics until 1939. 

Eddy became the G2 of III Corps in 1940, a position he 
retained until assigned to command the 114 th Infantry 
Regiment of the 44 th Infantry Division in 1942. He was 
promoted to brigadier general in March of that year and to 
major general in August, whereupon he assumed command 
of the 9 th Infantry Division. General Eddy commanded the 
9th Infantry Division in campaigns in Tunisia, Sicily, and 
Normandy. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the capture of the 
port of Cherbourg. By July of 1944, he had been chosen to command XII Corps, and was 
assigned to the newly-activated Third Army. 

Eddy had a sound, if unspectacular, record as a combat commander. Reporting on his 
achievements with the 9 th Infantry Division in North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy, the press 
called Eddy "the country's most brilliant division commander." That reputation was not 
enhanced by his physical appearance; even his greatest admirers commented that he looked like a 
Midwest school teacher. Eddy was somewhat more tentative as a Corps commander and had a 
tendency to control his divisions very closely, a trait that quickly brought him into conflict with 
the dynamic Maj. Gen. John "P" Wood, who commanded the 4 th Armored Division. He seemed 
to worry too much about the other corps commanders and whether they were doing better than 
he. Too, he was not nearly as audacious as Patton, and in the advance from Avranches worried 
constantly about the Third Army's flanks, which Patton had left to XIX Tactical Air Command 
to secure. For his part, Patton regarded Eddy as a very sound commander upon whom he could 

After the war, Eddy became Commandant of Command and General Staff College, deputy 
commander of EUCOM, and commanding general of Seventh Army. He retired as a lieutenant 
general. Aside from the DSC, Eddy received the Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf 
Cluster, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, two Bronze Star Medals, the 
Air Medal, and the Purple Heart. (CK) 


Major General Matthew B. Ridgway 
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps 

Ridgway graduated from West Point in April 1917, deployed 
to the Mexican border, but was assigned to teach Spanish at 
West Point in September 1918, missing his chance to join the 
American Expeditionary Forces in France. Ridgway' s career 
was quite unusual. After teaching Spanish, he stayed on at 
West Point as executive for athletics and graduate manager of 
athletics. He then shipped out for Tientsin, China, where he 
served a tour with the 15 th Infantry, arriving before George C. 
Marshall's tour as commander ended. He then became 
executive assistant to MG Frank McCoy on a special mission 
to regularize relations between the United States and 
Nicaragua. He moved on to become a member of the 
Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation on the Bolivian- 
Paraguayan border dispute. After two years in Panama he 
went to the Philippines in 1932 to serve as military advisor to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. He then 
returned to the United States, attended the Staff College and the War College, and joined the War 
Plans Division in September 1939, just as Marshall became Chief of Staff. In March 1942 he 
was promoted to brigadier general and became assistant division commander of the 82 nd Infantry 
Division. Ridgway helped lead the conversion of the Division into the first U.S. airborne 
division and then became its commander. In March 1943 he took the 82 nd into North Africa, and 
then to Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio. 

On D-Day Ridgway jumped with the division into Normandy. In August 1944 he became 
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, before Operation Market Garden, and James 
Gavin took command of the Division. During the Battle of the Bulge his corps headquarters 
assumed command of the 30 th Infantry Division and 7 th Armored Division as well as the 82 nd 
Airborne Division. 

After leading his corps to victory in Europe, Ridgway was promoted to lieutenant general and 
commanded the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, later becoming the deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander there, 1945-46. He was posted to the United Nations Military Staff Committee 
where he simultaneously served as the United States Representative and as chairman of the Inter- 
American Defense Board. He commanded the Caribbean Command, 1948-49, and then served 
as Deputy Chief for Administration, Department of the Army. During the Korean War he 
commanded 8 th Army, halting the Chinese counteroffensive and replacing General Douglas 
Mac Arthur as commander of all UN forces in Korea. He then became NATO Supreme Allied 
Commander and ended his career as Army Chief of Staff (1953-1955). Ridgway published his 
memoir, Soldier, in 1956. (Dr. Hal Nelson, BG(ret)) 


Major General Charles Hanson Corlett 
Commanding General, XIX Corps 

Charles H. Corlett was born in Nebraska in 1889 and was 
commissioned into the infantry from the United States 
Military Academy in 1913. During World War I, he served 
in the Signal Corps in the American Expeditionary Forces. 
He resigned from the Army in May of 1919 and became the 
manager of a cattle company until 1920, when he reentered 
the service. He was an instructor at the Coast Artillery 
School in 1925 and 1926 and at Command and General 
Staff School from 1927 through 1931. He served on the 
War Department General Staff from 1934 through 1938. 
From 1938 to 1940, he was Provost Marshal in Hawaii. In 
1940 and 1941, he commanded the 30 th Infantry Regiment, 
and then was chief of staff of IX Corps. Corlett was 
promoted to brigadier general in September of 1941 and to 
major general in September of 1942. 

From 1942 through 1943, he was commanding general of 
Task Force Kiska, for the fighting in the Aleutian Islands. 
In 1944, he commanded 7 tn Infantry Division with great success in the fighting at Kwajalein 
island. In part because of his experience with amphibious operations, he was then reassigned to 
the European Theater of Operations, to assist in the landings in Normandy. Corlett assumed 
command of XIX Corps in 1944 and commanded it until 1945, when he took command of 
XXXVI Corps. During the war, he was decorated with the Distinguished Service Medal with 
second Oak Leaf Cluster, the Silver Star, and the Legion of Merit. 

Corlett did not find a warm reception when he arrived in England. The commanders planning 
Operation OVERLORD were frankly uninterested in using the fruits of his experience with 
amphibious operations in the Pacific. As a consequence, Corlett was sensitive about the regard 
in which he was held and did not seem to get on very well with his Army commander. Difficult 
personal relationships were not enhanced by the fact that he was ill soon after his arrival in 
Europe, evidently of serious high blood pressure. Throughout the fighting in Normandy, Corlett 
felt neglected by Bradley and Hodges and was jealous of the intimate relationship both of his 
superiors had with the VII Corps commander, Collins. Throughout the fighting in France, 
Corlett was, among the Corps commanders, the "odd man out." (CK) 


Major General Clarence R. Huebner 
Commanding General, 1 st Infantry Division 

Clarence Huebner enlisted in the Army in 1910, rose 
through the ranks to Sergeant and was commissioned in 
1916. He served in most of the major World War I battles 
with the First Division — in spite of wounds — earning two 
Distinguished Service Crosses, a Distinguished Service 
Medal, and a Silver Star, and ending the War as an acting 
Lieutenant Colonel. He had commanded a company, 
battalion, and regiment of the First Division in combat. 

In the small post-war Army, Huebner was an instructor at 
the Infantry School for five years and at the Command and 
General Staff College for two years. He was recognized as 
an expert student and teacher of combined arms tactics. He 
graduated from all of the relevant Army schools and was 
promoted to Colonel in 1941. 

Huebner took command of the First Division in North 
Africa when higher headquarters became convinced that 
Terry Allen was losing perspective on issues beyond the Division. Huebner insisted on 
discipline and tough training, and he won the respect of the senior officers who continued with 
the Division. He led the First Division in the Sicily invasion and then brought it to England to 
train for operations in Northwest Europe. He commanded the division across Omaha beach, 
across northern France and Belgium, and into the Huertgen Forest. By mid-December he had 
been informed that he would rise to command V Corps when MG Gerow moved up to command 
an Army, but that change did not take place until 15 January 1945. He commanded V Corps 
until the end of hostilities, then served as chief of staff of U.S. Forces in Europe and acting 
commander of European Command before retiring in 1950 as a lieutenant general. (HN) 

Walter M. Robertson 
Commanding General, 2 Infantry Division 

Walter Robertson started his Army service at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and then became a 
junior officer in the 24 th Infantry Regiment with service at the Presidio of San Francisco and Ft. 
Missoula, Montana. He served in the Inspector General Directorate of the Army Expeditionary 
Forces in France and then had normal school and troop assignments after the war. 

His assignments were largely centered on Fort Sam Houston, home of the 2 nd Infantry Division, 
and before he became the Division Commander in late 1941 he had commanded two of its three 
regiments (9 th and 23 rd ) and had served as its Assistant Division Commander. He led the 
Division through the Louisiana Maneuvers, subsequent tests of the use of liaison and artillery 
spotter airplanes, and an experiment in airlifting an infantry division. He then led the Division 


through a change of station from Fort Sam Houston (its 
home since 1919) to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, where it 
spent the winter in training for winter warfare, including 
equipment tests and exercises on skis and snowshoes. These 
culminated in division-sized winter maneuvers conducted in 
northern Michigan. 

He moved the division to Northern Ireland in October 1943, 
where a lack of training areas limited training to small unit 
drills. The division staged into Southern Wales in mid- April 
1944 and came across Omaha Beach on D+l behind the 1 st 
and 29 th divisions as part of V Corps. Robertson led the 
Division in the fight for St. Lo, in the breakout across 
France, in the hard fighting on the German border, and on 
into the German heartland. He commanded XV Corps in 
Austria, 1945-46 and then became deputy commanding 

general, 6 Army before retiring in June 1950. (HN) 

Major General Norman D. Cota 

Commanding General, 28 th Infantry Division 

Norman D. Cota was born 30 May 1893 at Chelsea, 
Massachusetts, and graduated from the United States Military 
Academy in April, 1917. An infantryman, he was first 
assigned to training duty in the United States, and then as an 
instructor at the Military Academy, entirely missing overseas 
duty in World War I. From 1920 through 1924 he served 
principally as a finance officer. Cota graduated from the 
Army War College in 1936. 

From 1938 to 1940, he taught at the Command and General 
Staff School. In November, 1940, he became executive 
officer of the 16 th Infantry at Fort Jay, New York, followed in 
March of 1941 by assignment as G-2 of the 1 st Infantry 
Division. In July of 1941, he became divisional G-3, a post he 
held until June of 1942. While assigned as G-3, he devised 
and carried out extensive amphibious training exercises for the 
division. He became division Chief of Staff in June of 1942, 
while the division was preparing for movement overseas. 

In February 1943, he was promoted to brigadier general and 
assigned to British Combined Operations Headquarters in London. Through the spring and summer 
of 1943, he represented the US in a series of Anglo-American conferences on combined operations 


techniques and amphibious operations. In October of 1943, he became Assistant Division 
Commander of the 29 th Infantry Division and began training that division for the landings in France. 

Cota distinguished himself through personal gallantry while serving as Assistant Division 
Commander of the 29 th Infantry Division during the Normandy landings, and was decorated with 
both the Distinguished Service Cross and the British Distinguished Service Order. 

A member of his Weapons Section while teaching at the Infantry School in 1930, Cota had known 
Bradley for years. For his part, Bradley considered Cota a good friend. After relieving Maj. Gen. 
Lloyd Brown from command of the 28 th Infantry Division during the hedgerow fighting in France, 
Bradley assigned it to the ADC of the 9 th Infantry Division, who was mortally wounded a few hours 
after taking command. His next choice, in August, was Cota, largely because of his heroism at 
Omaha Beach. In his postwar analysis, Bradley concluded that Cota led the 28 th Infantry Division 
with great distinction, and that the division "soon became one of the toughest and most dependable 
in my command." 

After the war, Cota brought the division back to the United States and was assigned in 1946 as 
commanding general of the Fourth Service Command at Fort Jackson. He retired as a major general 
in June, 1946. He died on 4 October 1971. (CK) 

Major General Leland Stanford Hobbs 

Commanding General, 30 th Infantry Division 

Hobbs graduated from West Point in 1915, where he was 
noted for athletic prowess, lettering in football, basketball and 
track all four years and earning the 1915 Army Athletic Saber. 
He was commissioned in the Infantry and served with the 
Punitive Expedition to Mexico in 1916-17. Hobbs then was 
aide-de-camp to MG Arthur Murray and Brigadier George 
Trent before returning to West Point as an instructor and 
coach, 1920-24. He served in a number of small unit 
assignments before attending the Command and General Staff 
College, graduating in 1934 and then graduating from the 
Army War College in 1935. He served as Chief of Staff, Third 
Army, 1937-39 and then attended the Naval War College, 
graduating in 1940. He served as Chief of Staff, Trinidad 
Sector from 1941 until the spring of 1942, when he was promoted to brigadier general and 
assigned as Assistant Division Commander, 80 th Infantry Division. 

In September 1942 Hobbs was promoted to major general and became Commanding General, 
30 th Infantry Division. He retained command until September 1945, when he assumed command 
of III Corps for a short period before taking command of the 2 nd Armor Division. He served in a 
succession of command and staff positions until January 1953, when he retired as a major 
general. He died in 1966. (HN) 


Major General James M. Gavin 
Commanding General, 82 Airborne Division 

James Gavin enlisted in the Army at age 16, before finishing 
high school, but was recognized as a bright, talented young 
Soldier. He earned an "at large" appointment to West Point, 
graduating in 1929. He tried but failed to become a military 
pilot and then joined the 25 th Infantry in Arizona. During the 
1930' s he served in a succession of unit- level assignments 
and attended the Command and General Staff College. He 
then served as a Tactical Officer at West Point until 1941, 
when he returned to troop duty. 

Gavin was among the first to attend jump school and by 1942 
was a colonel commanding the 505 th Parachute Infantry 
Regiment. He jumped with his troops in Sicily and Salerno, 
establishing a reputation for leading from the front. He 
maintained that reputation when he jumped with lead 
elements as Assistant Division Commander of the 82 nd Airborne Division in Normandy after 
being promoted to brigadier general. He was promoted to major general and became Division 
Commander on the eve of Operation Market Garden and continued in command of the Division 
until the end of the war in Europe. He was serving as acting commanding general of XVIII 
Airborne Corps in mid-December 1944 in LTG General Ridgway's absence but led his division 
in the heavy fighting after it deployed to the north shoulder of the Bulge. 

Gavin served with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949-51, and then returned to Europe, where he was 
Commanding General, VII Corps, 1952-54. He returned to the Pentagon to serve on the Army 
Staff, but retired in 1958 as a lieutenant general rather than have to continue to defend before 
Congress military programs he felt endangered American security. He became CEO of Arthur 
D. Little. He left private life briefly to become President Kennedy's Ambassador to France, and 
he was never completely comfortable in the private sector, engaging in debate over Vietnam 
policies and briefly considering a run for the Presidency. As one of his classmates noted, "He 
might often march to the beat of a different drummer, but he always marched with the flag." 

Gavin published five books: On to Berlin, Airborne Warfare, War and Peace in the Space Age, 
France and the Civil War in America, and Crisis Now. (HN) 

Major General Robert C. Macon 
Commanding General, 83 Infantry Division 

Macon graduated from the Virginia Polytechnique Institute in 1912 and was commissioned in 
1916, serving initially with the 19 th Infantry Regiment and then with the 15 th Infantry Regiment 
in China (1920-22). After attending the Infantry Officer's Course at Ft. Benning, he served as 
PMS&T at VPI for four years. He attended the two-year course at the Command and General 


Staff School and then spent two years in the Panama Canal Department, first as G-4, then G-3. 
He graduated from the War College in 1934 and served as an instructor at the Infantry School, 
1934-39. He then served as G-3 Plans officer for VII Corps Area until August 1940, when he 
took command of the 6 th Armored Infantry while tests of the armored infantry concepts were 
being conducted. He then became G-3 of the 4 th Armored Division before commanding the 7 th 
Infantry Regiment in the 3 rd Infantry Division in North Africa. When he was promoted to 


Brigadier General in 1943 he became assistant division commander of the 83 Infantry Division 
and assumed command in January 1944. He commanded the division until the end of the war, 
then became military attache to Moscow, 1946-48, and Deputy Commanding General Army 
Field Forces, 1949-52, until he retired. (HN) 

Major General Alan W. Jones 
Commanding General, 106 th Infantry Division 

Alan Jones attended the University of Washington, 1914- 
1917, and joined the U.S. Army in the summer of 1917. He 
was commissioned in the Infantry in 1919 and did not see 
action with the American Expeditionary Forces. He served 
with the 45 th Infantry in the Philippines and then served five 
years as an instructor at the Infantry School (1924-29), where 
his professionalism and tactical skills brought him to George 
Marshall's attention. 

He attended the Command and General Staff School, 1934- 
36, and graduated from the Army War College in 1938. He 
then served with the 19 th Infantry in Hawaii until 1941, when 
he joined the Operations and Training Division of the War 
Department General Staff for nearly a year. 

He returned to troop training in March 1942, when he was 
promoted to Brigadier General and became Assistant Division 
Commander of the 90 m Infantry Division. He remained in that position until February 1943, 
when he became Commanding General, 106 th Infantry Division as it was being formed. He 
commanded the Division throughout its training, equipping and exercise cycle and brought it into 
line near St. Vith on 11 December 1944. Jones was hospitalized for wounds in 1945 and retired 
in October 1945. (HN) 


Major General Ernest N. Harmon 
Commanding General, 2 Armored Division 

Ernie Harmon graduated from West Point in April 1917, 
was commissioned in the Cavalry, and began his career at 
Ft. Ethan Allen, Vermont. He deployed to France with "F" 
Troop of the 2 nd Cavalry Regiment, the only U.S. Cavalry 
unit that saw battle action with the AEF (in the Vosges 
sector during the St. Mihiel offensive). He returned to the 
United States in 1919 and attended the Cavalry School at Ft. 
Riley before being assigned to the faculty at West Point, 
where he taught mechanical drawing, served as backfield 
coach for the football team, formed the Academy's first 
lacrosse team, and participated in the 1924 Olympics in the 
modern Pentathlon. He then joined the 6 l Cavalry 
Regiment at Ft. Oglethorpe for two years before being 
assigned as PMS&T at Norwich University (1927-31). He graduated from the two-year 
curriculum at the Command and General Staff School in 1933 and then from the Army War 
College in 1934. He commanded a squadron of the 8 th Cavalry at Ft. Bliss and then was 
assigned to the War Department General Staff. 

When the Armored Force began to take shape in 1939, he was the G-4 and later became its Chief 
of Staff. He was instrumental in the formation of the 2 nd Armored Division and became its 
Commanding General before its deployment to North Africa. He commanded the 2 nd Armored 
until the spring of 1943, when he served briefly as deputy corps commander, II Corps, during the 
crisis following the German attack at Kasserine Pass, before taking command of the 1 st Armored 
Division for the remainder of the campaign in Tunisia. He commanded the 1 st through Sicily and 
the early fighting in Italy before being assigned back to command the 2 nd Armored Division in 
the European Theater of Operations. He commanded the division until the end of the war. He 
was commanding general of the Constabulary forces in Germany, 1946-47, and then returned to 
the United States where he served as Deputy Commanding General, Army Ground Forces until 
his retirement in February 1948. He served as President of Norwich University, 1950-1965. 

Major General Maurice Rose 
Commanding General, 3 rd Armored Division 

Maurice Rose was killed in action while commanding his division on March 30, 1945. One of 
the best sketches of this fine leader is found in an unofficial history of the division published in 
Germany shortly after V-E Day: 

"Major General Maurice Rose (1899-1945) was a soldier's soldier. Immaculate, 
ruthless in his calculated destruction of the enemy, he was qualified by his experience, 
achievement, and character to lead the spearhead of the first Americans. General Rose 


came up form the ranks. He joined the U.S. Army in 1916 
as a buck private and served on the Mexican border. Upon 
graduating from the first Officer Training Course at Fort 
Riley, Kansas, in 1917, he was commissioned in the infantry 
and sent overseas with the 89 th Division. In France he was 
wounded at St. Mihiel, but went back to fight through the 
entire Meuse-Argonne offensive. 

"During World War II General Rose served with the 
three greatest of American Armored Divisions: in Africa 
and Italy with the 1 st , "Old Ironsides"; and 2 nd , "Hell on 
Wheels"; finally throughout the climactic western European 
at the head of his own 3 rd Armored Division, "Spearhead"." 

That excellent sketch omits interwar service. Rose attended the 
Infantry school and served briefly on the faculty there before 
becoming a professor of Military Science and Tactics at Kansas 
State University. He served in Panama, 1932-35 and then 
attended the two year course at the Command and General Staff 
School at Ft. Leavenworth. He served as an instructor with the Pennsylvania National Guard for 
two years and the attended the Army Industrial College, graduating in 1940. He commanded a 
battalion from July 1940 until July 1941 and then became Executive Officer, First Armored 
Brigade until he became Chief of Staff of the 2 nd Armored Division (1942-43), serving with that 
division through the invasion of North Africa. He was promoted to Brigadier General in June 
1943 and became Assistant Division Commander of the 1 st Armored Division. He had already 
assumed command of the 3 rd Armored Division when he was promoted to Major General in 
September 1944. (HN) 

Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck 

Commanding General, 7 th Armored Division 

Robert Hasbrouck graduated from West Point in 1917, and 
joined the Coast Artillery. He sailed for France with the 62 nd 
Coast Artillery in June 1918, and had limited duty at the Front 
before the Armistice. In 1919 Captain Hasbrouck was assigned 
to the Polish Relief Mission at Fort Zegne, Poland. When 
released from that duty he transferred to the Field Artillery, 
attended the Field Artillery School and joined its faculty. He 
later became professor of military science and tactics at 
Princeton University. He attended Command and General Staff 
College (class of 1933) and commanded the 68 th Field Artillery 
(Mechanized) at Fort Knox before attending the Army War 
College (class of 1937). 


In April 1941 Hasbrouck took command of the 22" Armored Field Artillery Battalion in the 4 
Armored Division at Pine Camp, New York. He then served briefly with the 1 st Armored 
Division at Ft. Knox before joining the 8 th Armored Division in August 1942 to command a 
Combat Command. He deployed to England in August 1943 to become the chief of staff of First 
Army Group during the buildup for the liberation of France. He served on that staff as it 
transitioned into 12 th Army Group, and in September 1944 took command of the 7 th Armored 
Division when MG Sylvester was relieved. He continued in command of the Division until the 
end of the war and retired for disability as a major general in 1947. (HN) 

Major General El wood Richard Quesada 
Commanding General, IX Tactical Air Command 

Elwood Quesada was born in Washington, D.C., and 
educated in the Washington public schools and Wyoming 
Seminary Preparatory School in Pennsylvania. In 1924, he 
was a student at the University of Maryland and working as a 
lifeguard at the Tidal Basin when an Army Air Service pilot 
invited him to come to Boiling Field for a ride in an Army 
airplane. The conversation led to Quesada' s enlistment in the 
Army in 1924 and flight training at Brooks Field, the Army's 
primary flight school in San Antonio, Texas. He graduated 
from primary flight school in February of 1925, a student of 
Lieutenant Nathan Twining, a future Air Force Chief of 
Staff. He then attended a pursuit course at Kelly Field for six 
months, where he became friends with Thomas White, 
another future Air Force Chief of Staff, and associated with 
Charles Lindberg, who was stationed at Kelly Field. Upon 
completing flight training in September of 1925, he was 
commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army Reserve and 
released from active duty. 

In 1927, he competed for one of a handful of Regular Army 
positions that opened in the Air Service and was selected. 
Assigned to Boiling Field in Washington, he became familiar 
with many types of aircraft, including amphibians, and became the pilot for Major General James 
E. Fechet, Chief of the Air Corps. In April of 1928, he flew Fechet to the Labrador crash site of 
the German aircraft Bremen, the first airplane to cross the Atlantic from east to west. For a year 
thereafter, he served as Fechet' s flying aide. 

In January of 1929, he became part of the crew of the Question Mark, a Ford tri-motor under 
command of then-Major Carl Spaatz and then-Captain Ira C. Eaker for its record-setting 
endurance flight. Quesada served as assistant military attache in Havana and flying officer for 
the U.S. Ambassador to Cuba from 1930 through 1932. He was promoted to first lieutenant in 
1932 and became aide to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Trubee Davison, and then chief 


pilot for the New York-Cleveland airmail route in 1933-1934. In that year, he had a brief tour at 
the Infantry School, where he served as George C. Marshall's pilot and met then-Maj. Omar 

Later in 1934, he served on the staff of the GHQ Air Force and, in the fall, reported to Maxwell 
Field, Alabama, to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. Promoted to captain in 1935, he then 
attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. It was only when he left 
there in the spring of 1937 that Quesada got his first real operational flying assignment, when he 
became a flight commander in the 1 st Bombardment Squadron at Mitchell Field, Long Island. In 
1938, he was sent to Argentina to assist in developing its air force. He was an air observer in 
London in 1939 and was assigned to the War Department General Staff in 1940 with the rank of 

In July, 1941, he assumed command of the 33 rd Pursuit Group at Mitchell Field and was 
promoted to lieutenant colonel in January 1942, to colonel in March, and to brigadier general in 
December, when he assumed command of the 1 st Air Defense Wing. 

In early 1943, he went to North Africa to command the 12 th Fighter Command and served as 
deputy commander of the Northwest African Coastal Air Force. In October, 1943, he reported to 
England, where he became commander of the IX Fighter Command of the 9 th (Tactical) Air 
Force. He was promoted to major general in April of 1944 and commanded the IX Tactical Air 
Command in Europe until the end of World War II. 

Quesada returned to the United States in June of 1945 as assistant chief of staff for intelligence. 
In March, 1946, he commanded the Third Air Force at Tampa briefly, and then became chief of 
the Tactical Air Command. He was promoted to lieutenant general in October of 1947. He 
feuded with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, about Vandenberg's 
decision to reduce the size and strength of Tactical Air Command, and finally retired from active 
duty in 1951. 

Outspoken, occasionally to the point of rudeness, Quesada inspired either deep loyalty or total 
antagonism in his subordinates. As he matured as a commander, he increasingly won the respect 
and admiration of those who worked for him. He remained on the outside of the Air Force 
establishment because he did not subscribe to the strategic bombing doctrine that defined the 
service. His determination to make close air support work made enemies among those officers 
who were primarily concerned with gaining independence for the Air Force. Ground force 
leaders thought highly of him, as might be expected. Bradley believed Quesada had contributed 
more to winning the war than had George Patton, and placed Quesada fourth in his listing of the 
thirty most important American generals, behind only Walter Bedell Smith, Spaatz and Courtney 
Hodges. Significantly, excepting only Spaatz, Bradley rated Quesada far above any other Air 
Force general. 

His decorations included: Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying 
Cross, Air Medal, Companion of the British Order of the Bath, French Legion of Honor, French 
Croix de Guerre with Palm. ( CK) 


Brigadier General Otto Paul Weyland 
Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command 

O.P. "Opie" Weyland was born in California in 1902 and educated in Texas. He graduated from 
Texas A & M with a BS in mechanical engineering in 1923 and with a commission in the U.S. 
Army Air Service. After flight training at Brooks and Kelly fields, he was posted to the 12th 
Observation Squadron at Fort Sam Houston. He later returned to Kelly Field as an instructor. 

Promoted to first lieutenant in June 1930, he went to Hawaii as 
commanding officer of the 4th Observation Squadron at Luke 
Field. He again served at Kelly as instructor in 1934, and in 
1935 became chief of the Observation Section, with promotion 
to captain that March. He attended both the Air Corps Tactical 
School at Maxwell Field and the Command and General Staff 
School at Fort Leavenworth In June of 9139, he went to 
Washington as assistant to the chief of Aviation Division in the 
National Guard Bureau. He was promoted to major in March 
1940 and to lieutenant colonel in December 1941, the latter 
while he was in Panama, commanding the 16th Pursuit Group 
and acting as chief of staff of the 6th Air Force. In 1942, he 
was promoted to colonel and was assigned to Washington as 
deputy director of air support at Headquarters, Army Air 

In September of 1943, he was promoted to brigadier general, 
and was assigned in Europe in November to command the 84th 
Fighter Wing. Four months later, he became commanding 
general of the XIX Tactical Air Command, supporting Third 
U.S. Army. By January 1945 Weyland had become a major 
general and finished the air war against Germany, participating 
in six major campaigns and called by Patton "the best damn general in the Air Corps". 

After the war, he served briefly as assistant commandant at Fort Leavenworth, and in June 1946 
went to Washington as assistant chief of plans at Headquarters, Army Air Force. When the Air 
Force became a separate service, he was assigned to Plans and Operations. From 1948 through 
July of 1950 he was deputy commandant of the National War College in Washington. In July 
1950 he was briefly commanding general of Tactical Air Command until going to Headquarters, 
Far Eastern Air Force in Tokyo as vice commander for operations. 

In April 1951 he returned to Tactical Air Command and was promoted to lieutenant general, and 
in June went back to Tokyo as commanding general of Far Eastern Air Forces and the United 
Nations Air Forces when Lieutenant General George Stratemeyer had a heart attack. He 
commanded through ten major campaigns in the Korean war. He was promoted to four-star 
general on July 5, 1952. He stayed in Japan to help that nation reorganize its air defense forces 
and aircraft industry, and became known as the "father of the new Japanese air force." He again 
returned home, in May 1954, as commanding general of Tactical Air Command. 

Weyland was decorated with two Distinguished Service Medals, the Silver Star, the 
Distinguished Flying Cross (for personally leading a bomber formation against important 


Communist targets in North Korea when weather prevented fighter cover and escort), the Legion 
of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, and Air Medal, as well as awards from Great Britain (Commander, 
Order of the British Empire— for air cover of Normandy Invasion), France, Luxembourg, 
Belgium, Korea, Thailand, Philippine Islands, Japan and Brazil. He retired from the Air Force in 
July of 1959 and died in September of 1979. (CK) 

British & Canadian Commanders 

General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery 
Commanding General, 21 st Army Group 

Montgomery was born in 1887 and entered Royal 
Military College, Sandhurst, in 1907, being 
commissioned into the Royal Warwickshire Regiment in 
1908. He served in the First World War from 1914 
onward, and was wounded in the First Battle of Ypres, 
after which he was promoted to captain and awarded the 
Distinguished Service Order. He was Brigade Major in 
the 112 th Infantry Brigade in 1915 and general staff 
officer in the 33 r Division and at IX Corps in 1917. In 
1918, he was promoted to brevet major and assigned as 
general staff officer in the 47 th Division. Temporary 
promotion to lieutenant colonel followed. In 1918, he 
commanded the 17 th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, in action. 

He attended Staff College at Camberley in 1920 and in 
1921 became Brigade Major in the 17 th Infantry Brigade, 
followed by assignment as Brigade Major in the 8 th 
Infantry Brigade in 1922. In 1923, he was a general staff 
officer in the Territorial Army's 49 m Division. In 1925, he returned to his regiment to command 
A Company, 1 st Battalion, Royal Warwicks. As a lieutenant colonel in 1926, he was on the 
directing staff at the Staff College at Camberley. In 1931, he commanded the 1 st Battalion, 
Royal Warwicks, in Palestine and Egypt, followed in 1934 by a post as Senior Directing Staff at 
the Indian Army Staff College in Quetta and promotion to colonel. 

As war neared, Montgomery remained in command positions. In 1937, promoted to Brigadier, 
he commanded the 9 th Infantry Brigade in England. In 1938, he became a major general and 
took command of the 8 th Division in Palestine. In August of 1939, he returned to the U.K. and 
assumed command of the 3 rd Infantry Division, which he took to France as part of the British 


Expeditionary Force. After returning to England in 1940, he was promoted to lieutenant general 
and took command of V Corps, followed by command of XII Corps in 1941. In August, he was 
called to Egypt to take command of Eighth Army, and was knighted in November of 1942 in 
recognition of his successes against the Afrika Korps. He was promoted to full general at the 
same time. He continued to operate in North Africa until Tunisia fell to Allied arms. He then 
led the British Eighth Army in the invasion of Sicily. In January of 1944, Montgomery took 
command of the 21 st Army Group in England and began preparing for the invasion of Europe. 

No one was neutral about Montgomery. He had a gift for irritating other officers — not only 
those that did not like him, but also those that did — and was often rude and nearly always 
overbearing. Evidently personally insecure, he had a mania for always being right, a trait that 
led him after the war to construct arguments about his plans for the D-Day attack on Caen that 
have since stirred immense controversy and passionate books by his detractors and defenders 

Montgomery's reputation as a brilliant battlefield commander stemmed from the western desert. 
In fact, however, he was a mediocre commander in an Allied setting, little understanding the 
demands of coalition warfare, as his smugness and narrowness of view testified. His frankly 
unbelievable arrogance and chronic tactlessness in dealing with Eisenhower throughout the 
campaign in western Europe underscored that failure, and very nearly led to his dismissal from 
command. By the time of the fighting in Normandy, he was not performing at his best, though 
he still believed that only he knew how to fight a battle properly. His innate caution and 
predilection for detailed preparation before a battle slowed his momentum to a plod and caused 
him to miss fleeting opportunities the rapidly changing situation offered. To be fair, the 
Commonwealth armies had been essentially tapped out on manpower since 1942, and Churchill 
had stressed to Montgomery the need to hold casualties to a minimum. Such a crucial political 
consideration obviously affected Montgomery's willingness to take risks in battle. 

Infuriating as he frequently was, there was much to admire in Montgomery, and not least his 
tactical acumen and determination to stick to his own principles. His victories in North Africa 
had made him a hero to the British people and much of the British and Commonwealth armed 
forces, and soldiers admired him, trusted him, and were willing to fight for him, no small 
consideration. He was essential to the British Empire. Winston Churchill summed Montgomery 
up by saying of him: "In defeat, unthinkable; in victory, insufferable." 

After World War II, Montgomery was showered with honors, including being made a Knight of 
the Garter and being granted a peerage as Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. From 1946 
through 1948, he was Chief of the Imperial General Staff, following his mentor, Field Marshal 
Viscount Alanbrooke. As Carlo D'Este phrased it, the office went from arguably the best CIGS 
ever to a man who was equally arguably "the most undistinguished CIGS in memory." 
Montgomery squabbled with the other service chiefs and did not get along with the politicians at 
Whitehall. He did better as Deputy Supreme Commander of NATO under Eisenhower, and 
retired in 1958. He wrote a number of books, including a fulsome memoir that justified his 
conduct of the Normandy campaign. Montgomery died in 1976 at the age of eighty-eight. (CK) 


General Sir Miles Dempsey 
Commanding General, Second British Army 

Miles Dempsey was one of the original "Monty men," having a relationship with Montgomery 
that reached back into the 1930s. Dempsey was appointed a second lieutenant in the Royal 
Berkshire Regiment in 1915 and earned a Military Cross and Mention in Dispatches in France, 
where he was also wounded in action. In the interwar years, he served in Iraq and returned to the 
United Kingdom where he attended Staff College at Camberley. There, he was one of Bernard 
L. Montgomery's students and made a favorable impression on him that Montgomery later 
described as frank admiration. In 1940 he was a Brigadier commanding the 13 th Infantry 
Brigade in France and, unlike many, came out of the Battle of France with his reputation as a 
commander intact. 

The consequence was an appointment to command of XII 
Corps in North Africa after the Battle of Alamein and the 
opportunity for further distinction in the pursuit of 
Rommel's Afrika Korps westward to Tunisia. In fact, 
Montgomery had specifically asked for Dempsey's 
assignment to his command as soon as he took over Eighth 
Army. In 1944, Dempsey commanded Second British 
Army capably, his soldiers bearing the brunt of the battles 
around Caen. 

After VE-Day, Dempsey took command of Fourteenth 
Army from Field Marshal Slim and commanded it through 
the liberation of Malaya. He remained in that theater as 
Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces, Southeast Asia. 
In 1946 he was promoted to General and took over the 
Middle East Command. Dempsey retired from the Army in 
1947 and died in 1969. 

Like Crerar, who commanded First Canadian Army, Dempsey had little chance to stand in the 
limelight while under Montgomery's command. In general, he is today regarded as a highly 
competent professional soldier, but not as a tactical genius. An ardent student of military history, 
Dempsey had an unusually retentive memory and an unique skill for reading maps and extracting 
tactical information from them. As Carlo d'Este reported, "Dempsey would soon leave his army 
staff in awe over his ability to remember everything he saw on a map, to bring a landscape 
literally to life in his mind even though he had never actually seen it. This talent proved 
particularly important during the crucial battles around Caen in June and July 1944." Many in 
the British Army regarded Dempsey as the leading expert on combined operations. Others, 
however, regarded Dempsey as simply colorless and introverted, and thought he lacked the 
ruthlessness and drive required of an Army commander. The American verdict, as enunciated by 
George Patton, was that Dempsey was just a "yes man" for Montgomery. ( CK) 


Lieutenant General Sir Neil Ritchie 
Commanding General, XII Corps 

Born in 1897, Neil Ritchie attended Royal Military College and was commissioned into the 
Black Watch in December, 1914. In 1915, he was wounded at Loos and, upon recuperation, 
assigned to the 2 nd Battalion, Black Watch, in the Middle East. There he won both the 
Distinguished Service Order and the Military Cross. He spent most of the 1920s and 1930s on 
various staffs, and commanded the 2 nd Battalion, The King's Own Royal Regiment, in 1938. 

Neil Ritchie was in many ways the image of a general officer. Personally wealthy, he also had 
an impressive personal appearance — vigorous and thorough — and a strong personality. 

Handsome and authoritative, he was good-humored in a 
slightly heavy-handed way. Correlli Barnett noted that there 
was "bovine strength about him," but that he was bright, liked 
and trusted, absolutely honest, and straight-forward. None of 
these things made him an effective commander of Eighth 
Army in 1942, however. 

Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck selected Ritchie in early 
1942 to command Eighth Army. It was an unfortunate choice, 
for while Ritchie was a brilliant staff officer, he was almost 
totally lacking in command experience. As events transpired, 
he was completely unable to fight Eighth Army effectively 
against Rommel, and Auchinleck relieved him of command in 
April of 1942. 

Ritchie was the exception to the rule that a failed commander 
never got another chance in the British Army. Unusually 
fortunate, Ritchie had a patron in Field Marshal Alan Brooke, 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, having served Brooke as Brigadier General Staff in II Corps 
of the British Expeditionary Force in Flanders in 1939-1940, and in the same post when Brooke 
was General Officer Commanding Southern Command in 1940. Brooke concluded that 
Ritchie's failure had really been the fault of Auchinleck and gave him another chance. There 
was much to argue in favor of that decision. Ritchie had really been too junior for Army 
command in 1940 — he was still a major in 1937. He had been in an impossible position, lacking 
the lavish supply that Montgomery later enjoyed in that post, and did his duty as best he could, 
never losing heart or self control, and never blaming others for his own failures. In fact, 
Auchinleck had written an enthusiastic efficiency report on Ritchie after his relief, though he 
recommended the man not be given independent command. Reduced in grade to major general, 
Ritchie commanded a division in training and was then promoted back to lieutenant general in 
1944 and assigned to command XII Corps. For the balance of the war, Ritchie performed very 
successfully and was widely regarded as a very capable corps commander — as recognized by the 
conferral of the degree of Knight of the Order of the British Empire in 1944. 

In 1945, he became General Officer Commanding, Scottish Command. In 1946, he was 
promoted to full General and the following year assigned as commander in chief, South East 
Asia Land Force, and awarded the degree of Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath. In 


1949, he served as Commander of the British Army Staff in Washington, D.C. He retired in 
1951and was awarded the degree of Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire. In 1952 he 
moved to Canada to work for Mercantile and General Insurance Company of Canada. He died in 
Canada on 11 th December 1983. (CK) 

Lieutenant General Sir Brian Horrocks 
Commanding General, XXX Corps 

Brian Horrocks was born in 1895 in India, where his father 
was an Army surgeon. He was an indifferent student and 
did not do well academically at Sandhurst, not receiving an 
appointment to a regiment until World War I began. In 
August 1914, he was commissioned in the 1 st Battalion, 
Middlesex Regiment and sent to France. By the end of 
October, he had been severely wounded and taken prisoner, 
remaining in German hands until the end of the war. After 
returning to England, he was assigned to the forces serving 
in Russia in 1919, and was again taken prisoner by the 
Bolsheviks, this time for ten months. 

This was an unpromising start for any officer, and his 
subsequent duty in the 1920s and 1930s did not particularly 
mark him for advancement. He did so badly on the 
examination for Staff College that he almost did not get to 
attend. He then obtained several important appointments in 
the War Office and in the coveted post of Brigade Major 
before going to Camberley to teach at the Staff College. 

Horrocks took command of the 2 nQ Middlesex Regiment, British Expeditionary Force, in May of 
1940, serving in the 3 rd Infantry Division under Montgomery, upon whom he made a strong 
favorable impression. A month later, he was a brigade commander, and in 1941 was promoted 
to Brigadier. In 1941, he became a division commander and, in August of 1942, a corps 
commander in the Western Desert under Montgomery. 

He first commanded the 44 th Infantry Division. In March 1942, he took command of the 9 th 
Armored Division where he quickly established his authority by demanding to know why so 
many of the division's vehicles would not run. "You", he said, "know all about mechanical 
things. As an infantryman, I don't. However, in the infantry division I have just come from, 
almost all the vehicles are serviceable. Perhaps you would care to explain why so many of yours 
are not." Horrocks commanded his division from a tank turret, giving orders by radio. 

He was an exceptionally successful corps commander in the desert, and later commanded his 
corps at Salerno, where he was severely wounded. He recovered just in time to assume 
command of XXX Corps in August of 1944. 


Discussions of Brian Horrocks always include superlatives, with descriptive phrases such as 
"dynamic and able" being usual. He had the personal mannerisms of a country squire, but that did 
not conceal the fact that he was probably the most able British corps commander in the second half 
of World War n. He was a popular commander, not just with British commanders and the soldiers 
they led, but also among the Americans, who admired his style and calm professional skill in the 
costly Normandy battles. Horrocks served as XXX Corps commander until the end of the war and 
then commanded the British Army of the Rhine. He was medically retired in 1949 and became a 
well-known public figure. He wrote two books about his military career. Horrocks died in January 
of 1985. (CK) 



German Command Architecture 
& Order of Battle 

The German Army's better formations in 
the Second World War had no superiors in the world 
in two military skills particularly: 
exploiting the offensive breakthrough, 
and holding ground tenaciously on the defense. 

Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants . pl29 




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OB-West (Commander-in-Chief, West) (von Rimdstedt) 
Army Group B (Model) 

Fifth Panzer Army (von Manteuffel) 

XL VII Panzer Korps (von Liittwitz) 

2nd Panzer Division. Experienced; reorganized after heavy losses in Normandy; had more than 
100 tanks and assault guns and many veterans still in its ranks. 

9th Panzer Division. A veteran division that fought in Normandy. With attached Tiger tanks, the 
division had just over 100 tanks. 

Panzer Lehr Division. Virtually destroyed in Normandy; rebuilding when committed to 
counterattack Third Army in the Saar region. No time to replace men and tanks before commitment 
in the Ardennes, but beefed up with attachments. 

26th Volksgrenadier Division. Destroyed many times on the eastern front; rebuilt to a strength of 
17,000 men. 

Fiihrer Begleit Brigade. Built around a cadre of troops from Hitler's headquarters guard. 
Included a tank battalion from the GroBdeutschland Panzer Division (still on the eastern front) 
and some infantry troops from that division. Strongly reinforced with assault guns, as well as 
both 88-mm and 105-mm artillery. 

LXVI Korps (Lucht) 

18th Volksgrenadier Division. Formed in September around a cadre from an air force field 
division, with fillers from air force and navy units. At full strength, and with two months of 
experience on the defensive. 

62nd Volksgrenadier Division. Rebuilt almost from scratch from a division destroyed on the 
eastern front. Many Czech and Polish conscripts who spoke no German. 

LVIII Panzer Korps (Kriiger) 

116th Panzer Division. A proud unit that suffered heavy losses in Normandy and the Huertgen 
Forest, but filled with good caliber replacements. Over 100 tanks and antitank and assault guns. 


560th Volksgrenadier Division. Formed from occupation troops in Norway in summer 1944. 
Poorly trained, but troops quickly gained battle experience and had fought effectively in France. 

XXXIX Panzer Korps (Decker) 

167th Volksgrenadier Division. Destroyed on the eastern front, re-formed from air force ground 
troops while stationed in Hungary. 

This corps took over control of other units at the end of December. 

Sixth Panzer Army (Dietrich) 

I SS Panzer Korps (Priess) 

1st SS Panzer Division ("Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler"). Among the most powerful German 
formations, it had 22,000 men. Division had a reputation for daring and ruthlessness. 

3rd Parachute Division. Practically destroyed in Normandy, it was rebuilt in Holland from rear 
echelon air force ground troops. Both troops and commanders were inexperienced. 

12th SS Panzer Division ("Hitler Jugend").. Rebuilt following heavy losses in Normandy and 
had around 22,000 men. Short of experienced junior officers. 

12th Volksgrenadier Division. Suffered heavy losses in Russia in summer 1944. Rebuilt and 
fought well around Aachen. 

277th Volksgrenadier Division. Only about 1000 veterans. A weak division. 

150th Panzer Brigade. A makeshift formation quickly put together to meet the needs of the 
special missions Hitler assigned to Otto Skorzeny. 

II SS Panzer Korps (Bittrich) 

2nd SS Panzer Division ("Das Reich"). The division had been in heavy fighting in Russia and 
then in Normandy, but was rebuilt during the fall with better than average replacements. Had a 
reputation for brutality. 

9th SS Panzer Division ("Hohenstaufen"). Rebuilt after heavy losses in Normandy and Holland. 
Few veterans, but excellent soldiers. Badly short of transport. 

LXVII Korps (Hitzfeld) 

3rd Panzergrenadier Division. Transferred from Italy in summer 1944. Lost heavily in fighting 
around Metz and Aachen. Refitted hurriedly, it lacked 20 percent of its troop strength and 40 
percent of its equipment. 


246th Volksgrenadier Division. Virtually destroyed on eastern front, the rebuilt division also lost 
heavily in fall fighting around Aachen. 

272nd Volksgrenadier Division. Virtually destroyed in Normandy and hastily rebuilt. 

326th Volksgrenadier Division. Rebuilt following withdrawal from France with generally 
inexperienced and poorly trained troops. 

Seventh Army (Brandenburger) 

LIII Korps (von Rothkirch) 

9th Volksgrenadier Division. Heavy losses in Romania in Fall of 1944, refitted and moved to 
Denmark for training. 

15th Panzergrenadier Division. Transferred from Italy in late summer of 1944 and served as a 
"fire brigade" around Aachen and the Vosges. Not fully refitted for the Ardennes. 

Fiihrer Grenadier Brigade. Formed from troops used in the outer defenses of Hitler's 
headquarters, the brigade fought a brief, but costly, action in Russia before arriving in the Ardennes. 

LXXX Korps (Beyer) 

212th Volksgrenadier Division. Heavy losses on eastern front, but kept a large cadre of 
experienced officers and noncommissioned officers. Above average replacements. The best 
division in the Seventh Army. 

276th Volksgrenadier Division. Formed from the shell of another division destroyed in 
Normandy. Had a number of hospital returnees, but not enough to make up for other poorly trained 
replacements and inexperienced leaders. 

340th Volksgrenadier Division. Had more veterans than most, but considerably under strength 
after fighting around Aachen. 

LXXXV Korps (Kniess) 

5th Parachute Division. Virtually destroyed in Normandy, refitted over the fall, and had nearly 
16,000 men. Both division commander and regimental commanders inexperienced in combat. 

352nd Volksgrenadier Division. Rebuilt with air force and navy replacements to a strength of 
13,000. Division poorly trained and lacked experienced officers. 

79th Volksgrenadier Division. Totally destroyed in summer 1944 on the eastern front (one man 
survived). Rebuilt from men culled from rear area headquarters. 



The German Army in December 1944 

Obersturmbannfuhrerjochen Peiper 


The German Army in 1944 had long since passed the peak of its power. Yet no American or 
British soldier who had fought in North Africa or Italy would be inclined to take any part of that 
army lightly, not even the static, or coastal defense, divisions that had manned the fortifications 
along the Norman coast. According to an old British military adage, "He who has not fought the 
Germans does not know war." American troops agreed. During the breakout from the Normandy 
beachhead, Major General Raymond O. Barton, commanding the 4th Infantry Division, visited one 
of his battalions, urging it on with assurances that the German formation in front of it was only 
second rate and not much of an opponent. A young S-2 lieutenant remarked: "General, I think 
you'd better put the Germans on the distribution list. They don't seem to realize that." 

An important part of the German Army's fighting capacity was its rigorous selection process for, 
and equally rigorous professional education system of, both officers and noncommissioned officers, 
and the ability of those men to transmit combat skills to their soldiers. German divisions 
demonstrated an astonishing ability to rebound in a matter of weeks from shattering casualties, as 
long as a reasonable cadre of the officers remained to train the replacements. A mere handful of 
German officers accomplished apparent miracles of training and leadership. At the beginning of 
the war, German officers comprised only 2.86 percent of the total army strength, and declined in 
relative size as the war went on. By contrast, officers were 7 percent of the total strength of the U. 
S. Army (growing to 15 percent by the Vietnam War). Unit consciousness and solidarity helped 
make the German Army an effective fighting force. German leadership capably welded individual 
soldiers into cohesive units such that the company was the primary group, whereas in the American 
Army the usual primary group was the squad or, at the largest, the platoon. 

Fighting in Normandy and across France from June through September of 1944 depleted the 
German army in the west, literally destroying many divisions and seriously damaging more. From 
the equipment point of view, Field Marshal Model considered the retreat across the Seine almost as 
great a disaster as the Falaise Pocket. Only 100 to 120 of the 1,300 tanks and assault guns 
committed to the Battle of Normandy ever made it back across the Seine. The average panzer 
division in September had less than ten tanks. The Germans had lost an additional 15,000 vehicles 
of other types, with corresponding effects on tactical mobility and sustainability of forces. The 
paradox of Hitler's "stand fast" strategy in Normandy was this: he had used up his Panzer divisions 
in the hedgerows of Normandy (ideal infantry terrain), while Rommel cried for infantry. When the 
Allies reached good tank country, Model had nothing left with which to stop them except infantry, 
which was of marginal value there. 

In preparation for the upcoming offensive in the Ardennes, Hitler gave orders on 2 September to 
raise twenty-five new divisions to become available between 1 October and 1 December. Those 
twenty-five and the eighteen raised in July and August were designated Volks grenadier divisions, a 
title intended to appeal to national and military pride. Some of the divisions were assigned new 
numbers in the 500 series, but others carried numbers belonging to divisions that had been totally 
destroyed, for Hitler had on 10 August forbidden the practice of erasing such divisions from the 
army rolls. 


The organization and equipment of the V oiks grenadier division reflected the German army 
tendency, current since 1943, to reduce manpower in combat divisions while increasing their 
firepower. Early in 1944, the army reduced the standard infantry division from about 17,000 to 
about 12,500 officers and men. The Volksgrenadier division was even smaller, at 10,000. It 
generally had three infantry regiments with two rifle battalions apiece and a smaller slice of organic 
service troops. Equipment varied with availability, but the attempt was to arm two platoons in each 
company with the 1944 model machine pistol, add more field artillery, and provide a slightly larger 
complement of antitank weapons and assault guns. The ideal of fourteen assault guns (the standard 
accompanying weapon for the German infantry in the attack) per division was seldom realized. 
About three-fourths of the divisional transportation was horse-drawn. One unit, the Fusilier 
battalion, was equipped with bicycles. The Fiisilier battalion customarily served as the division 
reserve, and replaced the reconnaissance battalion in the division organization. By 1944 it was 
clear that an army that customarily fought on the defensive had a diminished need for 
reconnaissance units. 

In general, the personnel policy was to bring survivors of divisions destroyed on the eastern front to 
Germany, there to be used as cadres in the formation of new divisions, and finally sent to the 
western front as the veteran core of these inexperienced formations. Ranks were not as closely 
tied to position in the German Army as in the American. By 1944, division commanders were 
frequently colonels, but might as easily be lieutenant generals. Officers from captain through 
colonel commanded regiments. Generally speaking, a German Army colonel was both more senior 
and more experienced than his American counterpart. 


Generally speaking, German weapons were superior to those issued to American soldiers. 

Tanks: Until 1935 in American doctrine, the tank was essentially a machine-gun carrier that 
accompanied the Infantry. Experiments with mounting heavy guns in tanks did not get very far, the 
Chief of Infantry in 1938 declaring that a 75-mm. gun was useless in a tank. In 1940, both the rival 
armies fought the Battle of France with tanks armed to a 75-mm standard, and the Germans had 
already experimented with the 88-mm gun in a turret. In June 1940, the U.S. adopted the 75-mm 
gun for tanks. In the spring of 1944, as Anglo-American armies prepared for the invasion of 
Europe, the largest gun on an operational American tank was still a short-barrelled, 
low-muzzle-velocity 75-mm, the standard armament of the then-standard M4 Sherman tank. At the 
same time, Germany's Panther tanks carried long-barrelled, high-muzzle-velocity 75s, and the Tiger 
carried the 88-mm gun. To kill tanks, American doctrine relied on the tank destroyer, a fast, 
heavily-gunned, lightly-armored vehicle standardized as the M10 in 1942. It mounted a 3-inch, 
high-muzzle-velocity, flat-trajectory gun on a Sherman chassis. The need for more power to cope 
with German tanks brought the M18, with a 76-mm gun, into service in 1944. The M18 had a 
shallow open turret and was mounted on a M24 light tank chassis. The M36, an M10 redesigned to 
accommodate a 90-mm gun, came into service about the same time. On none of these vehicles was 
the armor comparable to that of German tanks. Tank destroyers, appropriately armed to be "killer 
tanks," lacked the armor to stand up to German tanks for the fight. 


Infantry Anti-Tank Weapons. The American 2.36-inch rocket launcher, or "bazooka," was too 
small to penetrate the front armor of German tanks and demanded careful aim against soft spots. 
This was no easy chore for an exposed, nervous infantryman when a massive German tank loomed 
so close that he could hear the squeak of the bogies. The Germans adopted an 88-mm Panzerfaust, 
a rocket-propelled shaped-charge grenade that was about twice as powerful as the American 
bazooka. When James M. Gavin was a colonel commanding the 505th Parachute Infantry, his men 
tried out the bazooka in Sicily and found it disappointing. Gavin later wrote that "As for the 82nd 
Airborne Division, it did not get adequate antitank weapons until it began to capture the first 
German panzerfausts. By the fall of '44 we had truckloads of them. We also captured German 
instructions for their use, made translations, and conducted our own training with them. They were 
the best hand-carried antitank weapon of the war." The U.S. did not even initiate a project for a 
more powerful, 3.5-inch rocket until August 1944. 

Rifles. The Garand .30-caliber Ml semi-automatic was the best standard infantry shoulder arm of 
the war. No other rifle matched its combination of accuracy, rate of fire, and reliability. 

Artillery. The U.S. 105-mm howitzer was at least the equal of its German counterpart of the same 
caliber. The effectiveness of American artillery, however, was multiplied by the best equipment 
and techniques of any army for fire direction, observation, and coordination. 

Comparative Fire Power of U.S. and German 1944-Type Infantry Divisions 

(By TOE) 

Category U.S. German 

Strength 14,037 12,769 

Rifles & carbines 11,507 9,069 

Pistols 1,228 1,981 

Submachine guns 295 1,503 

Light MGs and automatic rifles 539 566 

Heavy MGs 90 90 

60-mm mortars 90 

81 -mm mortars 54 48 

120-mm mortars - 28 

Bazookas 558* 108** 

Flame throwers - 20 

U.S. .50-cal MG; German 20-mm AA gun 237 12 

37 -mm AT guns 13 

57 -mm AT guns 57 

75-mm AT guns - 35 

75-mm infantry howitzers - 18 

105-mm howitzers 54 36 

U.S. 155-mm howitzers; German 150-mm 12 18 

* Also 2,131 rifle grenade launchers 
**Either Panzerfausts or antitank rifles 



Biographical Sketches - Senior German 


"All Hitler wants me to do is cross a river, 
capture Brussels, and then go on and take Antwerp. 
All this in the worst time of the year through 
the Ardennes where the snow is waist deep and 
there isn 't room to deploy four tanks abreast 
let alone armored divisions. 
Where it doesn 't get light until eight and it's dark 
again atfourand with re-formed divisions 
made up chiefly of kids and sick old men... 
and get the job done by Christmas!" 

Sepp Dietrich 

Feldmarschall Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt Oberbefehlshaber- 

West (Commander-in-Chief, West) 

Born 12 December 1875 at Aschersleben in the Harz 
mountains and a graduate of the prestigious 
Hauptkadettenanstalt at Gross-Lichterfelde, von Rundstedt 
began active military service 22 March 1892 and earned a 
commission as lieutenant in the 83d Royal Prussian Infantry 
Regiment on 17 June 1893. After ten years of regimental 
service he passed the entrance examination for the 
Kriegsakademie in Berlin. After graduating, he was appointed 
to the Great General Staff, on which he served until 1909. He 
then served on General Staff with troops as a captain in a 
corps headquarters. 

Just finishing a tour of command of an infantry company 
when war broke out in 1914, he was assigned as operations 
officer in the 22d Reserve Infantry Division, which 
participated in the great attack across France with the First 
German Army. In 1915 he was promoted to major and sent to 
the eastern front as a division chief of staff. The fighting along the Narew River line in the summer 
of 1915 resulted in mobile warfare, and von Rundstedt got a taste of maneuvering troops in an 
advance that extended more than 250 miles. Before the end of the war, he had also served as a 
corps chief of staff. 

He remained in the 100,000- man German army at the end of the war, commanding the 18th Infantry 
Regiment as a colonel (his first troop command since 1914). As a major general, he was chief of 
staff of a military district. Promoted to lieutenant general, he commanded the 2nd Cavalry Division. 
In 1934, as general of infantry, he commanded 1st Army Group. In 1938, he led the Second Army 
in the occupation of the Sudetenland. 

He resigned from the army in 1938 in protest against Hitler's policies, which he thought would lead 
to a war for which Germany was grossly unprepared. He retired as a colonel-general and was 
appointed colonel-in-chief of the 18th Infantry Regiment, a distinction he valued highly. As a field 
marshal, he customarily wore his marshal's rank insignia on the uniform of a colonel of the 18th 
Infantry Regiment. With the invasion of Poland in 1939, he accepted recall to active duty and 
commanded army groups with distinction in Poland, Belgium, and France. Hitler promoted him to 
field marshal after the fall of France in 1940. In 1941 he commanded Army Group South in 
Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of Russia. Hitler relieved him of command in Russia at the 
end of 1941, although von Rundstedt gave impaired health (he had a heart attack in early 
November) as the reason. In March 1942, he was appointed commander-in-chief, west, with 
headquarters in France. By 1944, however, Hitler had given actual command of the army groups in 
France to von Rundstedt's subordinates and himself retained command of the operational reserve. 
The old man joked that his sole military prerogative was to change the guard at his headquarters. In 
July 1944, Hitler once again relieved him, but again reappointed him C-in-C West on 5 September. 


His professional reputation did as much as his abilities to bring order out of the chaos of the German 
forces on the west and, aided by the Allies' supply difficulties, von Rundstedt stabilized the front. 
He remained in command through the Battle of the Bulge, which was not his plan and in which he 
had no faith, and was finally dismissed from command in March of 1945. He died in Celle on 24 
February 1953. 

A soldier for more than half a century, von Rundstedt learned the lessons of World War I well and 
insisted on increasing fire support and mobility for the infantryman. He approved of tanks but did 
not envision the kind of role for them that such advocates as Heinz Guderian pressed for. Fluent 
enough in French to have passed the army's interpreter examination, he could also speak English. 
Stiff, formal, dedicated to his profession, he led a simple life and was indifferent to money or 
possessions. Yet he was affable to subordinates, extravagantly polite to women, smoked too much, 
and enjoyed an occasional drink. 

Unlike men such as Rommel and Guderian, he preferred to command from a headquarters, rather 
than from the front line. He felt that commanders at the front risked becoming so involved in the 
local fight that they lost perspective on the entire battle (a failing to which Erwin Rommel was 
occasionally prone). He refused to become immersed in details and preferred to work from a 
1:1,000,000 map, from which he could take in the entire situation at a glance. Thus he depended 
heavily on his chief of staff, who happened to be Erich von Manstein early in the war. It was a 
particularly successful professional relationship. 

Almost seventy years old in 1944, von Rundstedt was a soldier of the old school, widely admired by 
the German officer corps. Hitler disliked him intensely, partly because of the social class of officers 
he represented and partly because he knew that von Rundstedt referred to the Fuehrer in private as 
"the Corporal." By the fall of 1944, his age was showing. Many of his associates saw him for what 
Hitler intended him to be — a figurehead. 

At SHAEF headquarters, it was Rundstedt "whom we always considered the ablest of the German 
generals," as Eisenhower later said. Even Bernard Montgomery, rarely given to praising other 
generals, said "I used to think that Rommel was good, but my opinion is that Rundstedt would have 
hit him for six. Rundstedt is the best German general I have come up against." 

The following quotations reveal a little about the inner man: 

On the 1944 Ardennes Counteroffensive: "If old von Moltke thought that I had 
planned the offensive he would turn over in his grave." 

On freedom of action: "You see the guard posted outside. If I want to post him on 
the other side of the house I must first ask permission of Berchtesgaden." (Dr. Charles Kirkpatrick 
& COL French MacLean) 


Feldmarschall Otto Moritz Walter Model 
Commanding General, Army Group B 

Born 24 January 1891 in Gentheim, near Magdeburg, the son 
of a teacher, Model was not a member of the military 
aristocracy of Germany. He attended a classical gymnasium 
in Erfurt where he excelled in Greek, Latin and history. In 
1908 he became an officer cadet in the Kriegsschule, and in 
1910 he was appointed in the 52nd Infantry Regiment. He 
served on the western front between 1914 and 1916, was 
severely wounded in 1915, and attended an abbreviated 
general staff officer course in 1916. He returned to the front as 
a brigade adjutant and company commander and was again 
badly wounded. He served in various staff assignments from 
1917 through 1919 and entered the post-war Reichswehr. He 
commanded a company in the 8th Infantry Regiment between 
1925 and 1928, was a staff officer from 1928 through 1933, 
and commanded a battalion in the 2nd Infantry Regiment in 
1933-1934. As a battalion commander, his favorite saying 
was "Can't that be done faster?" In 1934 he became 
commander of the 2nd Infantry. Despite not having a 

technical background, Model found himself appointed to the technical warfare section of the War 
Ministry in 1935. He was already a strong advocate of motorization and visited the Red Army to 
study these questions. His drive contributed to considerable progress in weapons modernization. 
At the outbreak of war, he was Chief of Staff of IV Corps. 

In three years of hard fighting on the eastern front, Model earned the distinction as "the Fiihrer's 
Fireman" for his ingenuity which enabled him to salvage apparently hopeless situations. One of the 
few officers who enjoyed Hitler's complete trust, he was also appreciated by his peers. Heinz 
Guderian called him "a bold inexhaustible soldier ... the best possible man to perform the 
fantastically difficult task of reconstructing the line in the center of the Eastern Front." In Russia he 
established a reputation as a "lion of the defense." In January 1944, at age fifty-three, he became the 
youngest field marshal in the German army. 

As a lieutenant, Model earned a reputation as an ambitious and conscientious officer who was not 
afraid to speak his mind, but who formed no close fellowships with his fellow officers. That pattern 
characterized his entire career. Juniors regarded him as a hard taskmaster and peers thought of him 
as fractious. Utterly lacking tact, he freely criticized his superiors. Although he considered himself 
to be apolitical, he made the most of all of his contacts with the Nazi Party, developing an attitude 
that his fellow generals found difficult to understand. When he became an army commander he 
appointed a Waffen-SS officer as his aide-de-camp, which his fellow Army officers interpreted as 
kowtowing to the party. 

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein commented on Model's extraordinary and ruthless drive, as well 
as his self-assurance and determination, and particularly his personal courage. "He was always to 
be found in the most critical sector of any front he commanded," von Manstein wrote. Units he 
commanded often suffered very heavy casualties. Model often issued direct orders to the smallest 
of units and, unlike von Rundstedt, would sometimes lead them personally into action. During the 


battle of the Bulge, one German lieutenant met Model near St. Vith; he wrote in his diary that 
"Generalfeldmarschall Model himself directs traffic ... a little, undistinguished-looking man with a 

F. W. von Mellenthin, who served under Model as a staff officer, wrote that "in purely military 
terms, he was an outstanding soldier. In addition, he was a good and capable staff officer but 
inclined to rely too much on his own judgment and knowledge without as a rule being responsive to 
advice. He was a much better tactician than he was a strategist, and defensive positions were more 
to his taste than wide-ranging offensive operations. He possessed an astounding talent for 
improvisation, and there can be no disputing the originality of his conduct of affairs." Other 
judgements were similar: "... he trusted no one but himself. He wanted to have every single thing 
under his own control. Lacking confidence in others, he found it difficult to delegate tasks and 
responsibilities." "His manner was rough," according to von Manteuffel, "and his methods were not 
always acceptable in the higher quarters of the German Army, but they were both to Hitler's liking." 

General Hans Speidel (Rommel's chief of staff) observed that "his keen tactical eye was not 
balanced by an instinct for the possible. He thought too highly of his own ability, was erratic, and 
lacked a sense of moderation. Although he had been schooled in strategy, he could not rid his mind 
of the details of tactical leadership." 

Sixteen years von Rundstedt's junior, he treated the old man with respect but ran his army group 
pretty much as he pleased. For his part, von Rundstedt was no admirer of Model, whom he once 
described as having the makings of a good sergeant major. Still the two men managed to tolerate 
one another successfully. Model was appalled when he learned that Friedrich Paulus had 
surrendered to the Russians at Stalingrad. "A field marshal," he said, "does not become a prisoner. 
Such a thing is just not possible." On 21 April 1945, he committed suicide near Diisseldorf, rather 
than surrender to American forces. ( CK & FM) 

General der Panzertruppen Hasso Eccard von Manteuffel 
Commanding General, 5th Panzer Army 

Born in Potsdam on 14 January 1897, Manteuffel graduated from the Berlin-Lichterfelde cadet 
academy, and joined the 3d Brandenburg Hussar Regiment as a second lieutenant in 1916. He 
served on the western front as a lieutenant of infantry and was wounded during the battle of the 
Somme. In 1919, he continued fighting on Germany's eastern frontier as a member of the 
para-military Freikorps, but was then taken into the Reichswehr. 

He transferred to the cavalry, commanded a squadron as a lieutenant, and then served seven years as 
a regimental adjutant. He adopted then-Major Heinz Guderian's ideas about the possibilities of 
armor. He joined the inspectorate of Armored Forces in 1934, shortly after Guderian became its 
chief of staff. In 1935 he was assigned to the 2nd Panzer Division as a squadron commander of a 
motorcycle rifle battalion. During the attack on France, he commanded the 7th Rifle Regiment of 
Rommel's 7th Panzer Division. 


He disagreed with the attack on Russia but nonetheless 
volunteered for combat duty. He commanded an infantry 
regiment in the attack on Russia, and with particular 
distinction in the failed drive on Moscow. His army 
commander, Generaloberst Walter Model, threatened to 
court-martial him during the subsequent retreat when von 
Manteuffel called off an attack because his troops could 
hardly move in the deep snow. The division commander 
circumvented Model's intention by sending von Manteuffel 
with the advance party for the division's transfer to France. 
By 1944, von Manteuffel had commanded a division in 
North Africa and led the elite Grossdeutschland panzer 
division on the eastern front. He so impressed Hitler that 
the Fiihrer jumped him past corps to command the 5th 
Panzer Army on the western front, under Model's overall 

General von Manteuffel was remarkably forthright in his discussions with Hitler about the 
upcoming battle. He had personally reconnoitered the American forward positions facing the Our 
River. He determined that the U.S. 28th Infantry Division's 110th Infantry pulled back its outposts 
from the river at night. He also found that the division's 1 12th Infantry, on the German side of the 
Our, occupied widely spaced positions. Thus von Manteuffel argued to Hitler that the artillery 
preparation should be withheld, so that his assault troops could quietly cross the river while the 
artillery fire instead hit the American positions a mile or so back, along what was known as Skyline 
Drive. Hitler agreed to this. 

In general, von Manteuffel argued that a shorter artillery preparation would accomplish as much as 
a long one, while lessening the Americans' alertness. He wanted to attack well before daylight, at 
0600, rather than an 1000. Because the day was short, a 1000 attack would give him only six hours 
of light on the crucial first day of fighting. Instead, he wanted to attack aided by "artificial 
moonlight," created by bounching the light of antiaircraft searchlights off of the clouds. "How do 
you know you will have clouds?" Hitler asked. Von Manteuffel responded: "You have already 
decided there will be bad weather." 

Contemporaries described von Manteuffel as personally gentlemanly and courteous, and as 
professionally intense, demanding, and energetic. His efficiency reports for combat command 
described him as "indefatigable" and "a daredevil, a bold and dashing leader." Other formal 
evaluations considered that he was "quick thinking, tactically able to take in the whole situation at a 
glance." General Hermann Balck and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, themselves exceptional 
armored commanders, described von Manstein as "an exceptional Panzer commander." Manteuffel 
was forty-seven years old in 1944, considered young for an army command. At 5 feet, 2 inches, and 
120 pounds, his physique was also not prepossessing, and he frequently suffered from migraines. 



Oberstgruppenfiihrer Joseph "Sepp" Dietrich 
Commanding General, 6th Panzer Army 

Dietrich was born 28 May 1892 in Bavaria and apprenticed in the hotel business. In 1911 he 
volunteered in the 4th Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment and attended an NCO school in 1912. He 
went to war in 1914 with the 6th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment and was a corporal in the 10th 
Infantry in 1916-1917, being further assigned into the elite Sturm, or assault, troops in 1917. 

In January 1918, Dietrich was posted to the 13th Assault Tank 
Detachment. At St. Quentin, on 21 March, he commanded a tank 
in the first tank attacks the German army ever conducted. He later 
fought in tank actions at Villers-Cotterets in July 1918. At the end 
of the war he was a highly decorated sergeant, having won both 
first and second classes of the Iron Cross and medals from Austria 
and Bavaria as well. 

He was a member of the Freikorps irregular military formations 
that proliferated after the fall of the monarchy, and fought in 
Silesia in 1921. In 1928 he joined the SS and began a rapid rise 
through the ranks of that organization to command of the SS 
Wachtbataillon Berlin, later named the Leibstandarte SS Adolf 
Hitler. He was well acquainted with Hitler and saw him often 
through the 1930s. 

When war came, he led the Leibstandarte at regimental strength in 
Poland; at brigade strength in the attack on Greece; and at division strength in France and in Russia. 
Unlike his counterparts in the German army, Dietrich did not have a formal military education. His 
was the direct leadership style of the NCO. Army officers who formed a positive impression of the 
man attempted to help him improve his military education. General Baron von Fritsch, 
commander-in-chief of the German Army by 1938, helped Dietrich by lending his war-college 
notes, and also personally instructed him. At the invitation of the Army, Dietrich took part in many 
planning exercises in the late 1930s as well. 

A successful division commander, Dietrich rose to corps command in Russia and finally to army 
command on the western front. By 1944, he had begun to have doubts about Hitler's quality as a 
military commander and had started to distance himself from the Fiihrer. His chief military 
virtue was his tenacity and determination. He exemplified the self-taught noncommissioned 
officer, rough in personality and manners, in contrast to the aristocrats who dominated the 
German army. All agreed that he was a great natural fighter and front-line leader of men. In the 
Battle of the Bulge, his lack of staff training and strategic grasp were decisive shortcomings, 
because he continued to try to fight his way forward against stiff opposition instead of switching 
the main German effort behind von Manteuffel's successful advance. 

Nicolaus von Below, Hitler's military adjutant, said of Dietrich: "Unpretentious, not erudite but 
equipped with common sense, he commanded everyone's respect because of his honest character." 
F. W. von Manteuffel, who observed Dietrich's leadership in Russia, wrote that he "was undeniably 
a most courageous fighting soldier," but "could never have held high command without the backing 
of well-trained staff officers from the regular army." Otto Skorzeny, himself a bold SS soldier and 


leader of many special operations, said of Dietrich that "He gave to the Waffen SS a style and an 
esprit de corps which may possibly be compared only with Napoleon's Imperial Guard." (CK) 

General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger 
Commanding General, 7 th Army 

Born 1892 in Augsburg, Erich Brandenberger was fifty-one 
years old during the Hiirtgen Forest fighting. Brandenberger 
entered German Army in 1911 as a Field Artillery officer. 
He fought in World War I with the 6 th Bavarian Field 
Artillery Regiment, where he won both the Iron Cross 2 nd 
and 1 st Class; he was wounded during this conflict. After 
World War I, Brandenberger remained in the Reichswehr as 
a General Staff officer. During the 1939 Polish Campaign, 


he served as chief of staff for the XXIII Army Corps. He 
assumed command of the 8 th Panzer Division in 1941 and led 
this unit into Russia during Operation Barbarossa. 

During the Russian Campaign, Brandenberger commanded 
the LIX th Army Corps (Army Group Center) at Welikye 
Luki) and the XXIX th Army Corps (Army Group South 
Ukraine) in 1943 at the Dneiper River. He was promoted to 
General of Artillery (***) in August 1943, then laterally 
named to General of Panzer Troops. 

Brandenberger assumed command of the 7 th Army in August 1944, and he assumed command of 
the^ 111 Army (Army Group G) in March 1945. He was awarded the Knight's Cross as CO of the 8 th 
Panzer Division, and received the Oak Leaves as CO of the XXIX th Army Corps. He was a prisoner 
of war from the end of the war until 1948. Erich Brandenberger died 21 June 1955 in Bonn. 

Seemingly always calm and unflappable, Erich Brandenberger performed at his best during 
adversity. (FM) 



Comparative Military Officers' Ranks 

"The enemy is in a bad way... 
his situation is such that he cannot stage 
a major offensive operation. " 
21st Army Group I intelligence Summary, 
14 December 1944 

"Tomorrow , the heavies 'I I start firing again. 

We'll begin the final offensive. 
By the day after tomorrow, we'll be in Liege. 
In four days Antwerp will be ours. " 

Comments of a German Soldier, 15 December 1944 


What they do 








Five Star 

Command very large formations such as 
Army Groups or Expeditionary Forces 

Field Marshal 

General of the 

Generalfeldmarschall or 

Four Star 

Command Field Armies subordinate to Army 
Groups or Expeditionary Forces 



Generaloberst or 

SS Oberstgruppenfiihrer 

Three Star 

Command Corps (usually three divisions) or 
serve on very high level staffs 



General (derlnf, Art, etc.) 
or SS ObergruppenfUhrer 

Two Star 

Command divisions (about 20,000 soldiers) 
or serve on very high level staffs 

Major General 

Major General 

Generalleutnant or 
SS Gruppenfuhrer 

One Star 

Assist division commanders, command 
separate formations (smaller than divisions) 



Generalmajor or 
SS BrigadefUhrer 



SS OberfUhrer 


Command regiments 



Oberst or 

SS Standartenfuhrer 


Command battalions (three to a regiment) 



Oberstleutnant or 

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer 


Staff officer, executive officer of a battalion 



Major or 

SS Sturmbannfiihrer 


Command companies 



Hauptmann or 

SS HauptsturmfUhrer 



Staff officer, executive officer of a company 




Oberleutnant or 
SS Obersturmfuhrer 


Platoon Leader 



Leutnant or 

SS Untersturmfuhrer 


German Tiger - La Gleize, Belgium, August 2001 

German Panther - 
Grandmenil-Manhay, Belgium, August 2001 

American and British Armies shared many classes of equipment and between them equipped all 
of the French and Polish forces engaged on the continent. The United States Army was far more 
lavishly equipped than the German Army, but in almost every category of weaponry, the 
Germans had superior hardware. Tanks are the best example. Until 1935 in American doctrine, 
the tank was essentially a machine-gun carrier that accompanied the Infantry. Experiments with 
mounting heavy guns in tanks did not get very far, the Chief of Infantry in 1938 declaring that a 
75-mm. gun was useless in a tank. In 1940, both the rival armies fought the Battle of France 
with tanks armed to a 75-mm standard, and the Germans had already experimented with the 
88-mm gun in a turret. In June 1940, the U.S. adopted the 75-mm gun for tanks. In the spring of 
1944, as Anglo-American armies prepared for the invasion of Europe, the largest standard gun 
on an operational American tank was still a short-barreled, low-muzzle-velocity 75-mm, the 
standard armament of the then-standard M4 Sherman tank. Some models of the M4, and 
particularly the British Firefly variant, carried higher velocity weapons, notably the 76-mm gun. 
At the same time, however, Germany's Panther tanks carried long-barreled, high-muzzle-velocity 
75s, and the Tiger carried the 88-mm gun. To kill tanks, American doctrine relied on the tank 
destroyer, a fast, heavily-gunned, lightly-armored vehicle standardized as the M10 in 1942. It 
mounted a 3-inch, high-muzzle-velocity, flat-trajectory gun on a Sherman chassis. The need for 
more power to cope with German tanks brought the Ml 8, with a 76-mm gun, into service in 
1944. The M18 had a shallow open turret and was mounted on a M24 light tank chassis. The 
M36, an M10 redesigned to accommodate a 90-mm gun, came into service about the same time. 
On none of these vehicles was the armor comparable to that of German tanks. Tank destroyers, 
appropriately armed to be "killer tanks," lacked the armor to stand up to German tanks for the 

Anti-tank weapons were a similar case. The American 2.36-inch rocket launcher, or "bazooka," 
lacked the power to penetrate the front armor of German tanks and demanded careful aim against 
soft spots. This was no easy chore for an exposed, nervous infantryman when a massive German 
tank loomed so close that he could hear the squeak of the bogies. The Germans adopted an 
88-mm Panzerfaust, a rocket-propelled shaped-charge grenade that was about twice as powerful 
as the American bazooka. When James M. Gavin was a colonel commanding the 505th 
Parachute Infantry, his men tried out the bazooka in Sicily and found it disappointing. Gavin 
later wrote that "As for the 82nd Airborne Division, it did not get adequate antitank weapons 
until it began to capture the first German panzerfausts. By the fall of '44 we had truckloads of 
them. We also captured German instructions for their use, made translations, and conducted our 
own training with them. They were the best hand-carried antitank weapon of the war." The U.S. 
did not even initiate a project for a more powerful, 3.5-inch rocket until August 1944, and 
distribution of that weapon was not widespread even at the time of the Korean War. 

In two areas, however, the United States had a distinct advantage. The Garand .30-caliber Ml 
semi-automatic rifle was the best standard infantry shoulder arm of the war. No other rifle 
matched its combination of accuracy, rate of fire, and reliability. In artillery, too, the American 
Army had the edge. It was not that the artillery was qualitatively better than German equipment, 
although the U.S. 105-mm howitzer was at least the equal of its German counterpart of the same 
caliber. The effectiveness of American artillery was multiplied by the best equipment and 
techniques of any army for fire direction, observation, and coordination. "I do not have to tell 
you who won the war," George Patton said in 1945. "You know our artillery did." General 
George C. Marshall agreed when he wrote that "We believe that our use of massed heavy 
artillery fire was far more effective than the German techniques," concluding that "our method of 


employment of these weapons has been one of the decisive factors of our ground campaigns 
throughout the world." 

American soldiers entered battle with uniforms not well suited to field duty, a fact that became 
even more evident in bad weather and when winter came. Overshoes or galoshes were never in 
adequate supply, and the consequence was a higher rate of non-battle casualties caused by 
frostbite and trench foot. A brief flirtation with a camouflage utility uniform was quickly ended 
when Americans discovered that the SS used a field uniform almost identical in design. 
American load-bearing equipment was little changed from the First World War. Many soldiers 
quickly rid themselves of what they saw as pointless encumbrances, among them the gas mask 
and the bayonet. 


U.S. Army Infantry Weapons 



Rate of Fire 



Ml Carbine 


5.5 pounds 

40-50 rpm 

300 m 

Ml Garand 


9.5 pounds 

30-50 rpm 

460 m 



19.4 pounds 

550 rpm** 

600 m 



10.5 pounds 

700 rpm** 

170 m 

.30 cal MG 


33 pounds* 

400-500 rpm** 

1100 m 


.50 cal M2 


84 pounds* 

450-550 rpm** 

2200 m 


Bazooka M9 


16 pounds 


300 m 


*Weight without tripod or other mount. 
**Cyclic rate of fire. 

'Maximum effective range. 

.30 cal Heavy Machine Gun 



Rifle Grenade 

Weapons, left to right: Soldier is holding a .45-cal. Thompson submachine gun M1928A1. 
60mm Mortar M2; British Anti-Tank Gun; .30-cal. U.S. Rifle Ml with Bayonet Ml; .30-cal. Browning light 
Machine Gun M1919A4; hand grenades; .45-cal. M1911A1 pistol; .30-cal. U.S. Rifle M1903 with grenade 
launcher Ml; .30-cal. Browning Automatic Rifle M1913A2. 


U.S. Army Mortars 



Rate of Fire 



60 mm M2 

42 pounds 

18 rpm 

1800 m 


81 mm Ml 

136 pounds 

18 rpm 

2900 m 


4.2-inch M24 

650 pounds 

20 rpm 

5400 m 


60mm Mortar 


4.2-inch Mortar ("4-Deuce") 

Ml 57mm Anti-Tank Gun 

; ... I ^111— ii MIMMIB III— 

Range 9,230 m maximum 

Muzzle Velocity 2800 ft/sec 
Weight 2810 pounds 

Penetration 82mm of armor at 500 m 
Mount towed 

M-7 105mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (Priest) 


M-2A1 105mm Towed Howitzer 


Shell Weight 
Rate of Fire 

10,980 m 
33 pounds 
8 rpm 

Infantry division artillery 

M-l 155mm Howitzer 

M-1A1 155mm Gun 

Caliber 155mm 

Weight 30,600 pounds 

Range 22,860 m 

Shell Weight 95 pounds 

Rate of Fire 1 rpm 

Crew 6 

Notes Corps artillery 


M-2 8-inch Howitzer 


Shell Weight 
Rate of Fire 

8 -inch 

31,700 pounds 
16,660 m 
200 pounds 
1 rpm 

Corps artillery 

Cromwell Tank 

Weight 30.8 tons 

Speed 27 mph maximum 

Range 173 miles 

Armament 75 mm gun 

Secondary 2 x .30-cal. Machine gun 

Armor 76 mm maximum in turret; 

63 mm maximum in hull 

Crew 5 

Churchill Tank 

Original DrawitigdiCopyri-ght The Tank Museum 1983 


M4A1 Sherman 

Combat Weight 




30,300 kg 
34 km/h 
412 km 

75mm Gun M3 

90 rounds 

2 x .30 caliber MG 

1 x .50 caliber MG 

Maximum 76mm 

Minimum 13 mm 


Sherman "Firefly" M4 Variant 

Combat Weight 



32,700 kg 
40 km/h 

76.2mm ROQF 17-pounder 
Mk IV or VI with 77 rounds 
1 x .30 caliber MG 
Maximum 76mm 
Minimum 13 mm 

Cruiser Tank Sherman VC 

Origirtal Drawing byD.P. Dyer 
©Copyfisht R.P. Hunnlcult 1978 

Light Tank Stuart M5A1 

Combat Weight 







15,500 kg 
58 km/h 
161 km 

37mm Gun M6 
3 x .30 caliber MG 
Maximum 64mm 
Minimum 10 mm 


3 inch Gun Motor Carriage M10 

Original Drawing ©Copyright SquadronfSignal Publications 1988 

Allied Tactical Aircraft 


m Speed 





Number in 

Spitfire Mk 

440 mph 

850 miles 

2 x 20mm 
cannon; 2 x .50- 
cal. MG 

500 pounds 

43,000 feet 



412 mph 

510 miles 

8 x 20mm 

pounds or 8 

35,200 feet 



410 mph 

2,250 miles 

1 x 20mm 
cannon; 4 x .50- 
cal. MG 


44,000 feet 



430 mph 

590 miles 

6 x or 8 x .50- 
cal. MG 

pounds or 
10 rockets 

42,000 feet 




440 mph 

2,100 miles 

6 x .50-cal. MG 

pounds or 6 

41,900 feet 







Gewehr 98 and Karabiner 98 

Shown w/Grenade Launcher ("Schiessbecher") 

Caliber 7.92mm 

Operation bolt action rifles 

Construction Mauser design; wooden stock 

Magazine five round clip 

Weight 9 pounds 

Range 800 meters maximum 


Rifle Grenade Device for the GEW98 

Types of Grenades HE, AP, smoke, illumination 

Firing Positions 

Grenadier Load 

prone, kneeling, standing 

250 meters in horizontal fire; maximum range 400 meters. When 
Used as a mortar, 25 to 75 meters. 
10 HE and 5 AT grenades. 

The Germans characteristically used it as a squad mortar and anti-tank 
weapon. One grenadier per rifle squad. 

Maschinenpistole 40 (MP40) 

Caliber 9mm 

Operation blowback operated machine pistol 
Construction metal and plastic with folding stock 
Magazine 32 rounds 

Rate of Fire 500 rpm (cyclic) or 180 rpm (normal) 


Maschinenpistole 44 (MP44) 

Caliber 7.92mm 

Magazine 35-38 round magazine 

Range 600 meters maximum effective range 

Remarks Issued principally to airborne units. 

Maschinengewehr 42 (MG42) 

Caliber 7.92mm 
Rate of Fire cyclic-up to 1,400 rpm; practical-250-500 rpm, depending on the mount 
Ammunition 50-round metallic-link belt 

Range effective range of 2000 to 2500 yards as HMG; 600-800 yards on bipod. 

Mounts Vehicle, tripod (heavy MG), bipod (light MG) 

Remarks Introduced new, simple locking system and easy barrel changing method. 

Maschinengewehr 34 (MG34) 

Caliber 7.92mm 

Rate of Fire cyclic- 900 rpm; practical- 100-120 rpm (light), 300 rpm (heavy) 
Ammunition 50-round metallic-link belt or by drums 

Range effective range of 2000 to 2500 yards as HMG; 600-800 yards on bipod. 

Mounts Vehicle, tripod (heavy MG), bipod (light MG) 
Remarks Largely replaced by the MG42 in infantry units by 1944 


Stielhandgranate 24 

Weight 1 .36 pounds 

Length 14 inches 

Delay 5 seconds 

Charge .365 pounds TNT 

Eihandgranate 39 

Weight 8 ounces 
Delay 5 seconds 

Charge 4 ounces TNT 

Panzerfaust 30 

Length 41 inches 

Weight 1 1 pounds 

Charge shaped charge anti-tank grenade 

Range 30 meters optimum 

Penetration 200 mm of armor at 30 meters 

Raketenpanzerbuchse 54 (also known as the Panzerschreck) 

Length 5.5 feet 

Weight 20 pounds 

Charge 88mm shaped charge (7 pounds) 

Range 115 meters optimum 

Penetration 200 mm of armor 


Leichter Granatenwerfer 36 (50 mm Mortar) 

Caliber 50mm 

Weight 3 1 pounds 

Range 570 yards 

Rate of Fire 12-20 rpm 

Schwerer Granatenwerfer 34 (81mm Mortar) 

Rate of Fire 


124 pounds 

2625 yards maximum 

10-12 rpm 


Granatenwerfer 42 (120mm Mortar) 

Caliber 120mm 

Weight 616 pounds 

Range 6600 yards maximum 

Rate of Fire Rate of fire and overall fire support comparable to 105mm howitzer 

Leichte Feld Haubitze 18 

Caliber 10.5 cm 

Weight 4320 pounds 

Range 13,480 yards maximum 

Ammunition HE, smoke, sabot, incendiary, illuminating 

Remarks Standard divisional direct support artillery 


Feld Haubitze 18/40 

Caliber 15 cm 

Weight 12,096 pounds 

Range 14,630 yards maximum 

Ammunition HE, AP, smoke, anti-concrete 

Remarks Standard divisional general support artillery 

Morser 18 (210mm Howitzer) 

Caliber 21 cm 

Weight 36,740 pounds 

Range 18,300 yards maximum 

Ammunition HE, anti-concrete 


Panzerabwehrkanone 40 (PAK 40) 

Caliber 75 mm 
Weight 3136 pounds 
Range 1000 yards maximum 

Ammunition AP 

Remarks Penetration at maximum effective range - 102mm of armor; pictured is the 97/38 
variant with Solothurn muzzle brake 

Panzerabwehrkanone 43/41C (PAK 43/41C Antitank/Antiaircraft Gun) 

Caliber 88 mm 

Weight 9660 pounds 

Range 16,200 yards horizontal 

Ammunition AP, AA 

Rate of Fire 15-20 rpm 

Remarks Penetration at 1500 yards - 130mm of armor 


Nebelwerfer 41 

Caliber 150mm 

Weight 1,195 pounds 

Range 7,330 yards maximum 

Rate of Fire 6 rounds/90 seconds 

Sturmgeschutz III (Stu.G. Ill) 

Weight 26.35 tons Engine Maybach, 295 

Length 22.5' Range 124 miles (62 miles cross-country) 

Height 7' Speed 20 mph (15 mph cross-country) 

Width 9' 8" Crew 4 

Armor Main gun 7.5 cm Stu.K.40 L/48 with 49 rounds 

Maximum 8 1 mm Secondary 1 x MG34 

Minimum 20 mm Penetration 84mm of armor at 500 yards; 72mm of 

armor at 1000 yards 

Remarks The vehicle was based on the PzKpfw. Ill chassis. The Stu.G. IV, also 

found in Normandy, was based on the PzKpfw. IV chassis, used the same gun and 
had a similar performance. 


Sturmgeschiitz 38t (Stu.G. 38t) 

Weight 16.65 tons Engine Czech EP4, 150 hp 

Length 20.7' Range 124 miles (62 miles cross-country) 

Height 6' 10.5" Speed 23 mph (15 mph cross-country) 

Width 8 '7. 5" Crew 4 

Armor Main gun 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 with 41rounds 

Maximum 60 mm Secondary 1 x MG34 

Minimum 10 mm Penetration 84mm of armor at 500 yards; 72mm of 

armor at 1000 yards 
Remarks The vehicle was based on the Czech 38t light tank chassis. 

Schwerer Panzerspahwagen 8 Rad (Sd.Kfz. 231) 

Weight 8.35 tons Engine 8-cylinder, 155 hp 

Length 19' 1" Speed 51 mph maximum 

Height 7' 10" Crew 4 

Width 7'3" Range 110 miles cross country, 190 miles on roads 

Armor Armament 1 x 2cm KwK36; 1 MG 34 machine gun. 



Remarks This is typical of the variety of light armored fighting vehicles and reconnaissance 
vehicles used in German armored divisions. 


PanzerKampfwagen IV, Ausf. G 


26 tons 


Maybach, 295bhp 




130 miles (80 miles cross-country) 


8 '6" 


20 mph maximum (15 mph cross-country) 






Main gun 

7.5 cm KwK 40 L/43 with 79 rounds 


60 mm 


2 x 7.92 mm MG34 


20 mm 

PzKpfw V, Ausf. D (Panther) 


43 tons 


Maybach, 700 bhp 




124 miles (62 miles cross-country) 




20 mph (15 mph cross-country) 






Main gun 

7.5 cm KwK 42 L/70 with 79 rounds 


100 mm 


2 x 7.92 mm MG34 or MG42 machine gun 


16 mm 



Main Gun 

60 tons 




88mm w/92 rounds 
Effective Range 3000m AP, 5000 m HE 
Produced 1,350, July 1942 - August 1944 

Maybach 12-cyl gasoline, 700 bhp 
121 miles 

24 mph (11 mph cross-country) 

2 x 7.92mm MG34 


The Defense of Bastogne 



Situation: Following the German attack in the Ardennes on the morning of 16 December 1944, Lt. 
Gen. Courtney Hodges, commanding First U.S. Army, asked Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, commanding 
12th Army Group, for permission to use the two airborne divisions that constituted the theater 
reserve. Agreeing with Hodges' concerns, General Dwight D. Eisenhower on 17 December 
released the 101st Airborne Division, then resting and refitting at Camp Mourmelon, France, for 
movement to Belgium. Hodges sent the 101st to VHI Corps, under command of Maj. Gen. Troy 
Middleton. VIE Corps had taken the full force of the 5th Panzer Army's attack, and on 17 
December the Germans stood within eleven miles of the crucial road and rail junction of Bastogne. 

The commander of the 101st Airborne, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, was at that time in the 
United States, and his deputy, Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, was in England. Command thus 
devolved on Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, the divisional artillery commander. McAuliffe 
went ahead of the division to Bastogne where he conferred with Middleton, who was preparing to 
move the corps headquarters from the city. By the slenderest of margins, the 101st reached the city 
before the advancing Germans and immediately began to construct a defense during the night of 18 
December and morning of 19 December. Understanding that the Germans needed Bastogne and 
the complex of roads radiating from it in order to continue their attack to the west, Middleton on 19 
December gave McAuliffe a single terse order: "Hold Bastogne." To achieve this, Middleton 
attached a number of units to McAuliffe's division. In addition to the 805 officers and 11,035 
enlisted men of the 101st Airborne, McAuliffe also commanded forty tanks of Combat Command 
B, 10th Armored Division; a tank destroyer battalion; two battalions of 155-mm artillery; and a 
collection of soldiers from many units — dubbed Team SNAFU ~ and available as replacements. 

American Forces: Under command of Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, in acting command of 

101st Airborne Division 

101st Airborne Division (Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe) 

501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (Lt. Col. Julian J. Ewell) 
502d Parachute Infantry Regiment (Lt. Col. Steve A. Chappuis) 
506th Parachute Infantry Regiment (Col. Robert F. Sink) 
327th Glider Infantry Regiment (Col. Joseph H. Harper) 
321st Glider Field Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. Edward L. Carmichael) 
907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. Clarence F. Nelson) 
377th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. Harry W. Elkins) 
463d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. John T. Cooper, Jr.) 
81st Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion (Lt. Col. X. B. Cox, Jr.) 
326th Airborne Engineer Battalion (Lt. Col. Hugh A. Mozley) 


Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division (Col. William L. Roberts) 
3d Tank Battalion (Lt. Col. Henry T. Cherry) 
20th Armored Infantry Battalion (Maj. William R. Desobry) 
54th Armored Infantry Battalion (Lt. Col. James O'Hara) 
420th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Lt. Col. Barry D. Browne) 

705th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Lt. Col. Clifford D. Templeton) 

755th Field Artillery Battalion 

969th Field Artillery Battalion 

German Forces: XLVII Panzerkorps {General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Freiherr von 


Initial attacks: 

2 Panzer division (Oberst Meinrad von Lauchert) 
Panzer Lehr Division {Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein) 
26 Volksgrenadierdivision (Oberst Heinz Kokott) 
600 Pionier Battalion 

15 Volkswerferbrigade 
766 Volksartilleriekorps 

Reinforcing units for later attacks: 

9 Panzer division (Generalmajor Harald von Elverfeldt) 

116 Panzer division {Generalmajor Siegfried von Waldenburg) 

3 Panzer grenadierdivision (Generalmajor Walter Denkert) 
15 Panzer grenadierdivision (Oberst Hans-Joachim Dekert) 
Fiihrer Begleit Brigade (Oberst Otto Remer) 

Progress of the Defense: None of the German divisions attacking Bastogne was at full strength, 
and some were considerably depleted. Panzer Lehr had only 40 percent of its tanks, 60 percent of 
its guns, and 60 percent of its authorized strength. Because of previous battle losses, the 26th 
Volksgrenadierdivision was lacking one regiment. The 2nd Panzer division was at 80 percent 
strength, but one of its regiments of grenadiers was on bicycles and therefore unfit for offensive 
operations; that regiment was used only for replacements. Units that later reinforced XLVII 
Panzerkorps ranged in strength from 50 to 70 percent. 

At Gen. Middleton's orders, Col. Robertson had already constituted three teams from Combat 
Command B and dispatched them to defend villages to the southeast, east, and northeast of 
Bastogne. Team Desobry pushed to Noville; Team Cherry to Longvilly, and Team O'Hara to 
Marvie. All promptly came under heavy pressure. McAuliffe organized the 101st Airborne into 
regimental task forces and distributed them to the perimeter of Bastogne. By 20 December, 


German attacks had constricted the perimeter around Bastogne and encircled the town on the next 
day. Lacking enough strength to overwhelm the defenders, Luttwitz sent a note to McAuliffe on 22 
December, demanding his surrender. On hearing about the demand, McAuliffe's immediate reply 
was "Aw, nuts." When discussing what sort of reply to send to the Germans, Lt. Col. Harry W. O. 
Kinnard, G3 of the 101st, suggested that McAuliffe simply repeat his earlier remark. German 
attacks continued through the day, although not well coordinated and only in company strength 
against various parts of the perimeter. 

On 23 December the weather cleared and American airpower began to play a part, parachuting vital 
supplies, including artillery ammunition, to the defenders, while fighter-bombers attacked German 
armor. Thus strengthened, American morale stiffened, and the defenders repulsed renewed attacks 
by additional units of XLVII Panzerkorps on 24 and 25 December. The day after Christmas, the 
Germans attacked again with battalion-sized infantry and armor teams, but were held off by 
American defenses arrayed in depth and by heavy artillery concentrations. At 1600 that afternoon, 
American tanks of the 4th Armored Division broke through to relieve the town. Fighting continued 
over the next two days as the Germans attempted, but with no success, to crush the corridor that 
Gen. George S. Patton's troops had opened to Bastogne. In the end, the 101st Airborne Division, 
Combat Command B of the 10th Armored Division, and their attached units suffered just over 
2,000 casualties in the defense of Bastogne, while attacking German forces lost 7000 killed in 
action and more than 200 armored vehicles. 

Significance of the Action: Most of the fighting in defense of Bastogne was, like elsewhere in the 
Battle of the Bulge, a series of small unit actions. The 101st Airborne had the advantage of fighting 
on interior lines of communication, so that it could rush reinforcements to any threatened part of its 
perimeter. The Germans, on the other hand, were operating on inadequate roads that made it 
difficult to concentrate force and more difficult to keep the forward units supplied. Tactical 
organization played its part as well. Organizing the defenses as teams of infantry, armor, and 
artillery gave the 101st great flexibility. More important was the greater firepower that the 
defenders enjoyed. When alerted for movement to Belgium, the divisional artillery took much 
more ammunition than it normally would have planned for. Once in Bastogne, the divisional 
artillery was reinforced by a number of other battalions, so that McAuliffe could usually plan on 
using up to ten artillery battalions, although the need to conserve ammunition remained acute 
throughout the siege. The principal use of artillery was against armor. On 20 December, for 
example, seven battalions fired 2,600 rounds solely at German armor, and artillery fired both 
indirect and direct fire missions against tanks throughout the battle. Aggressive infantry patrolling 
gave good early warning of German attacks, and any tanks that penetrated the American defenses 
were destroyed after they were separated from their supporting infantry. By comparison, the 
Germans had very little artillery to support the attack and never really attempted to silence the 
American artillery through counterbattery fire. 

Fortunately for the defenders, German attacks throughout the siege were piecemeal and conducted 
without great vigor. In part, this was a reflection of the fact that few senior German commanders 
really believed in the plan they were trying to carry out. In part, it was a consequence of the 
inadequate road network that slowed down the German advance and made it hard to concentrate 


force at the decisive moment, and then to resupply the forward units when they needed it. In part, it 
was a result of the secrecy with which Hitler had carried out his plans, since the German tactical 
commanders only knew their missions a couple of days before the attack. Thus they had inadequate 
time to conduct reconnaissance and consider both what might go wrong and how they would 
respond to it. Finally, it was also partly due to the generally lower state of training and generally 
lower morale of the German forces employed at that point in the war. 

For the Americans, the successful defense of Bastogne and the link-up with elements of Third 
Army attacking from the south spelled the end of the German offensive effort in the Ardennes. 
Denied the road net of which Bastogne was the center, and delayed so long that the overall plan for 
the dash across the Meuse River and on toward Antwerp became impossible to execute, the 
German commanders finally persuaded Hitler to allow them to withdraw toward the Siegfried Line, 
salvaging what they could of the forces they had thrown into battle. 

"At 1630 on December 26, 1944, one of three M4 Sherman medium tanks 
of the Third Army's 4 th Armored Division breaks through and makes contact 
with members of the 101 st Airborne Division defending Bastogne, in a painting 
by John Paul Strain. " 



At 1 130 on 22 December, four Germans, a major, a captain, and two enlisted men, came up the 
road to Bastogne from Remoifosse carrying a large white flag. They were met on the road by 
T/Sgt Oswald Y. Butler and S/Sgt Carl E. Dickinson of Company F, 327 th Glider Infantry, and 
PFC Ernest D. Premetz of the 327 th Medical Detachment. 

Premetz could speak German. The captain could speak English. He said to Butler, "We are 

The men took the Germans to the house where Lieutenant Leslie E. Smith of Weapons Platoon, 
Company F, 327 th Infantry, had his command post. Leaving the two German enlisted men at the 
command post, Smith blindfolded the two officers and led them over the hill to the command 
post of Captain James F. Adams, commanding officer of Company F. Adams called 2d Battalion 
headquarters in Marvie, Battalion called Regiment in Bastogne, and the 327 th Headquarters 
called the 101 st Division, relaying the word that some Germans had come in with surrender 
terms. The rumor quickly spread around the front that the enemy had had enough and that a 
party had arrived to arrange a surrender. Many of the American defenders crawled out of their 

Major Alvin Jones took the terms to General McAuliffe and Lieutenant Colonel Ned D. Moore 
who was acting Chief of Staff. The paper called for the surrender of the Bastogne garrison and 
threatened complete destruction otherwise. It appealed to the "well known American humanity" 
to save the people of Bastogne from further suffering. The Americans were to have two hours in 
which to consider. The two enemy officers would have to be released by 1400 but another hour 
would pass before the Germans would resume their attack. 

Colonel Harper, commanding the 327 th , went with Jones to Division Headquarters. The two 
German officers were left with Captain Adams. Members of the staff were grouped around 
General McAuliffe when Harper and Jones arrived. McAuliffe asked someone what the paper 
contained and was told that it requested a surrender. 

He laughed and said, "Aw, nuts!". It really seemed funny to him at the time. He figured he was 
giving the Germans "one hell of a beating" and that all of his men knew it. The demand was all 
out of line with the existing situation. 

But McAuliffe realized that some kind of reply had to be made and he sat down to think it over. 
Pencil in hand, he sat there pondering for a few minutes and then he remarked, "Well, I don't 
know what to tell them". He asked the staff what they thought and Colonel Kinnard, his G3, 
replied, "That first remark of yours would be hard to beat". 

General McAuliffe didn't understand immediately what Kinnard was referring to. Kinnard 
reminded him, "You said 'Nuts!'". That drew applause all around. All members of the staff 


agreed with much enthusiasm and because of their approval McAuliffe decided to send that 
message back to the Germans. 

Then he called Colonel Harper in and asked him how he would reply to the message. Harper 
thought for a minute but before he could compose anything General McAuliffe gave him the 
paper on which he had written his one- word reply and asked, "Will you see that it's delivered?". 
"I will deliver it myself, answered Harper. "It will be a lot of fun." McAuliffe told him not to 
go into the German lines. 

Colonel Harper returned to the command post of Company F. The two Germans were standing 
in the wood blindfolded and under guard. Harper said, "I have the American commander's 
reply". The German captain asked, "Is it written or verbal?". "It is written", said Harper. The 
German captain translated the message. The major then asked, "Is the reply negative or 
affirmative? If it is the latter I will negotiate further." 

All this time the Germans were acting in an arrogant and patronizing manner. Colonel Harper 
was beginning to lose his temper. He said, "The reply is decidedly not affirmative!". Then he 
added, "If you continue this foolish attack your losses will be tremendous". The major nodded 
his head. 

Harper put the two officers in the jeep and took them back to the main road where the German 
privates were waiting with the white flag. He then removed the blindfolds and said to them, 
speaking through the German captain, "If you don't understand what 'Nuts!' means, in plain 
English it is the same as 'Go to Hell!'. And I will tell you something else - if you continue to 
attack we will kill every goddamn German that tries to break into this city.". The German major 
and captain saluted very stiffly. The captain said, "We will kill many Americans. This is war." 
It was then 1350. "On your way, Bud", said Colonel Harper, "and good luck to you". The four 
Germans walked on down the road. Harper returned to the house, regretting that his tongue had 
slipped and that he had wished them good luck. 


The Christmas Message 

24 December 1944 

Merry Christmas! 

Office of the Division Commander 

What's merry about all this, you ask? We're fighting - it's cold - we aren't home. All true, 
but what has the proud Eagle Division accomplished with its worthy comrades of the 10 th Armored 
Division, the 705 th Tank Destroyer Battalion and all the rest? Just this: We have stopped cold 
everything that has been thrown at us from the North, East, South, and West. We have 
identifications from four German Panzer Divisions, two German Infantry Divisions and one German 
Parachute Division. These units, spearheading the last desperate German lunge, were headed 
straight west for key points when the Eagle Division was hurriedly ordered to stem the advance. 
How effectively this was done will be written in history; not alone in our Division's glorious history 
but in world history. The Germans actually did surround us, their radios blared our doom. Their 
Commander demanded our surrender in the following impudent arrogance: 

December 22d 1944 

"To the U.S.A. Commander of the encircled town of Bastogne: 

"The fortune of war is changing. This time the U.S.A. forces in and near Bastogne have been 
encircled by strong German armored units. More German armored units have crossed the river 
Ourthe near Ortheuville, have taken Marche and reached St. Hubert by passing through Hompre- 
Sibret-Tillet. Libramont is in German hands. 

"There is only one possibility to save the encircled U.S.A. troops from total annihilation: 
that is the honorable surrender of the encircled town. In order to think it over a term of two hours 
will be granted beginning with the presentation of this note. 

"If this proposal should be rejected one German Artillery Corps and six heavy A. A. 
Battalions are ready to annihilate the U.S.A. troops in and near Bastogne. The order for firing will 
be given immediately after this two hours' term. 

"All the serious civilian losses caused by this artillery fire would not correspond with the 
well-known American humanity. 

The German Commander" 

The German Commander received the following reply: 

22 December 1944 

"To the German Commander: 


The American Commander" 

Allied Troops are counterattacking in force. We continue to hold Bastogne. By holding 
Bastogne we assure the success of the Allied Armies. We know that our Division Commander, 
General Taylor, will say: "Well Done!" 

We are giving our country and our loved ones at home a worthy Christmas present and 
being privileged to take part in this gallant feat of arms are truly making for ourselves a Merry 

A. C. McAuliffe 



Casualties, Medical Statistics, 
& Battle Losses 

Sherman - Wibrin, Belgium, August 2001 


"Some thirty-two U.S. divisions fought in the Ardennes, where the 
daily battle strength of U.S. Army forces averaged twenty-six divisions and 
610,000 men... (T)he cost of victory was staggering. The final tally for the 
Ardennes totaled 41,315 casualties in December to bring the offensive to a 
halt and an additional 39,672 casualties in January to retake lost ground. 
The SHAEF casualty estimate presented to Eisenhower in February 1945 
listed casualties for the First Army at 39,957; for the Third Army at 35,525; 
and for the British XXX Corps, which helped at the end, at 1,408... Sickness 
and cold weather also ravaged the fighting lines, with the First, Third, and 
Seventh (in Alsace) Armies having cold injury hospital admissions of more 
than 17,000 during the entire campaign. No official German losses for the 
Ardennes have been computed, but they have been estimated at between 
81,000 and 103,000." (from "Ardennes-Alsace", CMH Pub 72-26. Figures 
below are from Weigley, "Eisenhower's Lieutenants"). 






U.S. Army, 16 Dec 44-2 Jan 45 
(defensive phase) 





U.S. Army, 3-28 Jan 45 





(offensive phase) 

U.S. Army - total 





British (inch Canadian) Army 


Allied Total 


German Army (estimates) 




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ANNEX 2 * 

Battle Losses, Major Items 


I. Ordnance Items 

Gun, auto, 40-mm, Ml (AA & Garr. M2) . . . 28 

Gun,maeh,cal.30,M1917Al 324 

Gun, mach, cal .30, M1919A4, flex 267 

Gun, mach, cal .30, M1919A6 291 

Gun, mach, cal .50, Brg M2 HB, flex. 389 

Gun, mach, cal .50, W/C, flex. M2 13 

Gun, submach, cal .45, Thomp. Ml & M1A1 46 

Gun, submach, cal .45, M3 553 

Mortar, 60-mm, M2, w/mount, M2 349 

Mortar, 81-mm, Ml, w/mount, Ml 193 

Mount, AA, MG, cal .50, M2A1 20 

Mount, AA, MG, cal .50, M3 & M3A1 2 

Mount, tripod, MG, cal .30, M1917A1 301 

Mount, tripod, MG, cal .30, M2 492 

Mount, tripod, MG, cal .50, M3 319 

Elevator, cradle, AA, cal .50, Ml 142 

Mount, MG, cal .30, M48 97 

Mount; truck pedestal, M24A1 or M24A2 . . 36 

Mount, truck pedestal, M31 131 

Mount, truck, M36 96 

Mount, truck, M37 1 

Mount, truck, M37A2 1 

Rifle, auto, cal .30 Brg, M1918A2 590 

Bayonet, M1905 167 

Bayonet, Ml 5,360 

Carbine, U. S., cal .30, Ml 2,764 

Knife, trench, M3 4,858 

Launcher, grenade, Ml 3 

Launcher, grenade, M7 3,135 

Launcher, grenade, M8 : 748 

Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M1A1 204 

Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M9 1,108 

Pistol, auto, cal .45, M1911 & M1911A1 .... 1,208 

Pistol, pyro, M8 2 

Projector, pyro, hand, M9 47 

Projector, signal, ground, M4 28 

Rifle, U.S., cal .30, Ml 4,251 

Rifle, U. S, cal .30, M1903, '03A1 & '03A3 ... 2 

Rifle, U.S., cal .30, M1903A4 (Sniper's) .... 79 

Scabbard, bayonet, M3 167 

Scabbard, bayonet, M7 4,826 

Scabbard, trench knife, M8 4,750 

Gun, 57-mm, Ml AT & Carr M1A2 or Ml A3 124 

Gun, 57-mm, Ml AT & Carr Brit MKXV .... 10 

Gun, 3" towed, M5 & Carr Ml & M6 64 

How., 75-mm M1A1 (Pack) & Carr Ml & M8 3 

How., 105-mm M2 Al & Carr M2A2 ~ 34 

How., 105-mm M3 & Carr M3 or M3A1 26 

How., 155-mm Ml & Carr Ml & M1A1 8 

Gun, 90-mm, M1A1 & Mount M1A1 3 

Gun, 155-mm, M1A1 & Carr Ml 2 

How:, 8", Ml & Carr Ml 9 

Mount, truck, M50 3 

Car, armd, light, M8 106 

Car, annd, utility, M20 7 

Car, HT, M2 5 

Car, HT, M2, w/mult gun Mt M45 3 

Car, HT, M2A1 4 

Carriage, motor, 76-mm gun, M18 7 

Carriage, motor, 3" gun, M10 15 

Carriage, motor, 75-mm How, M8 2 

Carriage, motor, 105-mm How, M7 5 

Carriage, motor, mult gun M16 13 

Carriage, motor, mult MG, cal .50, M51 22 

Carrier, cargo, M29 19 

Carrier, pers, HT, M3 16 

Carrier, pers, HT, M3A1 149 

Car, HT, M3A2 8 

Carrier, 81-mm Mprtar, HT, M4A1 6 

Tank, light, M5A1 47 

Tank, medium, M4 151 

Tank, medium, M4 (105-mm How) 10 

Tank, medium, M4A1 29 

Trailer, ammo, M10 114 

Trailer, ammo, 4-ton, M21 3 

Tank, medium, M4A3E2 5 

Bulldozer, tank, mtd 3 

Tank, medium, M4A3 (75-mm) 2 

Tank, medium, M4A3 (76-mm) 45 

Carriage, motor, 90-mm gun, M36 13 

Tractor, medium, M4 (T9E1) 4 

Tractor, medium, M5A1 6 

Truck, small arms repair, M7 & M7A1 2 

Truck, heavy, wrecking, Ml ^ 2 

Vehicle, tank recovery, T2 1 

Vehicle, tank recovery, M32 3 

Ambulance, %-ton, 4x4 20 

Motorcycle, solo 17 

Trailer, %-ton, 2-whl, cargo 605 

Trailer, 1-ton, 2-whl, cargo 504 

Trailer, 1-ton, water tank, 250-gal 2 


Truck, 14 -ton, 4x4 1.844 

Truck, % -ton, 4x4 (12 V t 1 

Truck, %-ton, C/R 8 

Truck, %-ton, W/C 110 

Truck, 34-ton, W/C (12 V ) 31 

Truck, 1 14-ton, 6x6, cargo 102 

Truck, 214-ton, 6x6, cargo 534 

Truck, 2%-ton, 6x6, dump 73 

Truck, 214-ton, 6x6, SWB 61 

Truck, 4-ton, 6x6, cargo, SWB 2 

Truck, 4- ton, 6x6, Wrecker 2 

Truck, 714-ton, 6x6, Prime Mover 1 

Truck, 5-6-ton, 4x4, tractor 1 

II. Quartermaster Items 

Ax, handled, chopping, SB, 4-lb 371 

Ax, intrenching 1,229 

Bag, canvas, water, steril 142 

Bag, sleeping, w/ca9e 8,776 

Bar, wrecking 20 

Blanket, wool, OD 30,823 

Buckets, canvas, folding, 18-qt 806 

Bucket, GP, 14-qt 298 

Can, corr, nesting, 10-gal 163 

16-gal 71 

24-gal 288 

32-gal 145 

Can, meat 15,625 

Canteen 6,616 

.Carrier, wire cutters 1,668 

Carrier, ax, intrenching 854 

Carrier, pickmattock, intr. 1,397 

Carrier, shovel, intrenching • . . 5,268 

Container, rd, insul, w/inserts 428 

Container, water, 5-gal 7,149 

Cover, can, meat 2,876 

Cover, canteen 5,097 

Cup, canteen 12,474 

Cutters, wire 1,746 

Desk, field, co 64 

Desk, field, hq 23 

Fork, M1926 15,851 

Heater, water, imm. type 320 

Knife, M1926 14,691 

Lantern, gasoline 373 

Lantern, kerosene 154 

Outfit, cooking, 1-burner 251 

Outfit, cooking, 2-hurner 18 

Outfit, cooking, 20-man 64 

Outfit, officer's mess 30 

Overcoat, wool, OD 7,113 

Overshoes, arctic 4,436 

Pickmattock, handled 334 

Pickmattock, intrenching 2,031 

Pick, RR 274 

Raincoat, dismt'd 11,024 

Range, field, complete 54 

Range, field, pack "A" ■ 25 

Range, field, pack "B" 99 

Screen, latrine 140 

Shovel, D-l'audled, rd pt 743 

Shovel, L-handled, rd pt 179 

Shovel, intrenching 6,255 

Sledge, double-face 69 

Spoon, M1926 11,912 

Stove, cooking, 1 -burner 2,650 

Stove, cooking, 2-bunier 22 

Stove, tent, M--41 686 

Tent, command post 136 

Tent, hospital ward 20 

Tent, pyramidal 317 

Tent,ehelterlialf 19.084 

Tent, squad 9 

Tent, storage 14 

Tent, wall, large 20 

Tent, wall, small 22 

Tool set, carpenter 85 

Typewriter, portable 114 

Typewriter, nonportable 59 

III. Engineer Items 

Attachment for crane, trk mtd, % c.y., 

bucket dragline , 1 

Boat, assault, M-2 53 

Boat, rubber, recon, 6-man 3 

Boat, recon, pneumatic, 3-man 53 

Bridge parts: 

Float, pneumatic, 18-ton 28 

Saddles, M-2 21 

Tread way, steel, M-2 4 

Compressor, air, 15-cfm 8 

Compressor, air, mtz, 105-cfm 4 

Dolly, 2-wheel, DT, 25-ton ponton 3 

Generator, 3 KVA 2 

Grader, road, towed type 1 

Lubricator, trailer, mtd 1 

Manifold, infl & defl, pneumatic float 1 

Motor, outboard, 22-HP 20 

Pump, centrifugal, 2", 55 GPM 11 

Saw, chain, portable, GED, 36" 35 

Semitrailer, low bed, 20-ton, w/dolly 3 

Semitrailer, 25-ton, ponton 3 

Shovel, crawler, *4 cu yd 1 

Sprayer, paint 8 

Topo equipment: 

Alidade, miniature, telescopic, w/access . . 3 

Level, Engr, w/accessories & tripod 8 

Theodolite, direction, 1 sec, w/tripod .... 10 

Trailer, 2-wh, util pole type, 214-ton, type I 45 

Trailer, 2-wh, util pole type, 2%-ton, type II 2 

Trailer, low bed, 8-ton 6 

Trailer, low bed, 16-ton 4 

Trailer, low bed, 20-ton 2 

Tractor, crawler, 35 DBHP, R-4 6 

Tractor, crawler, 55 DBHP, D-6 1 

Tractor, crawler, 80 DBHP, D-7 3 


Truck, cargo, treadway. 6-ton. 6x6 ( Brock- 

wayj 5 

Welding equip, electric arc, 300 amps .2 

Welding equipment, oxyacetylene 1 

Water supply equip, set #1 ... 7 

IV. Signal Items 

Radio transmitter, An/TRC-1 4 

. Detector set, SCR-625 866 

Handset, TS-10 973 

. Power unit, PE-75 69 

Power unit, PE-95 13 

Radio set, SCR-177 3 

Radio set, SCR-193 55 

Radio set, SCR-284 195 

Radio set, SCR-300 964 

Radio set, SCR-399 8 

Radio set, SCR-506 Ill 

Radio set, SCR-508 383 

Radio set, SCR-509 63 

Radio set, SCR-510 305 

Radio set, SCR-511 . . . . . 72 

Radio set, SCR-528 395 

Radio set, SCR-536 1,612 

Radio set, SCR-538 108 

Radio set, SCR-543 .- 24 

Radio set, SCR-584 1 

Radio set, SCR-593 314 

. Radio set, SCR-608 105 

Radio set, SCR-610 823 

Radio set, SCR-628 2 

Reel equipment, CE-11 2,508 

Reel unit, RL-26 59 

Reel unit, RL-31 523 

Reel, RL-39 470 

Sound ranging set, GR-3 2 

Switchboard, BD-71 235 

Switchboard, BD-72 207 

Telephone, EE-8 ;. . 3,775 

Telephone central office set, TC-2 2 

Telephone central office set, TC-4 12 

Telephone central office set, TC-12 19 

Telephone repeater, EE-89 31 

Teletypewriter set, EE-97 1 

Test equipment, IE-9 3 

Test equipment, IE-17 50 

Test set, 1-56 47 

Test set, EE-65 23 

Test unit, 1-176 22 

Trailer, K-38 1 

Truck, K-43 ; i 

Truck, K-44 1 

Typewriter, MC-88 14 

Voltohmmeter, 1-166 19 

Wire, W-110 16,220 miles 

Wire, W-130 4,879 miles 

Wire, W-143 18 Reels 

V. Medical hems 

Case, ward, complete 9 

Basic instrument set, complete 2 

Oxygen therapy apparatus, closed circuit ... 2 

Chest MD 60, complete 19 

Chest MD 61, complete 1 

Chest MD 62, complete 1 

X-ray field generator 1 

Kit, dental officer, complete 24 

Kit, dental private, complete 17 

Kit, medical NCO's, complete 139 

Kit, medical officer's complete 72 

Kit, medical private's complete 1,142 

Field Hospital, hospitalization unit 2 

Unit medical equipment pack 32 

Blanket set, large, complete 32 

Blanket set, small, complete 65 

Chest, field, plain 30 

Chest MD 1, complete 38 

Chest MD 2, complete 65 

Chest MD 4, complete 36 

Chest, surgical supplies "B," complete 2 

Chest, tableware, complete 18 

Kit, 1st aid, MV, 24-vmit 174 

Kit, 1st aid, MV, 12-unit 1,181 

Set, gas casualty, M-2 36 

Kit, 1st aid, gas casualty, complete 361 

Blanket, OD 7,348 

Brassard, GC 5,193 

Bucket, hospital, set of 3 13 

Carrier, field, collapsible 16 

Cup, enamelware 136 

Cot, folding, canvas 1,500 

Lamp, operating, field 3 

Lamp, operating, field, generator 4 

Litter, straight steel 2,843 

Machine, imprinting 43 

Mattress pad 400 

Sterilizer, dressing & utensil horiz 5 

Sterilizer, instrument, 20" 3 

Stove, 2-burner, gasoline 66 

Splint set • 71 

VI. Chemical Warfare Items 

Flamethrower, portable 124 

Mask, gas, lightweight 20,542 

Mask, gas, optical 19 

Mask, gas, diaphragm 7 

Mask, gas, lightweight, small 2 



Suggestions for Further Reading 

The "Red Ball Highway" was the US response 
to keeping the rapidly advancing Allied armies 
sufficiently supplied with the "sinews of war" as 
ever-lengthening lines of communication put 
increasing strains on the over-burdened logistics system. 

Truck convoys rolled over this highway day and night, 
moving supplies from the beachheads to the fighting front. 

(from Morelock, Generals of the Ardennes, NDU Press, 1994) 

General Histories 

Ambrose, Stephen E. Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the 
Bulge to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944 - May 7, 1945. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1997. 

This book reflects Ambrose's two great strengths as a chronicler of front-line combat told in the 
words of the men who fought it and as Eisenhower' s biographer. The work is broader than the 
Ardennes, but Ambrose's coverage of this campaign alternates between gripping tales of 
desperate men heroically holding on to obscure crossroads and generally perceptive accounts of 
decision making at the theater level. By leaving out the middle, however, Ambrose at times 
seems to give Eisenhower sole credit for actions that were actually taken by subordinate 
commanders. (HalWinton) 

Cole, Hugh. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. Washington, D. C: Office of the Chief of 
Military History, 1965. 

Begin any study of the Battle of the Bulge with this book, one of the very few that offers 
professional soldiers the opportunity to study tactical operations in coherent detail. Cole discusses 
the strategic backgrounds of the battle; Hitler's rationale and operational planning for the offensive; 
troops and terrain; why commanders made the decisions they made; and the development of the 
battle in great detail and in orderly chronological and geographical sequence. The book includes 
good maps in text and a supplement of ten detailed fold-out maps at the back — the only really 
useful maps of the battle that are in print. The author knows what he is talking about. A graduate 
of the Command and General Staff School, he served during World War II as an intelligence officer 
on Third Army staff. After the war, he was Deputy Theater Historian in Europe and thereafter 
worked at the Army's Center of Military History, where he also wrote another volume in the series, 
The Lorraine Campaign. This book is based on original documentation and interviews with 
participants and commanders at all levels. Most newer books really only sift through the 
information that older books present and do not offer original research, basic research and analysis 
that Cole and his fellow Army historians did after World War n. (Charles Kirkpatrick) 

Dupuy, Ernest. St. Vith: Lion in the Way: The 106th Infantry Division in World War II. 

Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949, and subsequently reprinted. 

This book, which Russell Weigley considers one of the better divisional histories, details the fate 
of the 106th Infantry Division, two regiments of which eventually surrendered in the Battle of the 
Bulge — a battle that began for the division some six days after it arrived in Europe. (CK) 



Dupuy, Trevor N., David L. Bongard, and Richard C. Anderson Jr. Hitler's Last Gamble: 
The Battle of the Bulge, December 1944 - January 1945. New York: Harper Collins, 1994. 

The operational-level assessments in this work are at times questionable, but they are offset by its 
excellent and quite detailed tactical analyses. Succinct unit histories of engaged divisions on 
both sides, informative personality sketches of German and American division and corps 
commanders, excellent maps, and pithy summaries of major and minor engagements make this 
one of the most appealing and useful tactical studies of the Bulge in the last twenty years. (HW) 

Graham, Cosmas and Albert Cowdrey. The Medical Service in the European Theater of 
Operations. Washington, D. C, CMH, 1992. 

This is the official history of the medical services in the European theater. It is also one of the best 
sources available for use in staff rides devoted to operations in the Ardennes or the Huertgen. The 
hospital and evacuation crisis of late 1944 affected operations, morale, and manpower. 
Unanticipated high casualties in October and December swamped the system and required 
tremendous ingenuity to solve. The chapters about the evacuation system and the medics in retreat 
(December) and in the attack are also quite interesting and useful to a staff ride. (Scott Wheeler) 

Hogan, David. Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943-1945. 

Washington, D. C: CMH, 2000. 

Hodge's First Army played a central role in the battles from Normandy to the Rhine. Hogan' s 
account of the operation of the First Army command post is invaluable to anyone trying to 
understand how an army headquarters functions in wartime. The maps are excellent, and the 
discussions about the various functional and special staff sections are very interesting. Hogan also 
provides good analyses of the primary staff officers who served in the First Army HQ. (SW) 

Lewin, Ronald. Ultra Goes to War. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. 

The ground-breaking book that finally explained the Allies' great advantage in being able to 
decipher much of the German operational radio traffic, Lewin's book gives some of the basis for 
Eisenhower's and Bradley's assurance about German intentions and their well-conceived 
countermeasures. (CK) 

MacDonald, Charles. A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge. New 

York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985. 

A long-time colleague of Hugh Cole at the Center of Military History, and himself the author of a 
number of volumes in the official history series and an unacknowledged co-author of a number of 
books credited to other historians, MacDonald brought a different approach to his book about the 
Battle of the Bulge. In 1944, at 22 years of age, MacDonald was a rifle company commander in the 
2nd Infantry Division. He led the fight in a crucial V Corps battle in front of the towns of Krinkelt 


and Rocherath, a desperate battle in which he won a Silver Star and one of his soldiers a Medal of 
Honor. While his book is a careful and responsible tactical analysis of the fighting, MacDonald 
focused on two other factors that were crucial in the eventual American victory: the fighting quality 
of the individual American soldier and the character of American command and leadership at all 
levels. Because MacDonald was a gifted writer, his book is very readable. Because he fought in 
this battle, his wrote with great understanding of the conditions. Nonetheless, his analysis of the 
fighting was dispassionate and measured. A superb book about the Battle of the Bulge, A Time for 
Trumpets is the ideal companion volume to Cole's official history. While Cole analyzed the tactics 
in unmatched detail, MacDonald gives the reader a clear picture — a soldier's picture — of the 
intangibles of leadership and courage that made all the difference in those small unit actions. Those 
who wish more detail on the company-level battle should refer to MacDonald's classic memoir, 
Company Commander (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947, and reprinted many times 
subsequently). (CK) 

This book remains the best book for staff rides focusing on the tactical and operational levels of 
War during the Battle of the Bulge. MacDonald was a company commander in the 2d Infantry 
Division and his experiences illuminate his analysis and conclusions. MacDonald sets the 
strategic and operational stage before he describes and analyzes the tactical level. The book is 
especially good in its coverage of the North Shoulder, which MacDonald argues was the critical 
sector of the battle operationally. This book gives a superb account of the tactical operations, 
especially in the first seven days of the battle. (SW) 

MacLean, French. Quiet Flows the Rhine: German General Officer Casualties in World War 
Two. Winnipeg, Ont.: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1996. 

This is a masterful study of the German Army's senior officer casualties in the war. There is 
nothing like it for our army since we suffered so few general officer casualties. Not surprisingly, 
most general officer deaths occurred on the Eastern Front, where most of the German generals 
served. (SW) 

Mansoor, Peter. The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 
1941-45. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1999. 

This is one of the best accounts of how the United States Army mobilized, trained, fielded, and 
commanded infantry divisions in the Second World War. Mansoor' s point is that American 
infantry divisions performed magnificently against the more experienced, and often better armed, 
German divisions in Italy, France, Belgium, and Germany. The American divisions learned from 
their mistakes and corrected a remarkable number of problems in the field. He also points out the 
numerous weaknesses in the training and personnel systems of the US Army during the war. This 
section is very good food for thought about how to mobilize a large army for an emergency such 
as World War Two. Finally, Mansoor provides excellent biographical discussions of a number of 
infantry divisions and the generals who commanded them. (SW) 


Morelock J.D. Generals of the Ardennes: American Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge. 

Washington: National Defense University Press, 1994. 

Written while Morelock was an Army Colonel on active duty, this account fills in the gaps left in 
other works by explicitly examining one commander at each echelon from theater to combat 
command. The resulting protagonists are Dwight Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, 
Omar Bradley as commander of Twelfth Army Group, William Simpson as commander of Ninth 
Army, Troy Middleton as commander of VIII Corps, Alan Jones as commander of the ill-fated 
106 th Infantry Division, and Bruce Clarke as commander of Combat Command B, 7 th Armored 
Division. Although one could perhaps take issue with several of these choices, the book's real 
credibility derives from the judiciousness of Morelock' s assessments as he parcels out praise and 
blame to his subjects. (HW) 

Ruppenthal, Roland. Logistical Support of the Armies. 2 Volumes. Washington, D. C: CMH, 

This two-volume work is the best account of the history of logistical operations in Europe in 
World War Two. The old saying that 'professionals do logistics and amateurs do tactics' makes 
sense when one reads these volumes. As Eisenhower's memos to Marshall and the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff indicate, the logistical situation and requirements drove much of the strategic and 
operational thinking and decisions of the campaign. There probably would not have been a 
Huertgen Forest campaign in 1944-45 had the US Army not literally run out of supplies in 
September 1944. Ruppenthal explains why the corps' and divisions were running on empty at 
the end of the rapid pursuit of the Germans across France, and he tells the very interesting story 
of how the logistical troops and their commanders rectified that situation in a remarkably short 
time. Alas, there is too little about coal here. (SW) 

Votaw, John. Blue Spaders, The 26 Infantry Regiment, 1917-1967. Wheaton, HI.: Cantigny 
First Division Foundation, 1996. 

The First Infantry Division Museum and association published this interesting account of the 26 th 
Infantry in the two world wars. The Blue Spaders were in the thick of the fighting to take 
Aachen and the Stolberg Corridor. Later they helped turn the Huertgen Forest from the north. 
Finally, they destroyed the 12 th SS Panzer Division in the Battle of the Bulge. Anyone in the 
First Infantry Division doing a staff ride of the Huertgen or of the Ardennes ought to use this 
book along with MacDonald's books. (SW) 

Weigley, Russell. Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany 
1944-1945. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981. 

An analysis of the fighting in Europe by one of the most respected American military historians, 
this book is probably one of the best of the critical accounts that takes into account the occasionally 
high tension that existed among Allied commanders — particularly in times of stress, such as during 


the Battle of the Bulge, and particularly between Montgomery and American commanders, as 
refereed by Eisenhower. See chapters 17 and 25-30. (CK) 

Although nearly two decades old, this detailed examination of Allied command relationships in 
the European Theater of Operations remains one of the standard accounts. Weigley's assessment 
of the interplay of personalities is perceptive and his grasp of tactical and operational detail is 
remarkably sound. As in Ambrose's work the treatment of the Ardennes campaign is set solidly 
in the context of the operations that preceded and followed it. This book also benefits from 
Weigley's long study of the American Army's institutional history. (HW) 

Wheeler, James Scott The Big Red One: America's Legendary I s Infantry Division from 
World War I to Desert Storm. Lawrence, KS, 2007. 

"An exceptionally fine work of scholarship, written with a storyteller's verve. The Big Red One 
is not just a vivid account of the nation's most venerable division, but a compelling yarn for 
anyone interested in the history of the U.S. Army." Rick Atkinson, author of An Army at Dawn 
and In the Company of Soldiers: "A rousing battle history of the Army's most renowned major 
combat unit and the best history to date of any of the Army's active duty combat divisions." 

First Hand Accounts 

Bradley, Omar. A Soldier's Story. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1951; and Bradley, with Clay 
Blair. A General's Life. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 

These are the memoirs of the senior American commander in the battle. Bradley's 1951 memoir, 
based on the diary kept by Chester Hansen, his aide, is as reserved as Eisenhower's writing. In the 
later book co-written by Clay Blair, Bradley was less reticent and freely vented his frustration and 
anger not only with Montgomery, but also with George Patton and with General Eisenhower. In A 
Soldier's Story, read chapter 21, "Counteroffensive." (CK) 

Butcher, H. Three Years With Eisenhower. London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1946. 

If you can get your hands on this book, read Part Five: Cross Channel Invasion, which includes 
material on the Battle of the Bulge. This is the diary that Butcher, naval aide de camp to 
Eisenhower, kept throughout the European war, and is occasionally quite candid. The book is easy 
to use because the heading of each page indicates the date of the entry. (CK) 

Collins, J. Lawton. Lightning Joe: An Autobiography. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1979. 

VII Corps was early the designated counterattack force, although Collins had some difficulty 
marshalling divisions because the fighting tended to engulf whatever units became available. (CK) 


Eisenhower, Dwight Crusade in Europe. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948. 

Here you can read Eisenhower's own account of why the German attack did not unduly worry him. 
Note, however, that this book (because of official secrecy) could not mention the fact that 
Eisenhower regularly got the fruits not only of the breaking of German codes, but also of the 
Japanese diplomatic code. A recently discovered fact that bears on the issue is that Hitler discussed 
his forthcoming offensive with Baron Oshima, the Japanese ambassador to Berlin. Oshima duly 
reported the conversation to Tokyo. In the process, American naval code-breakers copied and 
decrypted the message and evidently passed the information on to Eisenhower. This book was 
based on official diaries kept by his aide de camp and other members of his personal staff and is 
often more remarkable for what it does not say than for what it does. Nowhere in the book, for 
example, does his frustration with Field Marshall Sir Bernard Law Montgomery come out as it does 
in his private correspondence. This is a valuable retrospective account of the fighting as seen by the 
supreme commander. See chapter 18. (CK) 

Gavin, James. On to Berlin: Battles of an Airborne Commander 1943-1946. New York: The 
Viking Press, 1978; and Matthew B. Ridgway and Harold H. Martin. Soldier: The Memoirs of 
Matthew B. Ridgway. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. 

These are accounts of the 82nd Airborne Division and XVTfl Airborne Corps actions during the 
Battle of the Bulge. The XVJJI Corps played an important role in holding the northern shoulder of 
the Bulge, west of the Salm River. Neither Gavin nor Ridgway shrink from critical comments about 
their fellow commanders. In Gavin's book, see the chapter "The Winter War" (pp. 193-266). (CK) 

Patton, George. War as I Knew It. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947. 

Patton kept a full diary during the war and based this book on portions of it. See Part Two, chapter 
4, for the relief of Bastogne. Supplement this account, written very much with future evaluations of 
his generalship in mind, with selected portions of Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers 1945-45 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974). The story of how Patton's Third Army staff functioned to plan 
the relief of Bastogne is well worth studying. (CK) 

Price, Frank. Troy H. Middleton: A Biography. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 

Based on interviews with Middleton when he served as president of LSU, and written by an 
historian who did not have as good an understanding of military affairs as one might desire, this 
book unfortunately does not tackle the big questions: Middleton's initial dispositions; the decision 
to order 28th Infantry Division to stand fast, regardless of losses; and the loss of the 106th Infantry 
Division. Nonetheless, this is a good portrait of a corps commander highly regarded by Eisenhower 
and Bradley. See chapter 17. (CK) 


Smith, Bedell. Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions: Europe 1944-1945. New York: Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1956. 

Smith was Eisenhower's peppery chief of staff and was in a unique position to observe the 
decision-making process at SHAEF headquarters. In this book, he outlines the key decisions he 
believes Eisenhower made throughout the war. See Chapter 3. (CK) 

Wilson, George. If You Survive. New York: Ivy Books, 1987. 

George Wilson joined the Fourth Infantry Division in Normandy in mid June. He was greeted by 
his company commander with the promise that, if he survived the next several days of combat, he 
would be promoted to first lieutenant. He survived, but was not promoted until December. Wilson's 
account is invaluable to anyone studying the psychological aspects of war as well as to those 
interested in small unit combat and personal experiences. (SW) 

Some Final Recommendations 

There are many German biographies and memoirs that tell various parts of the story, but there is not 
yet a first-rate operational history. That, however, is soon to appear. Watch for the forthcoming 
publication of volume 7 in the German official history series, Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive: 
Der Krieg im Westen, im Mittelmeerraum und in Ostasien 1943-1944/1945. If you don't read 
German, the book will also be published in English translation by Oxford University Press. These 
histories, issued by the German Military History Research Office, have been widely praised by 
historians throughout the world and are likely to be the definitive word from the German side. 



"The pious Greek, when he had set up a/tars to all the 
great gods by name, added one more altar, 
'To the Unknown God'. 
So whenever we speak and think of the great captains 

and set up our military altars to Hannibal and 
Napoleon and Marlborough and such-like, let us add 

one more altar, 'To the Unknown Leader', that is, 
to the good company, platoon, or section leader who 
carries forward his men or holds his post, and often 
falls unknown. It is these who in the end do most 
to win wars. The British have been a free people 
and are still a comparatively free people; and 
though we are not, thank Heaven, a military nation, 
this tradition of freedom gives to our junior leaders 
in war a priceless gift of initiative. So long as this 
initiative is not cramped by too many regulations, 
by too much formalism, we shall, I trust, continue 
to win our battles - sometimes in spite of our 
higher commanders. " 

Field Marshal Lord Wavell 


Antiaircraft Artillery 


Army Air Forces (US) 


After Action Report 


American-British Conversations (January-March 1941) 




Assistant Chief of Staff 


Armored Division 

Adm; Admin 



Assistant Directorate of Organization (US) 


Advance Section, Communications Zone 


Allied Expeditionary Air Force 


Allied Expeditionary Force 


Air Force 


Allied Force Headquarters 


Air Force Service Command 


Armored Fighting Vehicle 


Adjutant General 


Army Ground Forces (US) 


Army Group 


Allied Information Service 




Air Minister for Supply and Organization 


Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force 


Appendix or Annex 


Site of Anglo-American amphibious assault, January 1944, on the West 

coast of Italy 


Armor piercing 


Armored Personnel Carrier 






Army Service Forces 


Ammunition Supply Point 


Anti-submarine warfare; Assistant Secretary of War 




(Women's) Auxiliary Territorial Service 


Aviation Gasoline 

Axis, The 

Alliance of Germany and Italy, later including Japan and other nations, 

that opposed the Allies in World War II 

Bailey Bridging Military bridging designed by British engineers 

Bangalore Explosive charge used for clearing barbed wire and detonating land mines 

BAR Browning automatic rifle 

Bazooka American shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher 

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 

BC Bomber Command (British) 




Belgian Gates 







BOLERO Combined Committee (London) 
BOLERO Combined Committee (Washington) 

Person who directed troop and equipment movements onto and off the 

British Expeditionary Forces 

Steel gates used either as barricades or underwater beach obstacles. 
Constructed of steel angles and plates on concrete rollers. Also known as 
Element "C" 

Bataillon de Legion Etrangere (Foreign Legion Battalion), French 
German offensive operations characterized by rapid-moving tank attacks 
supported by dive bombers, artillery, and mounted infantry 

Hedgerow country in Normandy characterized by small fields bounded by 
embankments overgrown with trees and shrubs 
Branch; British 

British Chiefs of Staff Committee 
BOLERO-SICKLE Combined Committee 
Buildup Control Organization 













Classes of Supply 





Corps d'Armee (Army Corps), French 

Chief Administrative Officer 

Civil Affairs Division 

Combined Air Transport Operations Room 



Combat Command A, B, and Reserve in a US Armored Division 
Combined Chiefs of Staff (US-British) 
Combined Civil Affairs Committee 
Commanding General 

A wood and wire matting laid on beaches wherever needed to provide 
footing for vehicles 

Chief of the Imperial General Staff (British) 
Commander in Chief 
Commander-in-Chief (British usage) 


Fuels & lubricants such as gasoline & coal 
Ammunition & Explosives 

All other supplies and equipment for which allowances may (Class II) or 
may not (Class IV) be established, as, for example, clothing, weapons, 
construction, and fortification materials 
Chief of Naval Operations 
Commanding Officer 


Co Company 

CofEngrs Chief of Engineers 

CofS Chief of Staff 

CofT Chief of Transportation 

Com Committee 

Combined Involving forces of more than one nation 

Comd Command 

Comdr Commander 

COMZ Communications Zone - that portion of a theater of operations behind the 

Combat Zone 

Conf Conference 

COS Com British Chiefs of Staff Committee 

COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate) 

CP Command Post 

CPS Combined Staff Planners 

CWS Chemical Warfare Service 

DB Division Blindee (Armored Division), French 

DCofS Deputy Chief of Staff 

DD Duplex Drive (land and water propulsion) and flotation system fitted on 

various vehicles - especially tanks - in amphibious landings 

D-Day Exact day for the beginning of an operation 

DFL Division Frangais Libre (Free French (Infantry) Division) 

DI Division d'Infanterie (Infantry Division), French 

DIA Division d'Infanterie Algerienne (Algerian Infantry Division), French 

DIA (27 th ) 27 th Division d'Infanterie Alpine (Alpine Infantry Division), French 

DIC Division d'Infanterie Coloniale (Colonial Infantry Division), French 

Dieppe Raid Amphibious assault by British and Canadian troops on the coast of France 

in August 1942 - repelled with heavy losses 

DIM Division d'Infanterie Marocaine (Moroccan Infantry Division), French 

Dir Directive; Director 

Div Division 

DMM Division Marocaine de Montagne (Moroccan Mountain Division), French 

DOD Department of Defense (US) 

DQMG(L) Deputy Quartermaster General (Liaison) (British) 

DSC Distinguished Service Cross 

Dtd Dated 

DUKW 2 Vi ton 6x6 Amphibian Truck ("Duck" in Army slang) 

Dumb Barge An unpowered barge that could be beached 

Dunkerque Seaport in northern France from which British and Allied forces were 

withdrawn in a last minute escape after defenses collapsed in the face of 
German attacks, May 1940 

DZ Drop zone for paratroopers and air-dropped supplies 

EACS European Allied Contact Section 

Ech Echelon 


EM Enlisted men 

Eng; Engr Engineer 

ETO European Theater of Operations 

ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, United States Army 

EUCOM European Command, successor to USFET 

Exec Executive; Executive Officer 

Ex O Executive Officer 

FA Field Artillery 

FAAA First Allied Airborne Army 

Falaise Gap Opening between US and British advances north and south of the town of 

Falaise (south of Caen) through which many German soldiers escaped in 
August 1944 

FCNL French Committee of National Liberation 

FECOMZ Forward Echelon, Communications Zone 

FFI Forces Frangaises de Vlnterieur (French Forces of the Interior), the 

'Maquis ' Resistance 

Fifth column Subversive organization working in a country for an invading army 

Flail Tank fitted with heavy chains on a revolving drum that beat the ground in 

front of the tank to clear mines 
FLAK Antiaircraft artillery fire or gun 

FO Field Order 

Fuhrungsgruppe (German) Operations Group 
Fiihrungsstab (German) Operations Staff 

Funnies Special armored assault teams developed under Major General Sir Percy 

Hobart that operated unusual vehicles such as flail tanks (also "Hobart's 

FUSA First US Army 

FUSAG 1 st US Army Group 

G-l ACofS for personnel - the staff office responsible for personnel matters 

(US & Combined Headquarters) 
G-2 ACofS for intelligence - the staff office responsible for intelligence on 

enemy operations and capabilities (US & Combined Headquarters) 
G-3 ACofS for operations - the staff office responsible for plans and operations 

(US & Combined Headquarters) 
G-4 ACofS for supply - The staff office responsible for logistics (US & 

Combined Headquarters) 
G-5 ACofS for civil affairs - the staff office responsible for civil affairs (US 

and Combined Headquarters) 
G-6 Short-lived division of SHAEF which dealt with public relations and 

psychological warfare 
Gen Bd Rpt General Board Report 

Gen. St. d. H. Generalstab des Heeres (General Staff of the German Army) 

GFRS Ground Force Replacement System 

GHQ General Headquarters 


GO General Order 

Gooseberry Harbor constructed of sunken ships used to shelter small craft 

Goum A Moroccan infantry company-sized unit (made up of Goumiers) 

Goumier Ethnic Berber Moroccan mountain infantryman 

Gp Group 

GPA General Purchasing Agent 

Grand Alliance World War II coalition of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet 

Green Books Works in the official history of the U.S. Army in World War II 

Grenadier Honorific for German infantry 

GTM Groupement de Tabors Marocains (Group of Moroccan Tabors). A GTM 
is roughly equivalent to a regiment. It comprises 3 Tabors (1 Tabor = 1 
Battalion) & each Tabor comprises 3 Goums (1 Goum = 1 Company) 

HE High Explosive 

Hedgehog Portable obstacle, made of three crossed angle irons 

Heeresgruppe (German) Army Group 

H-Hour Exact minute for the beginning of a military operation 

Hist Historical; Historian 

HQ; Hq Headquarters 

ID Infantry Division 

Incl Inclosure 

Ind Indorsement 

Inf Infantry 

Int; Intel Intelligence 

Interdiction Cutting an enemy's line of communication by firepower (including aerial 

bombardment) to impede enemy operations 

Interv Interview 

ISS Identification of Separate Shipments to Overseas Destinations 

Jabo German slang for Jagdbomber (fighter-bomber) 

Joint Including elements from more than one service. 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff; Leaders of all services meeting to resolve issues and 

make decisions affecting more than one service (US) 

Jedburgh Team Small, specially trained teams of Allied officers and men dropped behind 

enemy lines to aid resistance groups 

JIC Joint Intelligence Committee 

JPS Joint Staff Planners 

JSM Joint Staff Mission (British mission to Washington) 

Jt Joint 

Kampfgruppe German equivalent of task force; combat team 

KTB Kriegstagebuch (German war diary) 


LBV Landing Barge, which was capable of carrying either supplies or vehicles 

and could be beached 


Landing Craft, Infantry (Light) 


Landing Craft, Mechanized 


Landing Craft, Tank 


Landing Craft, Vehicle & Personnel 


Line of Departure 


Act passed March 1941 allowing President Roosevelt to sell, transfer til 

to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of equipment to any 

country on which US defense was thought to depend 

Liberty Ships 

Mass-produced US cargo vessels of approximately 10,000 tons which 

were designed for speedy construction early in the war and served as th 

work-horse in ocean shipping 



Lobnitz pierheads 

Huge steel structures towed to the Normandy beaches to provide the 

unloading facilities for LCTs, LSTs and coasters in the Mulberries 




Landing Ship, Dock 


Landing Ship, Tank 

Ltr of Instr 

Letter of Instructions 


German air force 

LVT (1) 

Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Unarmored (Mark I) "Alligator" 

Ml (Garand) 

US Semiautomatic infantry rifle 

M4 (Sherman) 

US Medium Tank 

M5 (Stuart) 

US Light Tank 


US Tank Destroyer with 3-inch gun 


"Weasel" tracked cargo carrier 


Guerilla fighter in the French resistance 


Machine gun 


Key naval battle between the US Pacific Fleet and Japan's Combined 

Fleet, 4 June 1942 

Mil Mission Moscow US Military Mission to Moscow 



(-) (Minus) 

Understrength, or with components detached 


Ministry of Information (British) 

Mov & Tn Br 

Movements & Transportation Branch 


Movement Control 


Main Supply Route 

MT Ship 

Liberty Ship converted for maximum vehicle-carrying purposes 


Motor Transport gasoline, 80-octane 


Motor Transport Brigade 




Motor Transport Service 


Artificial harbor built of sunken ships and concrete caissons, forming a 

breakwater within which floating docks were assembled 


NAAFI Navy Army Air Force Institute (British) 

NATO; NATOUSA North African Theater of Operations; North African Theater of 

Operations, US Army 

Naval Gruppe West German coastal artillery located in Normandy 

NCO Noncommissioned Officer 

Nebelwerfer German multiple rocket projector 

NOIC Naval Officer in Command 

NUSA Ninth US Army 

NYPOE New York Port of Embarkation 

OB Order of Battle— organization and composition of a military force 

Oberkommando (German) Headquarters of an army or higher military organization 

OB WEST Oberbefehlshaber West (Headquarters, Commander in Chief West 

[France, Belgium, and the Netherlands]), highest German ground 

headquarters of the western front 

OCofEngrs Office, Chief of Engineers 

OCofT Office, Chief of Transportation 

OCMH Office, Chief of Military History 

OKH Obercommando des Herres (German Army High Command) 

OKL Obercommando der Luftwaffe (German Air Force High Command) 

OKM Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (German Navy High Command) 

OKW Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces High Command) 

OP Observation Post 

OPD Operations Division, War Department 

Opn Operation 

OQMG Office of the Quartermaster General 

ORC Organized Reserve Corps 

Ord Ordnance 

OSS Office of Strategic Services, forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency 

Ost battalions Non-German volunteer troops from east-European countries 

OWI Office of War Information 

P&O Plans & Operations Division, War Department, successor to OPD 

Panzer Armor (German) 

Panzer Division German Armored Division 

Panzerfaust German handheld antitank rocket launcher 

Panzer grenadier German mechanized or semi-armored organization, or infantry soldiers 

within such an organization 

Panzergruppe West Control headquarters for armored forces established by the Germans in 

November 1943 to control those decisive forces in any large-scale 
counterattack against Allied landings along the Channel coast 

PC&R Gp Port Construction and Repair Group 

Pillbox Low-roofed concrete emplacement for machine gun or antitank gun 

Ping Planning 

(+) (Plus) Overstrength, or with attached units 


PLUTO From "pipeline under the ocean" - a cross-Channel underwater pipeline 

planned for bulk POL deliveries to the far shore 
PMS&T Professor of Military Science & Tactics 

POINTBLANK Allied long-range bombing program (Combined Bomber Offensive) from 

Britain against Germany 
POL Petroleum (gasoline or diesel fuel), Oil, and Lubricants 

POW Prisoner of War 

POZIT US proximity fuze for artillery and antiaircraft 

Prcht Parachute 

PRD Public Relations Division, SHAEF 

Prep Prepared; preparation 

PROCO Projects for Continental Operations, as system of requisitioning supplies 

and equipment for special operations 
PSO Principal Staff Officers 

PWE Political Warfare Executive 

PzD Panzer Division - German Armored Division 

Q(L) Quartermaster (Liaison) 

QM Quartermaster 

RA Regular Army 

RAF Royal Air Force (UK) 

RAP ROUNDUP Administrative Planners 

Rations~C, D, K C was a balanced meal in a can; D was a fortified chocolate bar; K was a 
box meal more nourishing and palatable than C rations 

RCA Regiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique (French Regiment of African Chasseurs 

(Light Cavalry)) 

RCP Regiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes (French Regiment of Parachute 

Chasseurs (Airborne Infantry in this case)) 
RCT Regimental Combat Team 

Rec Records 
Rgt Regiment 

Rhino ferry A barge constructed of bolted ponton units and propelled by an outboard 


RI Regiment d'Infanterie (French Infantry Regiment) 

RIC Regiment d'Infanterie Coloniale (French Colonial Infantry Regiment) 

RICM Regiment d'Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc (French Moroccan Colonial 

Infantry Regiment - the reconnaissance regiment of the 9 th DIC) 
RMLE Regiment de Marche de la Legion Etrangere (French Foreign Legion) 

RSAR Regiment de Spahis Algeriens de Reconnaissance (French Regiment of 

Algerian Reconnaissance Spahis) 
RSM Regiment de Spahis Marocains (French Regiment of Moroccan Spahis) 

RTA Regiment de Tirailleurs Algeriens (French Algerian Tirailleurs) 

RTM Regiment de Tirailleurs Marocains (French Moroccan Tirailleurs) 

RTO Rail Transportation Officer 

RTS Regiment de Tirailleurs Senegalais (French Senegalese Tirailleurs) 


RTT Regiment de Tirailleurs Tunisiens (French Tunisian Tirailleurs) 

51 Personnel and administrative staff officer, or adjutant, of a brigade or 

smaller unit 

52 Intelligence staff officer of a brigade or smaller unit 

53 Operations staff officer of a brigade or smaller unit 

54 Logistics staff officer of a brigade or smaller unit 
SAC Supreme Allied Commander 

SACMED Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater 

SCAEF Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force 

Second Front Invasion of Western Europe by Anglo-American forces to relieve the 

Eastern (first) Front 

SFHQ Special Force Headquarters 

SGS Secretary, General Staff 

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 

Sitrep Situation Report 

SO Special Operations 

SOE Special Operations Executive 

Sommerfeld track A matting made of wire netting reinforced with steel, used in the same 

manner as chespaling 

SOP Standard Operating Procedure 

SOS Services of Supply 

SP Self-propelled 

Spahi French colonial reconnaissance soldier 

SPOBS Special Observer Group 

55 Schutzstaffel (Elite Guard) Nazi unit originally created to serve as Hitler's 
bodyguard; later expanded to oversee intelligence and security and to 
provide large combat organizations (Waffen-SS) that fought alongside 
German Army formations 

Stf Staff 

SUP Single Unit Pack, a method of crating vehicles 

Svc Service 

T Towed 

Tabor Moroccan battalion- sized unit, comprising company-sized Goums, French 

Tac Tactical 

TAC Tactical Air Command 

Tactical Air Force Generic name for the Allied ground support air forces and air commands 

T/BA Tables of Basic Allowance 

TC Transportation Corps 

TCC Troop Carrier Command 

TD Tank Destroyer 

T/E Tables of Equipment 

Tel Telegram; teletype 

Teller Mine German land mine 

Tetrahedra Pyramid- shaped obstacles made of angle iron 




TO&E; T/O&E 
Todt Organization 



Task Force 

Literally, 'sharpshooter', French colonial infantryman 

Theater Intelligence Section 

Tables of Organization & Equipment 

German organization for military construction (e.g. the Atlantic Wall and 
West Wall defensive lines) 

Time On Target; a method of timing artillery fire from various points to 

fall on a given target simultaneously 

Twin Unit Pack, a method of crating vehicles 

Turn-Round Control 

Third US Army 

Teletype message 









German submarine 

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
US Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom 
US Army Forces in the British Isles 
US Army Northern Ireland Force 

US Forces in the European Theater, successor command to ETOUSA 
US Strategic Bombing Survey 
US Strategic Air Forces 



German Volks grenadier Division 
US proximity ("variable time") fuze 

German secret weapons planned as revenge for the bombing of Germany— 
the V-l "buzz bomb" was a primitive cruise missile; the V-2 was the first 
operational ballistic guided missile 

Wacht am Rhein 





"Watch on the Rhine"; German code name for 1944 Ardennes 
counteroffensive (Battle of the Bulge) 

Combat arm of the SS (Schutzstaffel, Elite Guard); Military formation of 
the Nazi Party, in effect a partial duplication of the German Army 
War Department 

German Armed Forces - land, sea, and air - not including the 


War Office 

War Plans Division, War Department, predecessor of OPD 


Code Names 

"The sudden attacks and seemingly overpowering 
array of six enemy divisions... should not be 
misinterpreted. The quality of the divisions 
involved, the piecemeal efforts to launch small- scale 

attacks, and the apparent lack of long-range 
objectives would seem to limit the enemy threat... 
the day's events cannot be regarded as a 
major long term threat. " 
12th Army Group I ntelligence Summary, 
16 December 1944 

'Allied Forces yesterday repulsed a number of 
local counter-attacks. " 

SHAEF Communique of 17 December 1944 


The agreements resulting from the Anglo-American military staff 

conversations held in Washington in January - March 1941 


Chindit stronghold near Manhton, Burma 


German plan for the defense of northern Italy 


Plan for the entry of a British force into the Azores, October 1943 


Code for US Sixth Army while operating as a special ground task 

force HQ directly under GHQ SWPA 


US 3d Infantry Division force for Operation DRAGOON, and 3d 

Infantry Division landing beaches in the Cavalaire-St. Tropez area 


Plan to defend Kunming and Chungking 


Plan for recapture of Burma 


Plan for the Allied invasion of southern France, finally executed as 

Operation DRAGOON in August 1944 


First of the major US-British staff conferences following US entry 

into the war, held in Washington, December 1941 -January 1942 


Yalta Conference, February 1945 


USSTAF air operations against German aircraft factories, Feb '44 


Invasion of Italy at Salerno 


Mission sent by SEAC to Washington and London in Feb '44 to 















Task force for operations on Cape Gloucester, New Britain 
German offensive against USSR, 1941 

Deception operations aimed at misleading Axis forces as to the 
actual date & location of the Allied landings on Sicily 
Plan for capture of Dakar (formerly BLACK and PICADOR) 
British invasion of Italy on Calabrian coast 

Plan for American air support of USSR in event of Japanese attack 
on Soviet Union. Also code name for US survey project of air 
facilities in Siberia 

Training exercise held in the Slapton Sands area in England in 
March 1944, employing elements of the VII Corps and simulating 
the later assault on UTAH beach 

Plan for breaking out of the Normandy lodgment by means of a 

combined airborne-amphibious attack on St. Malo 

Plan to open port on coast of China 

Special security category and procedure to protect the 


Christmas Island 

Plan for capture of Dakar (later PICADOR and BARRISTER) 
British XII Corps operation to clear enemy salient between the 
Meuse and Roer-Wurm Rivers from Roermond southward 
Chindit roadblock on railroad near Namkwin, Burma 

Canadian II Corps offensive in Calcar-Udem-Xanten area 

































Allied deception plans designed to cloak the timing and location of 
OVERLORD while drawing German attention to the Pas de Calais 
Buildup of US troops and supplies in the United Kingdom in 
preparation for the cross-Channel invasion 
Cruciform structures designed for mooring off the Normandy 
beaches to provide floating breakwaters in deep water 
Dropping of small fuze incendiaries to European workers for use in 
sabotage operations 

Cover name for General Marshall during Casablanca Conference 

Operations against the island of Elba 

Operations in the Admiralties 

Plan for capture of Sardinia. Cancelled 

Drop site for Chindits, about 50 miles northwest of Indaw, Burma 
Plan for amphibious operation in Andaman Islands. Cancelled 
VI US Corps breakout from Anzio beachhead, May 1944 
Plan for operation against Arakan (Burma) coast 
British operation against toe of Italy 

US 36 th Infantry Division force for Operation DRAGOON, and 
36 th Infantry Division landing beaches in the Frejus-St. Raphael 

Unsuccessful British offensive against Akyab (Burma) in 1943 
Attack across the Chindwin River to Mandalay 
Revised BETA 

Project to drop supplies and agents to the French resistance 
Converging drives on Rabaul by S. Pacific and SWPA forces 
US 95 th Infantry Division diversionary action during operations 
against Metz 

Operations against Eniwetok and Ujelang Atolls, Marshall Islands 
Operations against Formosa 
Late 1943 plan for general offensive in Burma 
CHOO AEAF operations against enemy train movements in France 
and Germany 

British operation to seize Caen, launched 8 July 1944 

Plan for the construction of an artificial harbor in the Quiberon 

Bay area on the southern coast of Brittany 

Advanced air drop on Sicily by 2 SAS to disrupt communications, 
12 July 1943 

Invasion of Russell Islands 

British XXX Corps offensive to reduce Geilenkirchen salient 
First US Army operation to break out of the Normandy lodgment, 
launched 25 July 1944 

Diversionary operations in 1943 to pin down German forces in the 

British plan, not carried out, for an air drop on 7 September 1944 
in the Arnhem-Nijmegen area 

















Conquest of Pantelleria 

Blockships deliberately sunk off the Normandy beaches to form 
partial breakwaters known as Gooseberries, to shelter small craft 
Invasion of Kiska, 1943 
Malta portion of ARGONAUT conference 
A general term used by the Allies to refer to the German long- 
range weapons program and to Allied countermeasures against it 
Planned small scale operation on Arakan coast, Burma. Cancelled 
Plan for assault on Sumatra 
Task force for Noemfoor 

US 45 th Infantry Division force for Operation DRAGOON, and 

45 th Infantry Division landing beaches in the Ste. Maxime area 

Operations against Cape Gloucester, New Britain 

Allied spring offensive and advance on Rome, May- June 1944 

Task force for invasion of Arawe, New Britain 

Mission of US observers to Chinese communists 

Plan for attack on Rangoon, 1944 

The Allied invasion of southern France in August 1944. Name 
changed from ANVIL due to concern that the name had been 

First in the series of training exercises held in the Slapton Sands 
area in England, during January-February 1944, to test all aspects 
of amphibious operations, including mounting, assault, and logistic 
support. Involved mainly elements of the V Corps simulating the 
later assault on OMAHA beach 









Name given in November 1944 to posthostilities plans for 

Plan for seizure of New Britain, New Guinea, and New Ireland 

Task force of GALAHAD survivors used in drive on Myitkyina, 

Strategic level German radio communication encryption system 
Tehran conference, November - December 1943, where Western 
allies agreed to Stalin's appeal for a Channel crossing to open the 
'second front' in the spring of 1944 

A series of final rehearsals for the cross-Channel operation, 
involving the US V Corps and British forces, April-May 1944 
Fiji Islands 

Invasion of Corsica, 1943 

February 1944 German counteroffensive against VI US Corps in 
Anzio beachhead 

Air operation to disrupt flow of German air transports from Italy to 
Sicily and Tunisia 






Operations in the Marshall Islands 
Operations in the Marianas 

Allied deception operations designed to convince the Germans of 
an invasion of Western Europe in the Pas de Calais area 
Planning group located in Algiers (July 1942) 
Last major training exercises conducted by V Corps, March 1944 
Allied shuttle bombing of Axis-controlled Europe from bases in 
UK, Italy, and USSR 

Occupation of four islands in Lake Comacchio, Italy 

British airborne landing at Primasole Bridge, Sicily, 13-14 July 
















American long range penetration groups (Burma) 

Operations in Gilbert Islands 


Invasion of Italy at Cotrone. Cancelled 

Normandy beach assaulted by British 30 Corps, 6 June 1944 

Movement of Canadian I Corps from Italy to ETO 

British attack to break out of the Normandy lodgment in late July 

1944, coinciding with US Operation COBRA 

Partial breakwaters formed off the Normandy beaches by the 

sinking of blockships known as Corncobs, to shelter small craft 

Plan for operations in POA in 1944 

Plan for capture and occupation of the Azores 

One of the special OVERLORD supply procedures designed to 

expedite the delivery of ammunition and engineer fortification 

material in lieu of scheduled shipment of other supplies in the first 

phases of the cross-Channel operation 

German deception operation in support of the Ardennes 

counteroffensive, 1944 

21 Army Group large-scale offensive from the Roer to the Rhine 
Ninth Army supporting attack for Operation VERITABLE 
1941 plan for invasion of North Africa 

Artificial landing fields made of reinforced ice 

Halvetrson Project - bombing detachment for China-Burma- India 

Plan for breaking out of the Normandy lodgment by means of a 

combined airborne-amphibious attack on Quiberon Bay 

Aid to Turkey, Phase II 

British exercise in September 1943 to establish marshaling and 
embarkation procedures for a cross-Channel operation 
German plan to invade Malta. Cancelled 
Canton Island 

Assault force for Biak, New Guinea 
Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 

















Invasion of the Ryukyu Islands 

Japanese operation to take US air bases in east China 

Plan for First French Army attack against German garrisons on 

French coasts, December 1944 

Plan for movement of troops to Iceland 

Rehearsal for Morotai operation 

Normandy beach assaulted by Canadian 3d Division, 6 June 1944 
Plan for operations in northern Norway 

Glider landing at Syracuse, 9 July 1943 

Operation to clear area between Reno and southwest shore of Lake 
Comacchio, Italy 

British offensive operations in Libyan Desert, launched from El 
Alamein, October 1942 

Planned airborne drop at Tournai, Belgium, September 1944 
Planned airborne drop at Aachen-Maastricht Gap, September 1944 
XVIII Airborne Corps phase line near Wesel, Germany 
21 Army Group plan calling for an eastward drive and the capture 
of the Seine ports as an alternative to plans for the earlier capture 
of Brittany, considered by planning staffs in May and June 1944 

Plan that superseded RAINBOW-5 after US entry into the war, 

providing for the shipment of American forces to Northern Ireland 

Yalta portion of ARGONAUT Conference 

Capture of Singapore, 1945 

Air offensive against Po River bridges, Italy 

British occupation of southern Greece 

Airborne & armored operation intended to establish a bridgehead 
across the Rhine in the Netherlands, September 1944. Operation 
MARKET involved seizure of bridges in the Nijmegen-Arnhem 
area, and Operation GARDEN was to open a corridor from 
Eindhoven northward toward Germany 
US task force (5332d Brigade (Provisional)), CBI 
Plan for operating B29s from Cheng-tu against Japan 
Manus Island 

Task force for seizure of Saidor, New Guinea 

Project to build up stocks in the Far East in preparation for the 

entry of the USSR into the war against Japan 

Deception operations aimed at misleading Axis forces as to the 

actual date & location of the Allied landings on Sicily 

Party sent to London to present Marshall Memorandum, April 


The artificial harbors constructed off the Normandy beaches 
Projected landing on heel of Italy near Taranto, 1943 



Northern Island 


Commando raid on a lighthouse near the main Sicily landings, 10 

July 1943 


Operation to transport assault troops and equipment across the 

Channel to Normandy 


Plan for occupation of Channel Islands in case of German collapse 

or surrender 


American long-range penetration groups (Burma) 


XVIII Airborne Corps phase line in Ringenberg-Krudenberg area, 



Term used by the air forces in referring to target sites in their 

attacks on long-range weapons 


German counterattack in Alsace, January 1945 


Second Quebec Conference, September 1944 


Attack on Gothic Line, Italy 


Plan for March 1946 invasion of Kyushu, Japan 


Normandy beach assaulted by US V Corps, 6 June 1944 


Prewar plan of operations in event of war with Japan 


The invasion of northwest Europe in the spring of 1944 


British 10 Corps drive across the Garigliano River, Italy 


XVIII Airborne Corps phase line west of Erie, Germany 


Assault force for Aitape operations, New Guinea 


Concrete caissons towed across the English Channel and sunk to 

form the main breakwaters for the artificial harbors 


Plan for capture of Dakar (formerly BLACK, later BARRISTER) 


Drop site for Chindits, Burma 


Limited operation on south Mayu Peninsula. Cancelled 

PLOUGH, PLOUGH FORCE Project for training US and Canadian volunteers for snow 

operations in northern Norway 


Montgomery's northern crossing of the Rhine, March 1945 


The Combined Bomber Offensive from Britain against Germany 


Post-HUSKY Mediterranean operations 


Occupation of Buna area, New Guinea, 1942. Cancelled 


Attack on Mareth Line, Tunisia, 1943 


The first Quebec Conference, August 1943 


12 th Army Group operation on Roer Plain between Wurm and Roer 



Various plans prepared between 1939 and 1941 to meet Axis 

aggression involving more than one enemy 


US military plan designed to implement that portion of ABC-1 

which applied to the UK in the event of US entry into the war 























Assault on Camino hill mass, Italy 

Plans for return to the Continent in the event of deterioration of the 

German position 

Revised CARBONADO plan 

IV Corps plan for recapture of northern Burma 

Assault force for Hollandia operation 

Radio circuits set up in September 1944 for messages to and from 
the Supreme Commander 

SWPA plans for operations in the Biskmarck Archipelago, along 
northern coast of New Guinea and thence to Mindanao, P.I. 
Plan for reversing BOLERO and transferring US forces, supplies, 
and logistic structure from the United Kingdom to the Continent 
Japanese air operation to augment Rabaul air forces and delay 
Allied offensives 

Operation to clear Comacchio Spit, Italy 

Capture of Phuket Island, off Kra Isthmus, Burma 

French commando force landing at Cap Negre during Operation 


Arakan part of CAPITAL plan 

Operation to fly Chinese 22d Division to Chihchiang 

Ruhr pocket, April 1945 


French naval force landing southwest of Cannes, Operation 

Original codename for OVERLORD. Cross Channel operation 
intermediate in size between SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP 
Various 1941-43 Anglo-American plans for a cross-Channel attack 
Airborne force dropped to rear of southern France assault beaches 
in Operation DRAGOON 

Plan for US II Corps operation against Sfax, Tunisia. Cancelled 
Establishment of British forces in Turkey prior to Turkey's entry 
into the war 

Limited offensive to reopen land route from Burma to China 

Planned German invasion of UK. Cancelled 

The Cairo Conference of November 1943 

Supreme Commander's advance command post at Portsmouth, 

May 1944 

SHAEF advance headquarters at Tournieres 
Amphibious operation at Anzio, Italy 

Enlarged SHAEF forward headquarters near Portsmouth, replacing 

Japanese plan to counterattack US forces in western Pacific 
Name which in 1943 was given to the US air force buildup in the 
United Kingdom to distinguish it from the ground and service 
force buildup, known as BOLERO 
















Force taking islands of Levant and Port Cros, Operation 

Airborne drop at Taranto, Italy 

Plan for a limited-objective attack across the Channel in 1942, 
designed either to take advantage of a German collapse or as a 
sacrifice operation to aid the Soviets 
Early code name for TIDAL WAVE 
New Zealand 

Canadian attack, July 1944, coinciding with Operation COBRA 

Threat directed in 1943 against the Pas de Calais 

Invasion of the Palaus 

Early code name for TIDAL WAVE 

Air operations to destroy German rail, road, and sea 

communications south of the Pisa- Rimini line, March-May 1944 


British 30 Corps breakout, Egypt, 1942 

Revised plan of assault on Mereth Line, March 1943 

Plan for Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa, 

combining US and British plans and often used interchangeably 


Normandy beach assaulted by troops of British 3d Division, 6 June 

Plan for a combined airborne-amphibious operation to seize the 
area east of Brest, August 1944 
Casablanca Conference, January 1943 













Early name for posthostilities plans for Germany 

Akyab part of CAPITAL plan 

India-based portion of general offensive in Burma 

Task force in Aitape area, New Guinea 

Potsdam Conference, July 1945 

Offensive in Metz area 

Low-level heavy bomber attack on Ploesti, Romania, 1943 

The final rehearsal for the UTAH Beach assault by units of the VII 


Threat directed against Norway in 1943 
Second phase of ICHIGO operation 

A flexible 6-inch underwater pipeline designed to discharge POL 

tankers anchored offshore at Ste. Honorine-des-Pertes 

Signal for release of press information on D-Day in Normandy 

The Allied invasion operation in North Africa, November 1942 

Airborne assault on Mandalay 

Assault force for Wakde-Sarmi area, New Guinea 

Post-COBRA attack in France 

Post-COBRA attack in France 

Force for Morotai 



Plan for airborne operation to capture and control important road 

nets in Paris-Orleans area, 16-17 August 1944 


Washington Conference, May 1943 


First outline plan for operations directed at the capture of Rabaul 


Plan to base B-29s in CBI 


Task force for Sansapor-Mar operation, New Guinea 


British operation to intercept and decrypt German radio 

communications {ENIGMA) 


Seventh Army operation to breach the West Wall and establish a 

bridgehead over the Rhine in the Worms area, March - April 1945 


Normandy beach assaulted by US VII Corps, 6 June 1944 


FAAA operation in support of Operation PLUNDER 


21 Army Group plan for a Canadian attack between the Maas and 

the Rhine, January — February 1945 


Panay and Negros Occidental operation 


Cebu, Bohol, and Negros Oriental operation 


US Eighth Army operations against Palawan 


US Eighth Army operations against Sulu Archipelago and 

Zamboanga area of Mindanao 


US Eighth Army operations against western Mindanao 


Final ground offensive to clear Tunisia, 1943 

Wacht am Rhein 

"Watch on the Rhine"; German 1944 Ardennes counteroffensive 

(Battle of the Bulge) 


Threat directed against the Cotentin Peninsula in 1943 


Rehearsal for SHINGLE 


Flexible steel roadway, made of bridge spans and resting on 

pontons, forming the piers for the artificial harbors 


Noumea, New Caledonia 


SHAEF headquarters at Bushy Park, near London 




All US organizations working with Y-Force, CBI 


US-sponsored Chinese divisions in east China 


Plan for assault on Malaya, 1945